/*
 * ***** BEGIN LICENSE BLOCK *****
 * Version: MPL 1.1/GPL 2.0/LGPL 2.1
 *
 * The contents of this file are subject to the Mozilla Public License Version
 * 1.1 (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
 * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
 * http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/
 *
 * Software distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" basis,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License
 * for the specific language governing rights and limitations under the
 * License.
 *
 * The Original Code is the Elliptic Curve Cryptography library.
 *
 * The Initial Developer of the Original Code is
 * Sun Microsystems, Inc.
 * Portions created by the Initial Developer are Copyright (C) 2003
 * the Initial Developer. All Rights Reserved.
 *
 * Contributor(s):
 *   Dr Vipul Gupta <vipul.gupta@sun.com> and
 *   Douglas Stebila <douglas@stebila.ca>, Sun Microsystems Laboratories
 *
 * Alternatively, the contents of this file may be used under the terms of
 * either the GNU General Public License Version 2 or later (the "GPL"), or
 * the GNU Lesser General Public License Version 2.1 or later (the "LGPL"),
 * in which case the provisions of the GPL or the LGPL are applicable instead
 * of those above. If you wish to allow use of your version of this file only
 * under the terms of either the GPL or the LGPL, and not to allow others to
 * use your version of this file under the terms of the MPL, indicate your
 * decision by deleting the provisions above and replace them with the notice
 * and other provisions required by the GPL or the LGPL. If you do not delete
 * the provisions above, a recipient may use your version of this file under
 * the terms of any one of the MPL, the GPL or the LGPL.
 *
 * ***** END LICENSE BLOCK ***** */

#ifdef FREEBL_NO_DEPEND
#include "stubs.h"
#endif


#include "blapi.h"
#include "prerr.h"
#include "secerr.h"
#include "secmpi.h"
#include "secitem.h"
#include "mplogic.h"
#include "ec.h"
#include "ecl.h"

#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC

/* 
 * Returns true if pointP is the point at infinity, false otherwise
 */
PRBool
ec_point_at_infinity(SECItem *pointP)
{
    unsigned int i;

    for (i = 1; i < pointP->len; i++) {
	if (pointP->data[i] != 0x00) return PR_FALSE;
    }

    return PR_TRUE;
}

/* 
 * Computes scalar point multiplication pointQ = k1 * G + k2 * pointP for
 * the curve whose parameters are encoded in params with base point G.
 */
SECStatus 
ec_points_mul(const ECParams *params, const mp_int *k1, const mp_int *k2,
             const SECItem *pointP, SECItem *pointQ)
{
    mp_int Px, Py, Qx, Qy;
    mp_int Gx, Gy, order, irreducible, a, b;
#if 0 /* currently don't support non-named curves */
    unsigned int irr_arr[5];
#endif
    ECGroup *group = NULL;
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    int len;

#if EC_DEBUG
    int i;
    char mpstr[256];

    printf("ec_points_mul: params [len=%d]:", params->DEREncoding.len);
    for (i = 0; i < params->DEREncoding.len; i++) 
	    printf("%02x:", params->DEREncoding.data[i]);
    printf("\n");

	if (k1 != NULL) {
		mp_tohex(k1, mpstr);
		printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s\n", mpstr);
		mp_todecimal(k1, mpstr);
		printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
	}

	if (k2 != NULL) {
		mp_tohex(k2, mpstr);
		printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s\n", mpstr);
		mp_todecimal(k2, mpstr);
		printf("ec_points_mul: scalar k2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
	}

	if (pointP != NULL) {
		printf("ec_points_mul: pointP [len=%d]:", pointP->len);
		for (i = 0; i < pointP->len; i++) 
			printf("%02x:", pointP->data[i]);
		printf("\n");
	}
#endif

	/* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
	len = (params->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
	if (pointP != NULL) {
		if ((pointP->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) ||
			(pointP->len != (2 * len + 1))) {
			PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
			return SECFailure;
		};
	}

	MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&Qx) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&Qy) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&Gx) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&Gy) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&order) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&irreducible) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&a) = 0;
	MP_DIGITS(&b) = 0;
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Px) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Py) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Qx) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Qy) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Gx) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Gy) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&order) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&irreducible) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&a) );
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&b) );

	if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
		/* Initialize Px and Py */
		CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, pointP->data + 1, (mp_size) len) );
		CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, pointP->data + 1 + len, (mp_size) len) );
	}

	/* construct from named params, if possible */
	if (params->name != ECCurve_noName) {
		group = ECGroup_fromName(params->name);
	}

#if 0 /* currently don't support non-named curves */
	if (group == NULL) {
		/* Set up mp_ints containing the curve coefficients */
		CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Gx, params->base.data + 1, 
										  (mp_size) len) );
		CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Gy, params->base.data + 1 + len, 
										  (mp_size) len) );
		SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->order, &order );
		SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->curve.a, &a );
		SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->curve.b, &b );
		if (params->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp) {
			SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->fieldID.u.prime, &irreducible );
			group = ECGroup_consGFp(&irreducible, &a, &b, &Gx, &Gy, &order, params->cofactor);
		} else {
			SECITEM_TO_MPINT( params->fieldID.u.poly, &irreducible );
			irr_arr[0] = params->fieldID.size;
			irr_arr[1] = params->fieldID.k1;
			irr_arr[2] = params->fieldID.k2;
			irr_arr[3] = params->fieldID.k3;
			irr_arr[4] = 0;
			group = ECGroup_consGF2m(&irreducible, irr_arr, &a, &b, &Gx, &Gy, &order, params->cofactor);
		}
	}
#endif
	if (group == NULL)
		goto cleanup;

	if ((k2 != NULL) && (pointP != NULL)) {
		CHECK_MPI_OK( ECPoints_mul(group, k1, k2, &Px, &Py, &Qx, &Qy) );
	} else {
		CHECK_MPI_OK( ECPoints_mul(group, k1, NULL, NULL, NULL, &Qx, &Qy) );
    }

    /* Construct the SECItem representation of point Q */
    pointQ->data[0] = EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED;
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qx, pointQ->data + 1,
	                              (mp_size) len) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&Qy, pointQ->data + 1 + len,
	                              (mp_size) len) );

    rv = SECSuccess;

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ec_points_mul: pointQ [len=%d]:", pointQ->len);
    for (i = 0; i < pointQ->len; i++) 
	    printf("%02x:", pointQ->data[i]);
    printf("\n");
#endif

cleanup:
    ECGroup_free(group);
    mp_clear(&Px);
    mp_clear(&Py);
    mp_clear(&Qx);
    mp_clear(&Qy);
    mp_clear(&Gx);
    mp_clear(&Gy);
    mp_clear(&order);
    mp_clear(&irreducible);
    mp_clear(&a);
    mp_clear(&b);
    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }

    return rv;
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
 * value and the public key is the result of performing a scalar 
 * point multiplication of that value with the curve's base point.
 */
SECStatus 
ec_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey, 
    const unsigned char *privKeyBytes, int privKeyLen)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    PRArenaPool *arena;
    ECPrivateKey *key;
    mp_int k;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    int len;

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ec_NewKey called\n");
#endif
    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;

    if (!ecParams || !privKey || !privKeyBytes || (privKeyLen < 0)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    /* Initialize an arena for the EC key. */
    if (!(arena = PORT_NewArena(NSS_FREEBL_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE)))
	return SECFailure;

    key = (ECPrivateKey *)PORT_ArenaZAlloc(arena, sizeof(ECPrivateKey));
    if (!key) {
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    /* Set the version number (SEC 1 section C.4 says it should be 1) */
    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->version, 1);
    key->version.data[0] = 1;

    /* Copy all of the fields from the ECParams argument to the
     * ECParams structure within the private key.
     */
    key->ecParams.arena = arena;
    key->ecParams.type = ecParams->type;
    key->ecParams.fieldID.size = ecParams->fieldID.size;
    key->ecParams.fieldID.type = ecParams->fieldID.type;
    if (ecParams->fieldID.type == ec_field_GFp) {
	CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.prime,
	    &ecParams->fieldID.u.prime));
    } else {
	CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.fieldID.u.poly,
	    &ecParams->fieldID.u.poly));
    }
    key->ecParams.fieldID.k1 = ecParams->fieldID.k1;
    key->ecParams.fieldID.k2 = ecParams->fieldID.k2;
    key->ecParams.fieldID.k3 = ecParams->fieldID.k3;
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.a,
	&ecParams->curve.a));
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.b,
	&ecParams->curve.b));
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curve.seed,
	&ecParams->curve.seed));
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.base,
	&ecParams->base));
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.order,
	&ecParams->order));
    key->ecParams.cofactor = ecParams->cofactor;
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.DEREncoding,
	&ecParams->DEREncoding));
    key->ecParams.name = ecParams->name;
    CHECK_SEC_OK(SECITEM_CopyItem(arena, &key->ecParams.curveOID,
	&ecParams->curveOID));

    len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->publicValue, 2*len + 1);
    len = ecParams->order.len;
    SECITEM_AllocItem(arena, &key->privateValue, len);

    /* Copy private key */
    if (privKeyLen >= len) {
	memcpy(key->privateValue.data, privKeyBytes, len);
    } else {
	memset(key->privateValue.data, 0, (len - privKeyLen));
	memcpy(key->privateValue.data + (len - privKeyLen), privKeyBytes, privKeyLen);
    }

    /* Compute corresponding public key */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, key->privateValue.data, 
	(mp_size) len) );

    rv = ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &(key->publicValue));
    if (rv != SECSuccess) goto cleanup;
    *privKey = key;

cleanup:
    mp_clear(&k);
    if (rv)
	PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_TRUE);

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ec_NewKey returning %s\n", 
	(rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

    return rv;

}

/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a supplied
 * random value (in seed) and the public key is the result of 
 * performing a scalar point multiplication of that value with 
 * the curve's base point.
 */
SECStatus 
EC_NewKeyFromSeed(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey, 
    const unsigned char *seed, int seedlen)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    rv = ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, seed, seedlen);
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
    return rv;
}

#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
/* Generate a random private key using the algorithm A.4.1 of ANSI X9.62,
 * modified a la FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1 to eliminate the bias in the
 * random number generator.
 *
 * Parameters
 * - order: a buffer that holds the curve's group order
 * - len: the length in octets of the order buffer
 *
 * Return Value
 * Returns a buffer of len octets that holds the private key. The caller
 * is responsible for freeing the buffer with PORT_ZFree.
 */
static unsigned char *
ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(const unsigned char *order, int len)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
    mp_err err;
    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;
    mp_int privKeyVal, order_1, one;

    MP_DIGITS(&privKeyVal) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&order_1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&one) = 0;
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&privKeyVal) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&order_1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&one) );

    /* Generates 2*len random bytes using the global random bit generator
     * (which implements Algorithm 1 of FIPS 186-2 Change Notice 1) then
     * reduces modulo the group order.
     */
    if ((privKeyBytes = PORT_Alloc(2*len)) == NULL) goto cleanup;
    CHECK_SEC_OK( RNG_GenerateGlobalRandomBytes(privKeyBytes, 2*len) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, 2*len) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&order_1, order, len) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_set_int(&one, 1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_sub(&order_1, &one, &order_1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&privKeyVal, &order_1, &privKeyVal) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&privKeyVal, &one, &privKeyVal) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&privKeyVal, privKeyBytes, len) );
    memset(privKeyBytes+len, 0, len);
cleanup:
    mp_clear(&privKeyVal);
    mp_clear(&order_1);
    mp_clear(&one);
    if (err < MP_OKAY) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }
    if (rv != SECSuccess && privKeyBytes) {
	PORT_Free(privKeyBytes);
	privKeyBytes = NULL;
    }
    return privKeyBytes;
}
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

/* Generates a new EC key pair. The private key is a random value and
 * the public key is the result of performing a scalar point multiplication
 * of that value with the curve's base point.
 */
SECStatus 
EC_NewKey(ECParams *ecParams, ECPrivateKey **privKey)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    int len;
    unsigned char *privKeyBytes = NULL;

    if (!ecParams) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    len = ecParams->order.len;
    privKeyBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(ecParams->order.data, len);
    if (privKeyBytes == NULL) goto cleanup;
    /* generate public key */
    CHECK_SEC_OK( ec_NewKey(ecParams, privKey, privKeyBytes, len) );

cleanup:
    if (privKeyBytes) {
	PORT_ZFree(privKeyBytes, len);
    }
#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("EC_NewKey returning %s\n", 
	(rv == SECSuccess) ? "success" : "failure");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
    
    return rv;
}

/* Validates an EC public key as described in Section 5.2.2 of
 * X9.62. The ECDH primitive when used without the cofactor does
 * not address small subgroup attacks, which may occur when the
 * public key is not valid. These attacks can be prevented by 
 * validating the public key before using ECDH.
 */
SECStatus 
EC_ValidatePublicKey(ECParams *ecParams, SECItem *publicValue)
{
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    mp_int Px, Py;
    ECGroup *group = NULL;
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    int len;

    if (!ecParams || !publicValue) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }
	
    /* NOTE: We only support uncompressed points for now */
    len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
    if (publicValue->data[0] != EC_POINT_FORM_UNCOMPRESSED) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_EC_POINT_FORM);
	return SECFailure;
    } else if (publicValue->len != (2 * len + 1)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    MP_DIGITS(&Px) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&Py) = 0;
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Px) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&Py) );

    /* Initialize Px and Py */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Px, publicValue->data + 1, (mp_size) len) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&Py, publicValue->data + 1 + len, (mp_size) len) );

    /* construct from named params */
    group = ECGroup_fromName(ecParams->name);
    if (group == NULL) {
	/*
	 * ECGroup_fromName fails if ecParams->name is not a valid
	 * ECCurveName value, or if we run out of memory, or perhaps
	 * for other reasons.  Unfortunately if ecParams->name is a
	 * valid ECCurveName value, we don't know what the right error
	 * code should be because ECGroup_fromName doesn't return an
	 * error code to the caller.  Set err to MP_UNDEF because
	 * that's what ECGroup_fromName uses internally.
	 */
	if ((ecParams->name <= ECCurve_noName) ||
	    (ecParams->name >= ECCurve_pastLastCurve)) {
	    err = MP_BADARG;
	} else {
	    err = MP_UNDEF;
	}
	goto cleanup;
    }

    /* validate public point */
    if ((err = ECPoint_validate(group, &Px, &Py)) < MP_YES) {
	if (err == MP_NO) {
	    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
	    rv = SECFailure;
	    err = MP_OKAY;  /* don't change the error code */
	}
	goto cleanup;
    }

    rv = SECSuccess;

cleanup:
    ECGroup_free(group);
    mp_clear(&Px);
    mp_clear(&Py);
    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }
    return rv;
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
    return SECFailure;
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */
}

/* 
** Performs an ECDH key derivation by computing the scalar point
** multiplication of privateValue and publicValue (with or without the
** cofactor) and returns the x-coordinate of the resulting elliptic
** curve point in derived secret.  If successful, derivedSecret->data
** is set to the address of the newly allocated buffer containing the
** derived secret, and derivedSecret->len is the size of the secret
** produced. It is the caller's responsibility to free the allocated
** buffer containing the derived secret.
*/
SECStatus 
ECDH_Derive(SECItem  *publicValue, 
            ECParams *ecParams,
            SECItem  *privateValue,
            PRBool    withCofactor,
            SECItem  *derivedSecret)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    unsigned int len = 0;
    SECItem pointQ = {siBuffer, NULL, 0};
    mp_int k; /* to hold the private value */
    mp_int cofactor;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
#if EC_DEBUG
    int i;
#endif

    if (!publicValue || !ecParams || !privateValue || 
	!derivedSecret) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
    memset(derivedSecret, 0, sizeof *derivedSecret);
    len = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;  
    pointQ.len = 2*len + 1;
    if ((pointQ.data = PORT_Alloc(2*len + 1)) == NULL) goto cleanup;

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, privateValue->data, 
	                                  (mp_size) privateValue->len) );

    if (withCofactor && (ecParams->cofactor != 1)) {
	    /* multiply k with the cofactor */
	    MP_DIGITS(&cofactor) = 0;
	    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&cofactor) );
	    mp_set(&cofactor, ecParams->cofactor);
	    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mul(&k, &cofactor, &k) );
    }

    /* Multiply our private key and peer's public point */
    if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, NULL, &k, publicValue, &pointQ) != SECSuccess)
	goto cleanup;
    if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointQ)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);  /* XXX better error code? */
	goto cleanup;
    }

    /* Allocate memory for the derived secret and copy
     * the x co-ordinate of pointQ into it.
     */
    SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, derivedSecret, len);
    memcpy(derivedSecret->data, pointQ.data + 1, len);

    rv = SECSuccess;

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("derived_secret:\n");
    for (i = 0; i < derivedSecret->len; i++) 
	printf("%02x:", derivedSecret->data[i]);
    printf("\n");
#endif

cleanup:
    mp_clear(&k);

    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
    }

    if (pointQ.data) {
	PORT_ZFree(pointQ.data, 2*len + 1);
    }
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

    return rv;
}

/* Computes the ECDSA signature (a concatenation of two values r and s)
 * on the digest using the given key and the random value kb (used in
 * computing s).
 */
SECStatus 
ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, 
    const SECItem *digest, const unsigned char *kb, const int kblen)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    mp_int x1;
    mp_int d, k;     /* private key, random integer */
    mp_int r, s;     /* tuple (r, s) is the signature */
    mp_int n;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
    SECItem kGpoint = { siBuffer, NULL, 0};
    int flen = 0;    /* length in bytes of the field size */
    unsigned olen;   /* length in bytes of the base point order */
    unsigned obits;  /* length in bits  of the base point order */

#if EC_DEBUG
    char mpstr[256];
#endif

    /* Initialize MPI integers. */
    /* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
    MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&d) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&k) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&r) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&s) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&n) = 0;

    /* Check args */
    if (!key || !signature || !digest || !kb || (kblen < 0)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	goto cleanup;
    }

    ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
    flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;
    olen = ecParams->order.len;  
    if (signature->data == NULL) {
	/* a call to get the signature length only */
	goto finish;
    }
    if (signature->len < 2*olen) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_OUTPUT_LEN);
	goto cleanup;
    }


    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&x1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&d) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&k) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&r) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&s) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n) );

    SECITEM_TO_MPINT( ecParams->order, &n );
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT( key->privateValue, &d );

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&k, kb, kblen) );
    /* Make sure k is in the interval [1, n-1] */
    if ((mp_cmp_z(&k) <= 0) || (mp_cmp(&k, &n) >= 0)) {
#if EC_DEBUG
        printf("k is outside [1, n-1]\n");
        mp_tohex(&k, mpstr);
	printf("k : %s \n", mpstr);
        mp_tohex(&n, mpstr);
	printf("n : %s \n", mpstr);
#endif
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
	goto cleanup;
    }

    /*
    ** We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
    ** so we compute k*G using an equivalent scalar of fixed
    ** bit-length.
    ** Fix based on patch for ECDSA timing attack in the paper
    ** by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri at
    **   http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232
    **
    ** How do we convert k to a value of a fixed bit-length?
    ** k starts off as an integer satisfying 0 <= k < n.  Hence,
    ** n <= k+n < 2n, which means k+n has either the same number
    ** of bits as n or one more bit than n.  If k+n has the same
    ** number of bits as n, the second addition ensures that the
    ** final value has exactly one more bit than n.  Thus, we
    ** always end up with a value that exactly one more bit than n.
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&k, &n, &k) );
    if (mpl_significant_bits(&k) <= mpl_significant_bits(&n)) {
	CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_add(&k, &n, &k) );
    }

    /* 
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.2, Step 2
    **
    ** Compute kG
    */
    kGpoint.len = 2*flen + 1;
    kGpoint.data = PORT_Alloc(2*flen + 1);
    if ((kGpoint.data == NULL) ||
	(ec_points_mul(ecParams, &k, NULL, NULL, &kGpoint)
	    != SECSuccess))
	goto cleanup;

    /* 
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 1
    **
    ** Extract the x co-ordinate of kG into x1
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, kGpoint.data + 1, 
	                                  (mp_size) flen) );

    /* 
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 2
    **
    ** r = x1 mod n  NOTE: n is the order of the curve
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&x1, &n, &r) );

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 3
    **
    ** verify r != 0 
    */
    if (mp_cmp_z(&r) == 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
	goto cleanup;
    }

    /*                                  
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 4
    **
    ** s = (k**-1 * (HASH(M) + d*r)) mod n 
    */
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &s);        /* s = HASH(M)     */

    /* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
     * to the length of n in bits. 
     * (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
    CHECK_MPI_OK( (obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)) );
    if (digest->len*8 > obits) {
	mpl_rsh(&s,&s,digest->len*8 - obits);
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&n, mpstr);
    printf("n : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&d, mpstr);
    printf("d : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
    printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
    printf("digest: %s (decimal)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&r, mpstr);
    printf("r : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&r, mpstr);
    printf("r : %s\n", mpstr);
#endif

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&k, &n, &k) );      /* k = k**-1 mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&d, &r, &n, &d) );  /* d = d * r mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_addmod(&s, &d, &n, &s) );  /* s = s + d mod n */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&s, &k, &n, &s) );  /* s = s * k mod n */

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&s, mpstr);
    printf("s : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&s, mpstr);
    printf("s : %s\n", mpstr);
#endif

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.3.3, Step 5
    **
    ** verify s != 0
    */
    if (mp_cmp_z(&s) == 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NEED_RANDOM);
	goto cleanup;
    }

   /*
    **
    ** Signature is tuple (r, s)
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&r, signature->data, olen) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_to_fixlen_octets(&s, signature->data + olen, olen) );
finish:
    signature->len = 2*olen;

    rv = SECSuccess;
    err = MP_OKAY;
cleanup:
    mp_clear(&x1);
    mp_clear(&d);
    mp_clear(&k);
    mp_clear(&r);
    mp_clear(&s);
    mp_clear(&n);

    if (kGpoint.data) {
	PORT_ZFree(kGpoint.data, 2*flen + 1);
    }

    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ECDSA signing with seed %s\n",
	(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

   return rv;
}

/*
** Computes the ECDSA signature on the digest using the given key 
** and a random seed.
*/
SECStatus 
ECDSA_SignDigest(ECPrivateKey *key, SECItem *signature, const SECItem *digest)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    int len;
    unsigned char *kBytes= NULL;

    if (!key) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	return SECFailure;
    }

    /* Generate random value k */
    len = key->ecParams.order.len;
    kBytes = ec_GenerateRandomPrivateKey(key->ecParams.order.data, len);
    if (kBytes == NULL) goto cleanup;

    /* Generate ECDSA signature with the specified k value */
    rv = ECDSA_SignDigestWithSeed(key, signature, digest, kBytes, len);

cleanup:    
    if (kBytes) {
	PORT_ZFree(kBytes, len);
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ECDSA signing %s\n",
	(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

    return rv;
}

/*
** Checks the signature on the given digest using the key provided.
*/
SECStatus 
ECDSA_VerifyDigest(ECPublicKey *key, const SECItem *signature, 
                 const SECItem *digest)
{
    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
#ifdef NSS_ENABLE_ECC
    mp_int r_, s_;           /* tuple (r', s') is received signature) */
    mp_int c, u1, u2, v;     /* intermediate values used in verification */
    mp_int x1;
    mp_int n;
    mp_err err = MP_OKAY;
    ECParams *ecParams = NULL;
    SECItem pointC = { siBuffer, NULL, 0 };
    int slen;       /* length in bytes of a half signature (r or s) */
    int flen;       /* length in bytes of the field size */
    unsigned olen;  /* length in bytes of the base point order */
    unsigned obits; /* length in bits  of the base point order */

#if EC_DEBUG
    char mpstr[256];
    printf("ECDSA verification called\n");
#endif

    /* Initialize MPI integers. */
    /* must happen before the first potential call to cleanup */
    MP_DIGITS(&r_) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&s_) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&c) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&u1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&u2) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&x1) = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&v)  = 0;
    MP_DIGITS(&n)  = 0;

    /* Check args */
    if (!key || !signature || !digest) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
	goto cleanup;
    }

    ecParams = &(key->ecParams);
    flen = (ecParams->fieldID.size + 7) >> 3;  
    olen = ecParams->order.len;  
    if (signature->len == 0 || signature->len%2 != 0 ||
	signature->len > 2*olen) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INPUT_LEN);
	goto cleanup;
    }
    slen = signature->len/2;

    SECITEM_AllocItem(NULL, &pointC, 2*flen + 1);
    if (pointC.data == NULL)
	goto cleanup;

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&r_) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&s_) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&c)  );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&u1) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&u2) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&x1)  );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&v)  );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_init(&n)  );

    /*
    ** Convert received signature (r', s') into MPI integers.
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&r_, signature->data, slen) );
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&s_, signature->data + slen, slen) );
                                          
    /* 
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Steps 1 and 2
    **
    ** Verify that 0 < r' < n and 0 < s' < n
    */
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(ecParams->order, &n);
    if (mp_cmp_z(&r_) <= 0 || mp_cmp_z(&s_) <= 0 ||
        mp_cmp(&r_, &n) >= 0 || mp_cmp(&s_, &n) >= 0) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
	goto cleanup; /* will return rv == SECFailure */
    }

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 3
    **
    ** c = (s')**-1 mod n
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_invmod(&s_, &n, &c) );      /* c = (s')**-1 mod n */

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
    **
    ** u1 = ((HASH(M')) * c) mod n
    */
    SECITEM_TO_MPINT(*digest, &u1);                  /* u1 = HASH(M)     */

    /* In the definition of EC signing, digests are truncated
     * to the length of n in bits. 
     * (see SEC 1 "Elliptic Curve Digit Signature Algorithm" section 4.1.*/
    CHECK_MPI_OK( (obits = mpl_significant_bits(&n)) );
    if (digest->len*8 > obits) {  /* u1 = HASH(M')     */
	mpl_rsh(&u1,&u1,digest->len*8 - obits);
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
    printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&s_, mpstr);
    printf("s_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&c, mpstr);
    printf("c : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
    printf("digest: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
#endif

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&u1, &c, &n, &u1) );  /* u1 = u1 * c mod n */

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.2, Step 4
    **
    ** u2 = ((r') * c) mod n
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mulmod(&r_, &c, &n, &u2) );

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.3, Step 1
    **
    ** Compute u1*G + u2*Q
    ** Here, A = u1.G     B = u2.Q    and   C = A + B
    ** If the result, C, is the point at infinity, reject the signature
    */
    if (ec_points_mul(ecParams, &u1, &u2, &key->publicValue, &pointC)
	!= SECSuccess) {
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto cleanup;
    }
    if (ec_point_at_infinity(&pointC)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
	rv = SECFailure;
	goto cleanup;
    }

    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_read_unsigned_octets(&x1, pointC.data + 1, flen) );

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 2
    **
    ** v = x1 mod n
    */
    CHECK_MPI_OK( mp_mod(&x1, &n, &v) );

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&r_, mpstr);
    printf("r_: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
    printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
#endif

    /*
    ** ANSI X9.62, Section 5.4.4, Step 3
    **
    ** Verification:  v == r'
    */
    if (mp_cmp(&v, &r_)) {
	PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
	rv = SECFailure; /* Signature failed to verify. */
    } else {
	rv = SECSuccess; /* Signature verified. */
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    mp_todecimal(&u1, mpstr);
    printf("u1: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&u2, mpstr);
    printf("u2: %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
    mp_tohex(&x1, mpstr);
    printf("x1: %s\n", mpstr);
    mp_todecimal(&v, mpstr);
    printf("v : %s (dec)\n", mpstr);
#endif

cleanup:
    mp_clear(&r_);
    mp_clear(&s_);
    mp_clear(&c);
    mp_clear(&u1);
    mp_clear(&u2);
    mp_clear(&x1);
    mp_clear(&v);
    mp_clear(&n);

    if (pointC.data) SECITEM_FreeItem(&pointC, PR_FALSE);
    if (err) {
	MP_TO_SEC_ERROR(err);
	rv = SECFailure;
    }

#if EC_DEBUG
    printf("ECDSA verification %s\n",
	(rv == SECSuccess) ? "succeeded" : "failed");
#endif
#else
    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_KEYALG);
#endif /* NSS_ENABLE_ECC */

    return rv;
}

