



Fake Malware and Virus Scanners


Agenda

- ▶ Fake malware and virus scanners
- ▶ What are their goals?
- ▶ Malware statistics
- ▶ How they look like?
- ▶ Tricks by scammers to spread rogue malware
- ▶ A case study
- ▶ How to prevent them?




Fake Malware and Virus scanners

- ▶ A fake anti-virus or anti-malware scanner will mislead web visitors on fake scan results
- ▶ They will scare computer users by displaying files infection alerts
- ▶ It does not offer any protection to computer
- ▶ It uses false positives and fake alerts in order to trick user into obtaining a program
- ▶ The problem is widespread



What are their goals?

- ▶ Abuse the name of genuine malware scanner programs
- ▶ Force the user into buying for a fake anti-malware program
- ▶ Steal financial and personal information
- ▶ Compromise the target computer
- ▶ Stay resident



Malware Statistics

- ▶ The following statistics were compiled this year using data from computers running Kaspersky Lab products:

Monthly Malware Statistics, March 2011

March in figures


The following statistics were compiled in March using data from computers running Kaspersky Lab products:

- 241,151,171 network attacks blocked;
- 85,853,567 attempted web-borne infections prevented;
- **219,843,736 malicious programs detected and neutralized on users' computers;**
- 96,702,092 heuristic verdicts registered.

2011/05/20_11:46	crong.ce.ms/index.php7Q5LhRwB8GznrZMz dNVCswBwM7FmNbrQf+Gh DW59eCqCCLLDU+oANG4l DdfFids3lDS7REayXS5 RAp3rCaFDO6CMXeaKPx pRQw6QE=	188.229.88.102	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	43134	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	ezzo.ce.ms/index.php7Q9fhcN7b19Gg3p+M11 NS0X6a7MmNbrs++kxB N566CJSDlLk+7g0O4jX ssiCswCjy5BEW/EBSz EoDLMYXKfQ/qMz+CVpY8 RyQzF8U1=	46.161.111.100	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	29073	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	crong.ce.ms/index.php7Q5LhRwB8GznrZMz dNVCswBwM7FmNbrQf+Gh DW59eCqCCLLDU+oANG4l DdfFids3lDS7REayXS5 RAp3rCaFDO6CMXeaKPx pRQw6QE=	188.229.88.102	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	43134	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	hamshoofoti.ce.ms/index.php7Q6Xhh9RubbG vXamM71NSv5BZ+762Pb r534h8Dv57KCBcAbL+SgOk4k3sv1gds0e4C6X EfoUjpeEQDcaV+Dw+M +AJ7R8QYUy1=	46.161.111.100	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	29073	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	hgegeermon.ce.ms/index.php7Q3hDT/bf1Gk xq7WwNysv8BZC72N4r Qf+mBDp51yCkACiGo+h wN4jssu1juxqz4qe row57RpRkCVsIQ2SM0 uCxP2FRKpxQ6ao=	188.229.88.102	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	43134	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	khelelo.ce.ms/index.php7Q+h297Mbs1Gy3q 6M2xNGySPBY7HwMyzF +yxDs5Wc9yBfF4+CAP 74NpsFgYyNll7HEWA /N56JpNMjfpIo8mM7+D zP9NR3gyv4kQQ=	188.229.88.102	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	43134	🇧🇪
2011/05/20_11:46	khelelo.ce.ms/index.php7Q73hLTHbFGSxp 9M15Nyye8Ry7gGvYvP +n5AS59CFyAifE+1gH b4Ds2j8s3lzy4KEeg /8pm8oh7MADfOxWMOuc iPwRdwy5eal=	188.229.88.102	-	fake AV	AdamsNames Limited / person2007@adamnames.com	43134	🇧🇪

How they look like?

- ▶ The fake anti-malware pretend a critical infection
- ▶ A bogus scan is launched play-acting the file system is being scanned
- ▶ Too many alerts messages are displayed to panic the user
- ▶ Several “critical” infections are detected



Name	Risk level	Date	Files infected	State
Email-Worm.Win32.Net	Critical	24 APR 2010	42	Waiting removal
Email-Worm.Win32.Myd	Critical	26 OCT 2010	20	Waiting removal
Trj-Dwnldr.Win	Critical	FEB	37	Waiting removal

Description:
This program is potentially dangerous for your system. Trojan-Downloader stealing passwords, credit cards and other personal information from your computer.

Advice:
You need to remove this threat as soon as possible!

Tricks by scammers to spread rogue malware

- ▶ Spam on discussion forums
- ▶ Rogue malware scanners can be seen even in TV commercials
- ▶ Running an affiliate program to spread the fake scanners
- ▶ Social networks
- ▶ Malicious banner advertisement
- ▶ Well known domain name compromised

28 February 2011 Last updated at 12:55 GMT

London Stock Exchange site shows malicious adverts

Booby-trapped adverts that hit visitors with fake security software have been discovered on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) website.

Analysis of the LSE site suggests that over the last 90 days, about 363 pages had hosted malware.

The LSE said its site was now safe and an investigation showed that ads provided by a third party were the culprit.



The infection kicked off warnings from a fake security program

A case study (1)

- ▶ Let's study how a common fake malware scanner works
- ▶ We will study the one behind this URL:

somrtype.com/scn/f7068a638392089bf9c6462f3c816e37/0540f0d2bb566d0ed0d80150e2b728ef/3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2




A case study (2)

- ▶ After pasting the URL into a web browser a fake message says the computer is under risk of malware and virus attacks.
- ▶ A system requires an fast check
- ▶ The System Security fake malware will perform a bogus scan



A case study (3)

- ▶ A counterfeit windows security alert is created
- ▶ The fake scan starts
- ▶ Too many infections are showed to the user



A case study (4)

- ▶ Let's see how this fake anti-malware operates
- ▶ We get the web page using CLI commands.

```
C:\>wget http://somrtype.com/scn/f7068a638392089bf9c6462f3c816e37/0540f0d2bb566d0ed0d80150e2b728ef/3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2
--17:45:07-- http://somrtype.com/scn/f7068a638392089bf9c6462f3c816e37/0540f0d2bb566d0ed0d80150e2b728ef/3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2
=> `3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2.1'
Resolving somrtype.com.. 213.155.22.193, 213.163.65.2, 194.54.83.163
Connecting to somrtype.com|213.155.22.193|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: unspecified [text/html]

[ <=> ] 40'827 54.17K/s
7:45:08 (54.01 KB/s) - `3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2.1' saved [40827]
```

A case study (5)

- ▶ The file is a kind of hash
- ▶ It contains an encrypted webpage

```
(54.01 KB/s) - '3656b9eddb95cfb9d7f013ed46b015a2.1' saved [40827]
```



```
File Edit Format View Help
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1
<script type="text/javascript" src="/new_engine/encrypters/base64.js"></script>
ks8E7VZ1Stb/HBq+a+Sx3xWN0WPBotmphGPKkTyqs8/ZwdtgZafwyTI/+LRIamdBUVHJZA+bk6ZjJWB+h1x9kqWHM3tLI4
e0YxhaEY1jV7HGZLYA2AFLjdbcvdmfGvc/LPihJ8wgs3BJHm0oBRUqPVR1USvWN1GLB92og1csaONUSN7v+nuIDAH5DxP9
XgkHweY8D3wgHTRDc+NJA+hotMME6z1g028BdzYih6CGD+/Dqqt6BwhfA59wy0QVK3yJyD+ddfM0JI+Kj5/54Ik/wxsGK
PDxNSBugkJn6mnl+d2wVHSgWqgr56LkYntbq6THXKZEENQI95tXLjrrZ6PeBUHAekJIA4WCxPZwky4ME43+B9CHFZ0dXC
DIc5occ9qyN3J31UBDJlnedeJ8TYxbsC2t1Vv9m0bUCan88Dyg/JAtkguv/dg6LvS2UC0Swov0TCP71xzXgGXZMLL0wdj
hho06RfEqka5x9ksFFv8xNHD/Mqha5HAoh1s+cEAzack0cZgT57MRn1UGETRQRJ/NVjIZ5bk2/zbmXwsmj9YEepiah2w7c
OGkJo4rYvJPwRok29p0LwccmFFxgMCwImuu7EKjXRQ0MvbdH0YjJlPTHx31i0vkcnd6EC8BjCw4xAMvRihx13nJfDe+s
erDRdkAooXkn042FpMBHdwqqu5Kk/R93AHEyge0JGesns9Y9akH0dz+9smjF08ZTPC13670pNkfyky/AqNBFOvF9ndrc
C15H/CStk07/g4VnAL0Mq+RCwnXRIaHSBS5YpspzICi8G70PUoxgDPSeLJvnxHLnjr72lDfTpUMo+3g+G9yhj2PA9J2wIc
zxzRwim/ff1aE8NfyTUHBHMKZ+sIJBfAosns7NGAi265cmvuzvc13qw+ypdzxwuwFogePFNIGdo1qkvrRuk2gwxtNZF2pE
Bmt+Fn4r/dAnMvPj7VnNzAg1zqfEaeZpIGvc41xu2MNSH7tBztH8Mr71ULAE8RSn18fIyqBr15Qx5aQxfqkLHE8zkIMhe
hbJhFFOSxq1s1ndMqcm1RuphDuysI8HRvanZCB+r9CMweyJdeqJsmq93xi0L1egc+FKV+FRZHR6wskCq74srrTb59w1F1
M/dqJEdgdFuxkxjr7wgy+94DJ9BRCPBnepdkRXl1oZHPKPNPGNw5H+CfDL113tz6M7A10hE6cYtsHb5wVf1x1rJDDNHHUW
zmbfEdGb4M5c14ar71dnMLAZVZfsxwdsJB1AfhrZBZcsk9sJtN65NUAFag+50CdewD9pq52zm6pwvF6Uobm87nP3hVz1IF
Lbh/vqoTmowjzTgbxvhokjKnsHdodk7xhvchuiG8yE1D7o1pgycDewBgx25j1T+JdR4zccNpm3cyjdqvk15i7x+LStJ+pw
Co701hxy2rA1JDZf6kgooUqt/V/tLjwnL1KMA8jN6hrCXvd1AejAotbPZ21a2g7kGHhdj3MrCuIqPhge7Uuy6WELSpkcx
QFR60b1w5LG3TzYHdd5FduBk5ymwLamZqRMEUGIwobxp7Ya16HumFca8a3xw02eI3R+SQAjmvETUNFAAY1xPc+aujI3mk
zhchJYhaxFvJ1jkw171srFCNCJHFugnersJdzTXB1fc1BAfuris5iHCS0A5G206jfa3p1Iq21JP9rQ+RuNRUGPMSVSYt
arX3nkt09Sn8k8Quwdt5wlvjs4cwaJpny49HG65SEPTAEKUNJykzocBA2QYUjxcSXB4Nv5x3nhfa/LuxJ3J8akw/eSJC
/VNjNe+00QTS1gpLJoFsgdAFaumpus271sNOCBjHd7evdyNEPqbkPRYzESqHmJ/H9Znt8Tn2rW9q0g2uhmdDXIEquQ7y
sxzE89fE0iEboxe3FNmoZ2P9onH0jqlZJvjmjNfL2jfa1bkARqMADiBkaayvTmkelidegJag7Qv41vAB8USBCj1xpBGL
XI5ms0dwo+Q50DVEakMKIeueyc2T+mddehcb3+XPQbhsVmeJT3vppQ0cayWT+Eh2+1ScysGJUfNup2VlQ0WUMPYFfTR9TL
Dh1q2AMTN/cgPzKEETpL911cc3U3ZDSYU6zksvfBFYvphhJjXsxp0Em1dwsHxa61MBjBEWixqt3bXSLXsUxxve5UHRZar
G6bFaS12FbZypr9J4rOrAnu5Mx781sXLW2R/fk15FLJHnuh89IGP+k+yxar83LRm+wzqbgm28yyEPI1IGYEkvAmelGQC
UjEC4PDQ8VxmopPZ2Dv7Kqhon4cBhx2hQ03obgJwkXoyeTWERIwdpqrCG49EkE0cutgYph6cavv71cvtqo0tA8AUqnp3MT
KX/acabMAWmNj+Iqaf1NovueCQsptXPRYLSFbrS+dsWfNEwmcvFrBqVtsj+Pbk111r7S07f75rKfWmNvXrNSGuekbfbv
J3bu6x9m/v5JwfmFkwaFRBxdgvv/9tygd3pPvcxbJOLh/Btrv7nk3z11uXJ2vS51R01MFDawXSeav6T02wsr12xmaADv
BHU2CnJ+IkixmrW03GA2uFRMT8NvbyUZfukX1K4FAitjuebycmkJanRqih5DKrE4nd6j7gexbkCiy1P5BGRCDfmbwZEBT
t8B90yVnWnH9hk07V1qfms5Hqggu1qlpMUNXks/zkXRRwonujTAF01vpdcgh9r4jSptea0fB1xwz59qenH1o10dsJm1S9
I69b5y74L3+aySgHrdx3vmmFEczt5Pet0jgcbueU5kQPT1GVElyv9blngHihhB2RAEBhyJ5FC2v6c1ow9vkdc8fE243y
sBQCQMGpmuqvg26/r7EKex31gBaxewue5rQ5rXhdfdgk5+kny2qexRy61H3v/bge+rMXzd0/w8jzyukevnJns1sw1pE
SP1013Gm0bg3wQtbtsfC7U0BT+3ao+vwu/4E8uBtb1fmyNpWpCy572/9tFFm0PYOrGhe/4+sd+kBNyAgTzXwzgpZRIsc1
```

A case study (6)

- ▶ Let's open it using more user-friendly software
- ▶ We can understand more clearly what is happening in here
- ▶ Some JavaScript code waiting to be executed in x_xtea.js and base64.js files
- ▶ The long variable is being decoded using simply base64 algorithm. Then the result was passed to TEA algorithm using the password "test"

```
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">  
<script type="text/javascript" src="/new_engine/encrypters/x_xtea.js"></script>  
<script type="text/javascript" src="/new_engine/encrypters/base64.js"></script>  
<script type="text/javascript">  
var ymndkzpgcosjqtibfeahxuvr='DtmlOvjF9iOGZJ+kI8UPHz6kF9Izwdk46SXUsVjgkLIwjwdpSVkNdoe5Eqn3iFitFmh1SNAV+RmLKU/Qyz  
document.write (TEAdecrypt(base64Decode(ymndkzpgcosjqtibfeahxuvr), 'test')));  
</script>
```

A case study (7)

- ▶ When we change the document.write function by an alert one we get a screenshot of the deobfuscated code

```

<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
<meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en" />

<meta http-equiv="Cache-control" content="Public" />
<title>PcSecureNet - Online Protection</title>

<link rel="icon" href="/Images/favicon.gif" type="image/gif"/>
<script type="text/javascript">
var rand = "22396c263473f49fb955c51e971650dc7e1d8c27";
<table cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" align="center" width="395px">
<tr>
<td>
<table width="378px" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="position: relative; top: 28px; left: 24px">
<tr>
<td width="6px" height="5px" 
<td style="border-top: #d3d3d3 1px solid;" 
<td width="95px" height="51" style="border-left: #d3d3d3 1px solid;" 
<td align="center" valign="middle">
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="font-size: 12px">
<tr>
<td align="left">Operating system:
<td align="left" height="25px" id="os_label">
<tr>
<td align="left">Internet browser:
<td align="left" id="browser_label">
<tr>
<td align="left" height="25px">Scan time:
<td align="left" id="scantime_label">
<tr>
<td style="border-right: #d3d3d3 1px solid;" 
<td style="border-bottom: #d3d3d3 1px solid; font-size: 1px;" 
<td style="border="0">
<td style="border="0">
<td style="border="0">
<td style="border="0">
<table border="0" style="width: 100px; position: relative; top: 40px; left: 30px; font-size: 20px; color: #727272;">
<tr>
<td style="width: 20px; height: 22px; background: url(/new_engine/landings/04/img/green_dot.jpg) no-repeat; font-size: 20px; color: #727272; position: relative; top: 3px; left: 0px; float: left; visibility: hidden;">
<div id="stage1" style="visibility: hidden;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Stage 1</div>
</div>
<div id="check1" style="font-size: 14px; font-weight: bold; position: relative; top: 50px; left: 55px; visibility: hidden;">Checking firewall status</div>
<div style="position: relative; top: 65px; left: 54px;">

<div id="way1" style="font-size: 10px; position: relative; top: 70px; left: 56px; visibility: hidden;">Sending data to server</div>
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" height="33px" width="303px" style="font-size: 10px; position: relative; top: 60px; left: 56px; visibility: hidden;">
<tr>
<td width="303px" height="41" 
<tr>
<td align="center" background="/new_engine/landings/04/img/red_bg.jpg">
<div style="position: relative; top: 2px; left: 13px; width: 270px; height: 25px; background: url(/new_engine/landings/04/img/x.jpg) no-repeat; color: #FFFFFF; padding-left: 28px; font-size: 14px; font-weight: bold; padding-top: 3px;">Firewall protection disabled</div>
<tr>
<td width="303px" height="41" 
<tr>
<td align="center" style="width: 100px; position: relative; top: 90px; left: 30px; font-size: 20px; color: #727272;">
<div style="width: 22px; height: 20px; background: url(/new_engine/landings/04/img/red_dot.jpg) no-repeat; font-size: 20px; color: #727272; position: relative; top: 3px; left: 0px; float: left; visibility: hidden;" id="dot1">
</div>
<div id="stage1" style="visibility: hidden;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Stage 2</div>
</div>
<div id="check1" style="font-size: 14px; font-weight: bold; position: relative; top: 100px; left: 55px; visibility: hidden;">Checking installed security software</div>
</div>

```

A case study (8)

- ▶ Playing a while with the path /new_engine/landings/04/ let us know another interesting JavaScript page scn3.js


```
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head>
  <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8" />
  <meta http-equiv="Content-Language" content="en" />

  <meta http-equiv="Cache-control" content="Public" />
  <title>PRODUCT_NAME - Online Protection</title>

  <link rel="icon" href="/Images/favicon.gif" type="image/gif"/>
  <script type="text/javascript">
    var rand = "7e2a602d0618a2f1a674c25596ac4e1deal69fe1";
    var strategy = {preLandingTemplate: "<table cellpadding=\\"0\\" cellspacing=\\"0\\" align=\\"center\\" width=\\"395px\\">\\"};
    var downloadUrl = "";
  </script>
  <script type="text/javascript" src="PATH/scn3.js"></script>
</head>
<body>
<div id="loading" style="display:none">
  <div class="loading-indicator">
    
    <br />
    <span id="loading-msg">Initializing Virus Protection System...</span></div>
</div>
</body>
</html>
```

A case study (9)

- ▶ After viewing the file contents I get another encoded webpage




```
eval({function(x){var d="";var p=0;while(p<x.length){if(x.charAt(p)!="`")d+=x.charAt(p++);else{var l=x.charCodeAt(p+3)-28;if(l>4)d+=d.substr(d,
```

- ▶ This time I used Malzilla. This good piece of code is very useful to be used in exploring malicious webpages



A case study (10)

- ▶ Copying the code into the decoder option got me in seconds the deobfuscated webpage contents
- ▶ We can clearly see the list of files being used for the fake antivirus, trying to convince the victim that the box is being scan to search “malicious” programs



The screenshot shows a browser window titled "Malzilla by bobby" with a menu bar including Download, Decoder, Misc Decoders, Kallmero Processor, Shellcode analyzer, Log, Clipboard Monitor, Notes, Hex view, PScript, Tools, Settings, and About. The main content area displays a large block of deobfuscated JavaScript code. Below the code, there are several buttons: "Run script", "Debug", "Replace eval() with eval", "Override eval()", "Leave as is", "Find", "Case sensitive", "Templates", "Wide 2 UCS2", "Do not bother me with messages", "Selection length: 0 (0)", "Format code", and "Show eval() results".

At the bottom of the browser window, a list of system files is displayed, enclosed in a red box. The files include:

```

ini", "clock.avi", "cmsetacl.log", "comsetup.log", "control.ini", "corelpf.lrs", "desktop.ini", "directX.log", "btclninstall.log",
"erg_dial.ini", "erg_film.ini", "explorer.exe", "explorer.scf", "FaxSetup.log", "FinishDrv.log", "FontData.fdb", "SDEPH.log",
"FSISU.log", "FSPROD.log", "FSSFM.log", "FSSGUI.log", "Giza Setup Log.txt", "activeds.tlb", "ahui.exe", "apphelp.dll", "appmgmts
.dll", "appmgr.dll", "atmadm.exe", "atmlib.dll", "bootcfg.exe", "bthprops.cpl", "c_949.nls", "c_28592.nls", "catsrvps.dll",
"cidaemon.exe", "cmmgr32.hlp", "comsdig.dll", "cryptdll.dll", "d3drm.dll", "d3dx10_37.dll", "defrag.exe", "dhcpcsvc.dll", "dmadmir
.exe", "docprop2.dll", "dpvacm.dll", "dsound3d.dll", "edit.hlp", "extrac32.exe", "forcedos.exe", "gpupdate.exe", "hotplug.dll",
"icfgnt5.dll", "igfxrll.lrc", "kbdh220.dll", "kbdp11.dll", "KGYGaAvL.sys", "loadperf.dll", "mcd32.dll", "mfc70fra.dll", "mpr.dll
", "msacm32.dll", "alg.exe", "arp.exe", "atmf.d11", "avicap.dll", "avicap32.dll", "calc.exe", "camocx.dll", "explorer.exe", "hh.exe
", "HideWin.exe", "IsUninst.exe", "meta4.exe", "MicCal.exe", "NOTEPAD.EXE", "regedit.exe", "TASKMAN.EXE", "tuunk_16.exe", "tuunk_32
.exe", "winhelp.exe", "winhlp32.exe", "x2.64.exe", "twain.dll", "twain_32.dll", "vmmreg32.dll", "bootstat.dat", "d3dx.dat", "nsreg
.dat", "popcinfo.dat", "SET3.tmp", "SET4.tmp", "SET8.tmp", "accwiz.exe", "actmovie.exe", "ahui.exe", "winspool.exe", "winver.exe",
"UISPTIS.EXE", "wowdeb.exe", "wowexec.exe", "wpabaln.exe", "wppninst.exe", "write.exe", "wscntfy.exe", "wscript.exe", "wuauclt.exe
", "wuauclt1.exe", "wupdmgr.exe", "cic.dll", "ciodm.dll", "cib.dll", "cibcatex.dll", "cibcatq.dll", "cliconfg.dll", "cygwini.dll",
"cygz.dll", "d3d8.dll", "d3d8thk.dll", "d3d9.dll", "drnclien.dll", "drmostor.dll", "drmw2cit.dll", "drprov.dll", "ds16gt.dLL",
"ds32gt.dll", "dsauth.dll", "dsdmo.dll", "ieakeng.dll", "ieaksie.dll", "ieakui.dll", "ieapfltr.dll", "iedkcs32.dll", "ieencode.dll
", "ieframe.dll", "iepeers.dll", "iernonce.dll", "iertutil.dll", "iesetup.dll", "ieui.dll", "kerberos.dll", "kernel32.dll", "keymgr

```

How to prevent them?

- ▶ Users should pause before clicking on a window or strange pop-ups
- ▶ Users should make sure that they run up-to-date legitimate antimalware software
- ▶ Updated Web browser with antiphishing features
- ▶ Patched applications and Operating system
- ▶ Auto-update features should be enabled



References

- ▶ SecureList – http://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792170/Monthly_Malware_Statistics_March_2011
- ▶ MalwareDomainList – <http://www.malwaredomainlist.com>
- ▶ Malzilla – <http://malzilla.sourceforge.net>
- ▶ The Inquirer – <http://www.theinquirer.net/inquirer/news/2029425/london-stock-exchange-website-hacked-malware-ads>



Questions?

brian.mariani@htbridge.ch

