# MICROSOFT EXCEL SPREADSHEETS EXPOSE USER PIN USED FOR CONFIDENTIAL/SECURE PRINTING

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### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Confidential/Secure Print is a feature common to printers used in corporate environments. This feature is designed to avoid exposing sensitive printouts to other people who also have access to the printer. Print jobs are delayed until the owner is physically present at the printer to enter their Personal Identification Number (PIN).

This document discusses a design feature of Microsoft Excel created twelve years ago, which in more recent times has the undesired consequence of storing the user's Confidential/Secure Print PIN inside the spreadsheet. This defeats the whole concept of the Confidential/Secure Print feature especially when some less sensitive spreadsheets using the same PIN are available to potential adversaries, for example stored in a network shared directory.

The Confidential/Secure Print feature is enabled at the printer driver level to conveniently and automatically apply the user PIN protection to all files printed by the user. An adversary can use Windows Explorer to search network shared drives for Excel spreadsheets, and view them in Microsoft Notepad to reveal user PIN information. The adversary can then gain access to any file (e.g. Word, Excel, PowerPoint, PDF) printed by the victim, if the adversary beats the victim to the printer. The adversary can then either print two copies of the victim's file and leave one on the printer for the victim, or print one copy of the victim's file and photocopy it before leaving the original on the printer for the victim, or print one copy of the victim's file and take it resulting in the victim thinking that perhaps they didn't click the print icon after all.

# **EXCEL DESIGN FEATURE**

Microsoft has made the specifications publicly available for the proprietary binary file formats used by Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel and Microsoft PowerPoint [1].

A quick skim of the 349 page Microsoft Excel specifications reveals that spreadsheets contain

"PLS: Environment-Specific Print Record (4Dh)

The PLS record saves printer settings and printer driver information." [2]

This includes a "DEVMODE structure" which contains a field called "dmDriverExtra" which has the following definition

"Contains the number of bytes of private driver-data that follow this structure. If a device driver does not use device-specific information, set this member to zero. The private data for a device driver follows the public portion of the DEVMODE structure." [3]

### **EXAMPLE PRIVATE DEVICE-SPECIFIC INFORMATION**

Corporate Xerox printers typically have a Secure Print feature which Xerox describe as

"Jobs are safely stored at the device until the owner enters a PIN to release them. This controls unauthorized viewing of documents sent to the printer." [4]

Corporate Lexmark Multifunction Products/Printers (MFP) typically have a Confidential Print feature which Lexmark describe as

"The Confidential Print feature addresses the basic concern of printed pages lying on the MFP for any-one to pick up. With Confidential Print, the MFP holds submitted jobs until the intended recipient is present at the device. By producing the printed job only when the proper PIN code is entered on the MFP's operator panel, the job is delivered securely into the right hands. The features and benefits of Confidential Print include:

\* An intuitive and effective means to deliver print jobs only when the recipient is at the MFP." [5]




Microsoft highlights the benefits of using the Confidential/Secure Print feature to print sensitive Excel spreadsheets and other Microsoft Office files to shared Xerox and other printers [6]. This Microsoft article links to a list of "which printers offer the best security" which includes the corporate printers Xerox Phaser 7400 and the Lexmark X646e [7].

#### FEEL SAFE USING XEROX PHASER 7400 AND LEXMARK X646E?



The Xerox Phaser 7400 and Lexmark X646e are listed as "printers that you can feel safe using".


The following screenshots illustrate Excel spreadsheets storing the Confidential/Secure Print user PIN when the spreadsheets were printed and saved.




The Secure Print feature is configured with a PIN of 2146 using the latest Xerox Phaser 7400 Printer Command Language (PCL) printer driver from the Xerox web site as of 1 Feb 2009.




The readily available Microsoft Notepad works as a substitute for a hex editor to reveal the user PIN of 2146, highlighted by the author of this document for the reader's convenience.



The Confidential Print feature is configured with a PIN of 2146 using the latest Lexmark X646e PostScript (PS) printer driver from the Lexmark web site as of 1 Feb 2009.



After printing and saving an Excel spreadsheet, Notepad reveals the user PIN of 2146.



The user PIN was visibly stored in Excel spreadsheets when using any of the four (two PS and two PCL) printer drivers, including when using the "highly recommended" PCL driver.

#### FEEL SAFER WITH UPDATED/UNIVERSAL PRINTER DRIVERS?

Some printer driver vendors are producing generic universal printer drivers which

"provide users and administrators with a standardized, one-driver solution for their printing needs. Instead of installing and managing individual drivers for each printer model, administrators can install the Lexmark Universal Print Drivers for use with a variety of both mono and color laser printers. The Lexmark Universal Drivers are available in 19 languages, supporting more than 100 printer models" [8].

Some of these newer printer drivers appear to use data compression or other mechanisms which have the side effect of avoiding storing the user PIN in the clear in Excel spreadsheets.

The author of this document will assume that this attempted mitigation is an accidental side effect. It is unlikely that the printer driver vendors were already aware of this Excel information disclosure vulnerability, otherwise (hopefully) they would have fixed or removed affected printer drivers from their web site and publicly informed their customers.

Lexmark deserve some kudos for their Oct 2008 version universal printer driver avoiding storing the user PIN in the clear in Excel spreadsheets. However, the following extracts from the Lexmark Universal Print Driver Technical White Paper [8] indicate that the updated and perhaps more secure universal printer driver is not designed to replace model-specific printer drivers


"Frequently asked questions

Will Lexmark stop providing model-specific drivers?


There are no plans for the Universal Print Drivers to replace model-specific drivers.

When should I use a model-specific print driver instead of the UPD?

Use a model-specific driver if you need a PCL-XL (PCL 6) emulation driver or if your printer is not in the list of supported printers. Use model-specific drivers if you need resolutions other than 600 dpi."



The universal printer driver version 1.3 released in Oct 2008 is available, although strangely the Lexmark web site recommends using the older model-specific X646e PCL printer driver instead.



Kudos to Lexmark's proactive security by applying (basic) mathematical obfuscation to store the user PIN as 623#1 instead of 2146.



The Open XML 2007 .xlsx format also appears to store private device specific information such as the user PIN. After printing and saving a spreadsheet in this format, the (slightly obfuscated) user PIN was stored in the *printerSettings1.bin* file inside the .xlsx container.

# POTENTIAL MITIGATION

In the absence of Microsoft changing the Excel file format specification which has been in use for over 12 years, or modifying the Excel executable to store blank spaces instead of private data in the spreadsheet, the following steps can help mitigate exploitation of this information disclosure vulnerability:

- Printer driver vendors could update their printer drivers to ensure the user PIN is not stored in the clear in Excel spreadsheets.
- Users should ensure they are using a recent printer driver which does not store the user PIN in the clear in Excel spreadsheets. This may mean using a recently produced universal printer driver, since printer driver manufacturers are unlikely to fix all of their hundreds or thousands of printer drivers (and perhaps associated printer firmware).
- Users could manually disable the Confidential/Secure Print feature when working on Excel spreadsheets which other users have access to. However, this mitigation step would involve effort and consistent discipline since the Confidential/Secure Print feature is enabled at the printer driver level to conveniently and automatically apply the user PIN protection to all files printed by the user.
- Users could attempt to justify acquiring a printer to be located in their line of sight, or otherwise run to the printer as soon as they print a sensitive file.
- Users should be suspicious if they are certain they printed their file, yet when they arrive
  at the printer, the printer is not waiting for the user to enter their PIN. Perhaps somebody
  else entered the PIN and printed the file. Note however that these symptoms may occur
  legitimately since
  - "Jobs stored in the MFP's RAM memory will be deleted if the MFP is powered off, and can be deleted automatically by the MFP if a memory shortage is encountered." [5]
- Users should be suspicious if they printed their file, yet when they arrive at the printer, their printout is already sitting on the printer without requiring the user to enter their PIN. Perhaps somebody else entered the PIN, printed and photocopied the file, or selected "2 copies" and kept one copy for themselves and left the other copy on the printer.

# **VENDOR CONTACT**

Relevant vendors were contacted prior to the public release of this document, as per the principles of responsible and coordinated disclosure. Since this document mentions Microsoft, Lexmark and Xerox, they were initially contacted to confirm the technical accuracy of this document, with subsequent attempts to contact other printer driver vendors.

This document was provided to the Microsoft Security Response Center in April 2009. Microsoft agreed that this is an information disclosure vulnerability, and after spending many months investigating and contemplating remediation options, eventually concluded that "the best way to address this issue is through documentation, and suitable changes to the WHQL (Windows Hardware Quality Labs) logo program that help foster a conscious decision on the side of the driver manufacturer, with respect to the nature of information they store in the DEVMODE."

This document was provided to Lexmark for comment in September 2010. Lexmark responded in a timely and positive manner. Lexmark engaged in a constructive dialogue, expressed appreciation for the opportunity to review this document and stated "*It is a well written and informative piece of work*".

Lexmark noted the steps they have already proactively taken to help mitigate this information disclosure vulnerability, including masking the user PIN, and mentioned their plan to further enhance this masking feature for both device specific printer drivers as well as for future versions of their Universal Print Driver.

For users requiring increased levels of printing security, Lexmark noted their variety of Print Protection capabilities, ranging from additional layers of authentication such as card readers, to full encryption of the data stream between the host computer and the printing device using features such as Lexmark's IPsec and PrintCryption capabilities discussed in more detail at the web page

http://www1.lexmark.com/content/en\_us/solutions/business\_solutions/security/standard\_security features.shtml

This document was provided to Xerox for comment in September 2010. Xerox expressed appreciation for being informed about this new information disclosure vulnerability.

Xerox confirmed the flaw in a number of older printer drivers, and recommended that customers should download and install newer printer drivers such as the Global Print Driver and the Mobile Express Driver available at the web pages

http://www.support.xerox.com/go/results.asp?

Xtype=download&prodID=GLOBALPRINTDRIVER&Xlang=en\_US&Xcntry=USA

http://www.support.xerox.com/go/results.asp?

Xtype=download&prodID=MOBILEEXPRESSDRIVER&Xlang=en US&Xcntry=USA

For users requiring increased levels of printing security, Xerox noted their more secure methods to prevent the exposure of printed information, including techniques such as strong encryption, tokens and authentication. Xerox noted that features like this are already shipping in their advanced multifunction devices and will be incorporated into more Xerox devices over time.

This document was provided to US-CERT and CERT/CC in October 2010 for them to liaise with printer driver vendors prior to public release of this document. CERT/CC replied that "due to our current case load we will not be able to follow up with the coordination at this time. Please continue to work with affected vendors before disclosing the details to the public." Therefore, as per the principles of responsible and coordinated disclosure, the author of this document attempted to perform coordination by sending a copy of this document on 13 November 2010 to readily available email addresses at the following readily available list of printer vendors: Brother, Canon, Epson, HP, Konica Minolta, Kyocera, Oki, Ricoh and Samsung. Some of these vendors did not disclose readily available email addresses, so a copy of this document was sent to the following email addresses for all of these vendors: secure@, security@ and postmaster@ These vendors were also notified that this document would be publicly released on 15 January 2011 (or beforehand if publicly leaked).

HP should be applauded for taking security seriously enough to have established a dedicated and contactable security team. The HP Software Security Response Team replied quickly with the statement "Thanks for the advance notice. We can find no HP printers that are vulnerable."

### **REFERENCES**

[1] Title: Microsoft Office Binary (doc, xls, ppt) File Formats

Publication Date: 15 Feb 2008

URL: <a href="http://www.microsoft.com/interop/docs/OfficeBinaryFormats.mspx">http://www.microsoft.com/interop/docs/OfficeBinaryFormats.mspx</a>

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[2] Title: Microsoft Office Excel 97-2007 Binary File Format (.xls) Specification URL: <a href="http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/B/E/0BE8BDD7-E5E8-422A-">http://download.microsoft.com/download/0/B/E/0BE8BDD7-E5E8-422A-</a>

ABFD-4342ED7AD886/Excel97-2007BinaryFileFormat(xls)Specification.pdf

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[3] Title: DEVMODE

URL: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa927408.aspx

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[4] Title: Xerox Product Security for Information Security and Document Control URL: <a href="http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product-security/enus.html">http://www.xerox.com/information-security/product-security/enus.html</a>

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[5] Title: Security and Lexmark Multifunction Products: Overview of Features

Author: Rich Russell Publication Date: Feb 2006

URL: <a href="http://www.lexmark.com/vgn/images/portal/Security%20Features%20of%20Le">http://www.lexmark.com/vgn/images/portal/Security%20Features%20of%20Le</a>

xmark%20MFPs%20v1 1.pdf

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[6] Title: Secure printing: No more mad dashes to the copy room

Author: Annik Stahl Publication Date: 21 Nov 2008

URL: <a href="http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HA012276311033.aspx">http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/help/HA012276311033.aspx</a>

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[7] Title: Cream of the Crop: Secure Printers

Author: Bob Violino Publication Date: 26 Apr 2006

URL: http://www.crn.com/hardware/186100108

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009

[8] Title: Universal Print Driver Technical White Paper

Publication Date: Dec 2008 (according to metadata)

URL: http://www.downloaddelivery.com/downloads/documentation/Lexmark-

Universal-Driver-v1.3-White-Paper.pdf

Access Date: 1 Feb 2009