

# DAVSP: Safety Alignment for Large Vision-Language Models via Deep Aligned Visual Safety Prompt

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
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**Abstract**—Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have achieved impressive progress across various applications but remain vulnerable to malicious queries that exploit the visual modality. Existing safety alignment approaches typically fail to resist malicious queries while preserving utility on benign ones effectively. To address these challenges, we propose Deep Aligned Visual Safety Prompt (DAVSP), which is built upon two key innovations. First, we introduce the Visual Safety Prompt, which appends a trainable padding region around the input image. It preserves visual features and expands the optimization space. Second, we propose Deep Alignment, a novel approach to train the visual safety prompt through supervision in the model’s activation space. It enhances the inherent ability of LVLMs to perceive malicious queries, achieving deeper alignment than prior works. Extensive experiments across five benchmarks on two representative LVLMs demonstrate that *DAVSP* effectively resists malicious queries while preserving benign input utility. Furthermore, *DAVSP* exhibits great cross-model generation ability. Ablation studies further reveal that both the Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment are essential components, jointly contributing to its overall effectiveness. The code is publicly available at <https://github.com/zhangyitonggg/DAVSP>.

## 1. Introduction

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) [1], [2], [3] can process user queries consisting of visual and textual inputs, enabling multimodal understanding and reasoning. Owing to these capabilities, LVLMs have been widely applied in safety-critical domains such as autonomous driving [4], healthcare [5], and robotics [6]. However, recent works have found that LVLMs are vulnerable to queries with malicious intent and may output harmful content [7], [8], [9]. Figure 2 shows a real-world example, where LVLMs fail to resist a malicious query and output how to conduct cyberattacks. Our preliminary experiments on a popular safety evaluation benchmark [7], show that a mainstream LVLM - LLaVA-1.5-13B [2] struggles to resist 57% of



**Figure 1:** The comparison between safety perturbations (left) and *DAVSP*(right). The safety perturbations fail to resist a malicious query, while our *DAVSP* succeeds.

malicious queries. Thus, how to improve the resistance of LVLMs to malicious queries is a pressing problem.

Safety alignment is a mainstream research direction aimed at addressing the above problem [10], [11]. A straightforward approach is to train LVLMs to refuse malicious queries, such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [12], [13]. While effective to some extent, this approach requires a substantial computational cost and extensive labeled data, lacking scalability and generalization ability. Alternatively, a common and lightweight solution is to prepend user queries with a safety prompt, which contains guidance and guardrails on models’ behaviors [14], [15]. However, existing safety prompts focus on safeguarding the textual inputs and ignore the visual inputs.

Recent studies, such as ESIII [16] and UniGuard [17], extend the idea of safety prompts to visual inputs by adding a trainable perturbation to visual inputs. The perturbation is trained to guide LVLMs toward safer responses during inference. In this paper, we refer to the perturbation as the safety perturbation. Results show that safety perturbations

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can further improve the capability of LVLMs in resisting malicious queries when combining with textual safety prompts. However, these studies still face two severe limitations. First, their ability to resist malicious queries remains insufficient for real-world deployment. For example, LLaVA-1.5-13B with ESIII still fails to resist 29.2% of malicious queries in a safety evaluation benchmark [7]. Second, they degrade the model’s utility on benign queries. For instance, on the MME benchmark [18], ESIII reduces the utility score of LLaVA-1.5-13B from 1818 to 1403, indicating a significant loss in overall utility.

We attribute the limitations of safety perturbation to two intrinsic flaws. ❶ First, additive perturbations inevitably distort the visual features of the input image, impairing the model’s visual perception. To mitigate this, the perturbation magnitude is often tightly constrained, which in turn narrows the optimization space. ❷ Second, existing training objectives of the perturbation are limited to response-level supervision, resulting in shallow alignment. It means that the models exhibit superficial safety behaviors without truly understanding the underlying safety principles [19], [20], [21]. As a result, the models often fail to effectively resist malicious queries.

Building upon the above analysis, we propose *DAVSP*, a novel safety alignment approach for LVLMs. *DAVSP* effectively improves the capability of LVLMs in resisting malicious queries and preserves the model’s utility on benign queries. Our approach introduces two key innovations that address the limitations of prior safety perturbations.

First, we propose **Visual Safety Prompt**, a novel approach to introducing safety prompts into visual inputs. Our motivation is that textual safety prompts, which have been widely adopted, are typically concatenated with the user query rather than embedded within it [14], [15], [22]. Thus, we construct a trainable padding region around the input images, serving as the visual safety prompt, as shown on the right side of Figure 2. Compared with safety perturbations, our visual safety prompt has two advantages: ❶ it preserves the model’s perception of the original image by avoiding impact on its visual features; and ❷ it removes the expressiveness bottleneck imposed by strict per-pixel perturbation constraints.

Second, we propose **Deep Alignment**, a novel approach to training the visual safety prompt through supervision in the model’s activation space. Our motivation is that LVLMs inherently possess a latent ability to perceive the harmfulness of user queries. This is evidenced by prior studies [23], [24] showing that malicious and benign queries tend to induce distinguishable patterns in the model’s activation space. We expect that the visual safety prompt can unlock such ability of LVLMs, thus enabling them to better resist malicious queries. To this end, we construct a harmfulness vector that represents the direction of harmfulness in the model’s activation space. The visual safety prompt is then trained to maximize the projection of malicious queries on the harmfulness vector and minimize the projection of benign ones. Compared to safety perturbations, our visual safety prompt is trained to enhance the inherent ability of

LVLMs to perceive malicious queries, addressing the issue of shadow alignment.

We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate *DAVSP* and compare it with existing alignment approaches. The evaluation focuses on two aspects: resistance to malicious queries and utility on benign queries, measured by resist success rates and utility scores. Our experimental results yield the following conclusions: ❶ *DAVSP* achieves superior defense performance while preserving utility. It consistently outperforms existing baselines across both in-distribution and out-of-distribution settings. On MM-SafetyBench [9] and FigStep [7], *DAVSP* achieves the highest resist success rate among all methods. For example, on FigStep, *DAVSP* achieves a 13.4% higher resist success rate on LLaVA-1.5-13B compared to the strongest baseline. At the same time, it maintains high utility scores on benchmarks like MM-Vet [25], MME [18], and LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild) [26], often exceeding existing safety prompt baselines. For example, on MME, *DAVSP* achieves a utility score that is 199 points higher than ESIII on LLaVA-1.5-13B. ❷ *DAVSP* shows great generalization ability across different models. When trained on LLaVA-1.5-13B [2], the visual safety prompt generalizes well to other LVLMs, including Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct [3], Deepseek-VL-7B-Chat [27], and LLaVA-1.5-7B [2], and shows promising results even on commercial APIs such as GPT-4o [1]. For example, when transferred to Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct, our visual safety prompt achieves a resist success rate of 98% on FigStep. ❸ Ablation study shows that the visual safety prompt and deep alignment both contribute to the performance of *DAVSP*, including enhancing defense effectiveness and preserving utility.

## 2. Background and Related Work

### 2.1. Large Vision-Language Models

By integrating visual inputs, Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have achieved remarkable performance in perception and reasoning, supporting a wide range of applications, including autonomous driving [4], healthcare [5], and robotics [6]. A typical LVLM consists of three components: a visual encoder that extracts features from images, a fusion mechanism that integrates these features into the language model’s input, and a large language model (LLM) that generates responses based on the multimodal input. Representative examples include the LLaVA series, which typically connects a CLIP [28] visual encoder with a Vicuna [29] language model via a simple linear projection layer. Other models, such as Qwen2-VL [3], DeepSeek-VL [27], MiniGPT-4 [30], and InstructBLIP [31], share broadly similar architectures.

### 2.2. The Vulnerability of LVLMs to Malicious Queries

Despite their strong capabilities in multimodal understanding, LVLMs remain vulnerable to malicious queries

that elicit harmful or policy-violating responses [10], [11]. In particular, adversaries can construct malicious multimodal inputs to induce harmful or policy-violating responses [8]. This is especially concerning when seemingly benign textual inputs are paired with visual inputs that implicitly convey malicious intent, which can often circumvent safety constraints imposed on the language component [7], [9].

Recent studies have systematically examined this vulnerability through a variety of safety benchmarks. MM-SafetyBench [9] covers 5,040 examples across 13 harmful scenarios, featuring three types of malicious queries—SD, TYPO, and SD+TYPO—respectively generated by stable diffusion, typography-based editing and their combination. FigStep [7] consists of 500 malicious image-text pairs across 10 harmful scenarios, where harmful intent is subtly encoded in the visual input through incomplete typographic prompts. VGuard [8] comprises 3,000 images, each paired with one or more textual inputs to form image-text pairs annotated with binary safety labels. Unlike benchmarks that subtly embed threats through typographic or generative techniques [7], [9], VGuard offers explicitly harmful examples, with harmful content presented in either the image, the text, or both.

### 2.3. Safety Alignment for LVLMs

To improve the ability of LVLMs to resist malicious queries, recent research has explored various safety alignment strategies [10], [11], [19]. A straightforward approach is to train LVLMs to refuse harmful queries using methods such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [12], [13], [32] or Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) [8], [33], [34], with the goal of reinforcing safe behaviors across diverse inputs. While such approaches can be effective, they require substantial human annotation and computational resources, which limits their scalability and adaptability.

As a more practical and lightweight alternative, many works introduce safety alignment at inference time through either textual safety prompts or safety perturbations [14], [16]. In this setting, the visual input is transformed via a visual transformation function, while the textual input is prepended with a safety prompt:

$$\hat{\mathbf{x}}_v = T(\mathbf{x}_v, \delta), \quad \hat{\mathbf{x}}_t = [\boldsymbol{\tau}_t; \mathbf{x}_t], \quad (1)$$

where  $\delta$  denotes a visual perturbation,  $\boldsymbol{\tau}_t$  represents a textual safety prompt, with  $T(\cdot)$  denoting a visual transformation function and  $[\cdot; \cdot]$  indicating text concatenation. The modified inputs are then processed by the model to guide its response toward safer content.

Textual safety prompts have been explored through both non-optimized strategies, such as AdaShield [14], and optimized strategies, such as PAT [15]. Although effective in certain scenarios, these approaches operate solely on the textual input and ignore the visual input, which significantly reduces their reliability against multimodal threats.

To address this gap, recent methods such as ESIII [16] and UniGuard [17] introduce additive perturbations into the

visual input, referred to as safety perturbations, to align the model’s behavior with safety objectives during inference. While such approaches have demonstrated better safety alignment compared to textual safety prompts, they still suffer from two critical limitations. First, their ability to resist malicious queries remains insufficient for practical deployment. Second, these alignment approaches often degrade the model’s utility on benign queries, leading to a non-negligible drop in performance.

In this work, we propose a novel alignment approach to address the aforementioned limitations.

## 3. Threat Model

We consider a realistic threat model that aligns with practical deployment scenarios of LVLMs in this work.

### 3.1. Attacker Setting

**Goal.** The attacker aims to induce the LVLM to produce harmful or policy-violating outputs. To achieve this, they craft image-text pairs with malicious intent as queries, which are input to LVLMs.

**Knowledge and Capability.** We assume a black-box adversary, reflecting the realistic deployment scenarios where internal access to the model is restricted. The attackers can only interact with the model through its input-output interface: they input malicious queries and get the generated responses. They do not have access to model parameters or gradients. This assumption excludes white-box attacks [35], [36], while prevalent in academic research, are rarely applicable in practical deployment scenarios such as API-based services.

### 3.2. Defender Setting

**Goal.** Following related works [16], [37], [38], the goal of defender is to enhance the ability of models to resist malicious queries and preserve the models’ utility on benign queries.

**Knowledge and Capability.** We consider two scenarios based on whether the defender has full access to the target LVLM:

- **White-box scenario.** We assume that the defender (*e.g.*, the developers of models) has full access to the target LVLM, including the model architecture, parameters, and activations. This enables defender to train the visual safety prompt in *DAVSP* based on the target LVLM.
- **Black-box scenario.** We assume the defender (*e.g.*, the third-party service provider) can only access the model through API-based services without internal visibility into model parameters or gradients. In this setting, directly training the visual safety prompt on the target LVLM is infeasible. To address this, we train the visual safety prompt on a surrogate white-box model, and then transfer it to the target black-box model without further tuning.

## 4. Our Motivations

As stated in Section 2, existing safety perturbations [16], [17] take an early step towards safety alignment of the visual modality. Although promising, they still can not satisfy the defender’s goals due to two limitations: (1) their ability to resist malicious queries remains insufficient for real-world deployment, and (2) they often degrade the model’s utility on benign inputs.

In this section, we analyze the root causes of the above limitations, which motivate our approach.

### Motivation (1)

**Safety perturbations inevitably impact the features of visual inputs, resulting in a narrow optimization space.**

Most existing safety perturbations adopt additive pixel-level perturbations, where a trainable perturbation is directly added to the visual input [16], [17]. In this setting, the transformation function takes the following form:

$$T(\mathbf{x}_v, \delta) = \mathbf{x}_v + \delta, \quad (2)$$

where  $\mathbf{x}_v$  denotes the input image and  $\delta$  is a trainable perturbation of the same shape, trained to guide the model toward safer responses.

Additive perturbations inevitably alter the raw pixel values of the input image, which may disrupt low-level visual features such as edges, textures, and color distributions. Since models rely heavily on these visual features for semantic grounding and reasoning, even perturbations that are imperceptible to humans can still degrade the model’s perception and reduce its utility on benign queries [39], [40]. Such additive perturbation may lead to undesired behaviors, including failure to provide a valid answer or generating inaccurate responses, particularly for tasks that heavily rely on visual perception [4], [41].

To mitigate this side effect, researchers often impose strict constraints on the perturbation’s magnitude, typically using an  $\ell_\infty$  bound such as  $\epsilon = 16/255$  or  $32/255$  [16], [17]:

$$\|\delta\|_\infty \leq \epsilon. \quad (3)$$

While this constraint helps maintain visual fidelity to some extent, it imposes a tight bound on the perturbation’s pixel-level magnitude, thereby narrowing the optimization space. Consequently, the ability to resist malicious queries remains limited.

### Motivation (2)

**Existing training objectives of perturbations are limited to the superficial response level, resulting in shallow alignment.**

Existing works typically train perturbations by encouraging or discouraging models to generate target responses. For

example, ESIII trains perturbations by maximizing the generation probability of predefined safe responses. UniGuard, on the other hand, minimizes the likelihood of harmful content in the output.

However, such supervision remains confined to the surface level of output response, often leading to shallow alignment [20]. It typically means that the aligned model may exhibit superficial refusal behaviors without internalizing the underlying principles that justify the rejection of malicious queries [21]. As a result, the generated outputs may appear harmless or defensive at first glance but ultimately contain policy-violating or harmful content upon closer inspection. A typical example is shown in the bottom-left corner of Figure 2, where the model begins its response with a standard disclaimer—“I’m sorry, I cannot assist with illegal activities”—but then provides detailed and actionable instructions that directly contradict the initial refusal. This inconsistency between surface denial and the model’s actual generation behavior reveals a critical flaw: the perturbation fails to reliably prevent unsafe outputs and does not enforce true safety alignment.

While prior studies have recognized that response-level supervision may lead to shadow alignment, this issue remains underexplored in the context of LVLMS [20], [21], [42]. In multimodal settings, cross-modal fusion introduces additional alignment challenges due to potential inconsistencies between modalities. Without stronger semantic guidance, existing safety perturbations struggle to resist diverse malicious queries successfully.

Building on the above analysis, we present *DAVSP*, a novel safety alignment approach that addresses the limitations of existing safety perturbations through two key innovations. ❶ First, we introduce the **Visual Safety Prompt**, which attaches a trainable padding prompt around the visual input without modifying its original content directly. This design preserves critical visual features while expanding the optimization space, thereby overcoming the inherent dilemma of safety-oriented perturbations. ❷ Second, we propose **Deep Alignment**, which training visual safety prompt through supervision in the activation space. Deep Alignment guides the visual safety prompt to unlock the model’s intrinsic capability to distinguish malicious queries from benign ones, thereby addressing the shallow alignment issue prevalent in response-level supervised methods.

## 5. Methodology

In this section, we propose *DAVSP*, an effective and lightweight safety alignment approach for LVLMS. We begin by introducing a paradigm shift from conventional additive safety perturbations to a novel padding-based visual safety prompt, which constitutes the core of our approach. We then propose Deep Alignment, which trains the visual safety prompt by constructing a supervision signal from the model’s internal activation space. Finally, we describe how the trained visual safety prompt is applied to LVLMS in a plug-and-play manner.

## 5.1. Visual Safety Prompt

To address the intrinsic flaws of existing safety perturbations, which inevitably impact visual features and result in a narrow optimization space as discussed in the Section 4, we introduce the **Visual Safety Prompt**. Inspired by the visual prompt tuning [43], [44], [45], we design the visual safety prompt as a trainable padding region surrounding a resized version of the image. Formally, we define the visual transformation function  $T(\cdot, \cdot)$  in Equation 1 as follows:

$$T(\mathbf{x}_v, \delta) = \mathbf{m} \odot \delta + \text{Resize}(\mathbf{x}_v), \quad (4)$$


where  $\mathbf{x}_v \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times H \times W}$  denotes the original input image,  $\delta \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times H \times W}$  is the trainable visual safety prompt of the same spatial dimensions, and  $\mathbf{m} \in \{0, 1\}^{3 \times H \times W}$  is a binary mask indicating the padded region. The function  $\text{Resize}(\cdot)$  resizes  $\mathbf{x}_v$  to a lower resolution  $H' \times W'$ , and centers the resized image within a blank canvas of size  $H \times W$  by zero-padding the surrounding areas. It is worth noting resizing is widely used in LVLm pipelines and typically causes negligible degradation to visual features [2], [30], [44]. If the padding width is  $p$  on each side, then  $H' = H - 2p$  and  $W' = W - 2p$ . The element-wise multiplication  $\mathbf{m} \odot \delta$  ensures that the visual safety prompt does not modify the pixel values of the resized input image.

Unlike existing safety perturbations, our visual safety prompt provides a new perspective on the safety alignment for LVLms. It has two unique advantages: ❶ By avoiding direct modifications to the visual inputs, it preserves critical visual features and the utility of models on benign queries; ❷ By removing the strict constraints on the pixel-level magnitude, it enables a broader optimization space, allowing for the training of more effective safety prompts.

## 5.2. Deep Alignment

After determining the visual safety prompt, the next challenge is how to train the safety prompt to safeguard LVLms. Existing works [16], [17] typically define optimization objectives at the response level, which often leads to shallow alignment. To address the issue of shadow alignment, we propose Deep Alignment. Our motivation is that recent studies [24], [46], [47] have shown that malicious and benign queries tend to induce distinguishable patterns in the model’s activation space, indicating a latent ability to perceive the harmfulness of user queries. Thus, Deep Alignment constructs supervision signals from activation space to guide the training of the visual safety prompt, which is expected to unlock the LVLm’s inherent ability to resist malicious queries. Specifically, it consists of the following two steps:

**Harmfulness Vector Construction.** A key challenge in achieving deep alignment is to construct supervision signals that reflect the model’s perception of harmful intent. Prior works have shown that it is possible to extract vectors from the activation space that are associated with harmfulness [23], [24], [48]. Inspired by this observation, we construct



**Figure 2:** Given a text-image pair, we extract the hidden state of the final input token at a specific decoder layer and project it onto the harmfulness vector. During training, the projection is encouraged to exceed  $\mu_+$  for malicious queries and fall below  $\mu_-$  for benign ones.

a **harmfulness vector**, which represents the direction of harmfulness in the model’s activation space. By aligning the visual safety prompt’s effect with this direction, we can move beyond superficial shadow alignment and promote deeper adherence to safety principles. In the following, we describe how this vector is constructed using a contrastive approach inspired by prior work [7], [23], [24].

First, let  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{malicious}}$  and  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$  denote two datasets consisting of  $N$  malicious multimodal queries that are consistently rejected by the model and  $M$  benign queries respectively. For each query, we extract the hidden state corresponding to the last input token at a specified decoder layer  $l$ , which is assumed to encode a comprehensive representation of the input and the model’s intended response.

We then compute the mean activation difference at layer  $l$  between the malicious and benign queries. Formally, let  $\mathbf{a}_{i,l}^{\text{malicious}}$  and  $\mathbf{a}_{j,l}^{\text{benign}}$  denote the activation of the final input token at layer  $l$  for the  $i$ -th malicious and  $j$ -th benign query, respectively. The unnormalized harmfulness vector  $\mathbf{v}'_l$  is computed as:

$$\mathbf{v}'_l = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \mathbf{a}_{i,l}^{\text{malicious}} - \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=1}^M \mathbf{a}_{j,l}^{\text{benign}}, \quad (5)$$

Finally, to ensure unit scale, we normalize the vector to obtain the final harmfulness vector:

$$\mathbf{v}_l = \frac{\mathbf{v}'_l}{\|\mathbf{v}'_l\|}, \quad (6)$$

The resulting vector  $\mathbf{v}_l$  defines a direction in the activation space and serves as an internal supervision signal to guide the training of the visual safety prompt, with the goal of achieving deeper alignment with safety principles. In Section 6.6, we further validate that this vector reliably reflects harmful intent in the model’s activation space.

**Visual Safety Prompt Training** After obtaining the harmfulness vector, we train the visual safety prompt by supervis-

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**Algorithm 1:** The Training Process of Visual Safety Prompt

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**Input:** datasets for constructing harmfulness vectors  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{malicious}}, \mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}$ ; datasets for training visual safety prompt  $\mathcal{D}'_{\text{malicious}}, \mathcal{D}'_{\text{benign}}$ ; frozen LVLMM  $M$ ; selected layer  $l$ ; padding size  $p$ ; batch size  $B$ ; step size  $\alpha$ ; weighting coefficient  $\lambda$ ; training steps  $n$

**Output:** trained visual safety prompt  $\delta$

```
/* Construct harmfulness vector */
1: Extract hidden states  $\{\mathbf{a}_{i,l}^{\text{malicious}}\}$  and  $\{\mathbf{a}_{j,l}^{\text{benign}}\}$  from  $M$  at layer  $l$ ;
2: Compute mean activations:  $\mu_{\text{malicious}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{\text{malicious}}|} \sum_i \mathbf{a}_{i,l}^{\text{malicious}}$ ,  $\mu_{\text{benign}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}_{\text{benign}}|} \sum_j \mathbf{a}_{j,l}^{\text{benign}}$ ;
3: Compute harmfulness vector:  $\mathbf{v}_l \leftarrow \text{normalize}(\mu_{\text{malicious}} - \mu_{\text{benign}})$ ;
/* Train visual safety prompt */
4: Initialize visual safety prompt  $\delta \leftarrow \mathbf{0}$ ;
5: Initialize binary mask  $\mathbf{m}$  using padding size  $p$ ;
6: Combine training datasets:  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{train}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}'_{\text{malicious}} \cup \mathcal{D}'_{\text{benign}}$ ;
7: for  $i \leftarrow 1$  to  $n$  do
8:   Sample batch  $\mathcal{B} \subset \mathcal{D}_{\text{train}}$  of size  $B$ ;
9:   foreach  $(\mathbf{x}_v, \mathbf{x}_t, \mathbf{y}_{\text{target}}, y_{\text{label}}) \in \mathcal{B}$  do
10:    Apply  $\delta$  to  $\mathbf{x}_v$  to obtain  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_v$ ;
11:    Extract layer- $l$  hidden state from  $M$  with  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_v$  and  $\mathbf{x}_t$ ;
12:    Compute projected scalar value  $s$  using  $\mathbf{v}_l$  and  $\mathbf{h}_l$ ;
13:    Compute  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}}$  using margin thresholds  $\mu_+, \mu_-$  and label  $y_{\text{label}}$ ;
14:    Compute  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}$  between model output and  $\mathbf{y}_{\text{target}}$ ;
15:   Aggregate losses:  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}} + \lambda \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}$ ;
16:   Update visual safety prompt via masked gradient descent:  $\delta \leftarrow \delta - \alpha \cdot \mathbf{m} \odot \nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}_{\text{total}}$ ;
17: return trained visual safety prompt  $\delta$ ;
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ing the model’s internal representations along this direction. The goal is to guide the model toward a genuine understanding of harmful intent and enable it to distinguish malicious queries from benign ones. This supervision encourages a clear separation between the two along the harmfulness vector, thereby reinforcing the model’s internal alignment with safety principles.

We use  $\mathbf{v}_l$  as a projection axis in the activation space and seek to supervise the model by shaping the projections of internal representations along this direction. Let  $\mathbf{h}_l(\mathbf{x})$  denote the hidden state of the last input token at layer  $l$ , where  $\mathbf{x}$  is the multimodal input pair after applying the visual safety prompt. We define the projected scalar as:

$$s(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{v}_l^\top \cdot \mathbf{h}_l(\mathbf{x}). \quad (7)$$

A straightforward training strategy would be to maximize the projection  $s(\mathbf{x})$  for malicious queries while minimizing it for benign ones. However, this unconstrained separation objective leads to undesirable side effects: it tends to excessively suppress the model’s internal activations for benign inputs, which may impair the model’s ability to generate meaningful responses. Our preliminary experiments show that this approach severely compromises the model’s utility on benign queries.

To mitigate this issue, we design a margin-based objec-

tive that enforces a bounded separation between malicious and benign queries in the activation space. Specifically, we define two projection margins,  $\mu_+$  and  $\mu_-$ , representing the expected activation ranges for malicious and benign queries, respectively, with  $\mu_+ > \mu_-$ . These margins are computed as the mean projected activations from the corresponding queries used to construct  $\mathbf{v}_l$ , thereby establishing a data-driven decision boundary.

Based on this, we define the primary training objective as a loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}}$ , which encourages the projections of malicious queries to exceed  $\mu_+$  and those of benign queries to fall below  $\mu_-$ . Formally:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}} = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{B}} [\mathbb{I}_{\text{malicious}}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \max(0, \mu_+ - s(\mathbf{x})) + \mathbb{I}_{\text{benign}}(\mathbf{x}) \cdot \max(0, s(\mathbf{x}) - \mu_-)], \quad (8)$$

where  $\mathcal{B}$  denotes a training batch, and  $\mathbb{I}_{\text{malicious}}(\mathbf{x})$ ,  $\mathbb{I}_{\text{benign}}(\mathbf{x})$  are binary indicator functions that evaluate to 1 if  $\mathbf{x}$  is labeled as malicious or benign, respectively, and 0 otherwise.

This supervision enhances the model’s ability to distinguish between malicious and benign queries by encouraging a separation along the harmfulness vector, thereby improving safety. However, enforcing supervision on internal representations may unintentionally perturb the model’s output behavior. To address this concern, we retain an auxiliary

loss commonly adopted in prior work [16], [17], to preserve the quality and coherence of the generated responses. Specifically, we apply a cross-entropy loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}$  between the model’s generated output and the ground-truth response  $\mathbf{y}_{\text{target}}$ :

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{output}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}}(P(\cdot | T(\mathbf{x}_v, \delta), \mathbf{x}_t), \mathbf{y}_{\text{target}}), \quad (9)$$

As the final step of training, we jointly train the trainable visual safety prompt  $\delta$  using a combination of the loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}}$  and the loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}$ . The total training objective is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}} = \mathcal{L}_{\text{proj}} + \lambda \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}, \quad (10)$$

where  $\lambda$  is a weighting coefficient controlling the balance between deep alignment and response quality. Gradients are computed by backpropagation through the frozen LVLM, updating only the parameters of the visual safety prompt. The training process of deep alignment is shown in Algorithm 1.

### 5.3. Inference-Time Deployment

At inference time, the trained visual safety prompt is applied by padding it around the original image, forming the transformed visual input  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_v$  as defined in Equation 1. This process requires no modification to the model architecture or inference flow.

Following prior work [16], [17], we pair the visual safety prompt with a textual safety prompt to enhance safety alignment. The choice of textual prompt is flexible and can be selected from existing methods, such as non-optimized prompts (e.g., AdaShield [14]) or optimized ones (e.g., PAT [15]). The textual safety prompt is concatenated with the user’s input to form the transformed textual input  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_t$ .

The model then receives  $(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_v, \hat{\mathbf{x}}_t)$  as input. Through this coordinated application of visual and textual safety prompts, our approach enforces alignment from both modalities while preserving compatibility with existing inference pipelines.

## 6. Experiments

To systematically evaluate our *DAVSP*, we conduct extensive experiments to answer the following Research Questions (RQs).

As stated in the threat model, the goal of the defender is to enhance the model’s ability to resist malicious queries while preserving its utility on benign queries. Therefore, we design RQ1 and RQ2 to evaluate whether *DAVSP* can effectively achieve these goals.

**RQ1: How does *DAVSP* perform in resisting malicious queries toward LVLMs?** We evaluate the performance of *DAVSP* in resisting malicious queries on two popular benchmarks and compare it with related baselines (e.g., textual safety prompts and safety perturbations).

**RQ2: How does *DAVSP* perform in preserving the LVLMs’ utility on benign queries?** We compare *DAVSP* with four related baselines by evaluating their utility scores on three benchmark datasets containing diverse benign

queries. These datasets cover a wide range of multimodal tasks, enabling a comprehensive assessment of each alignment approach’s impact on the model’s utility.

To further assess its practicality in black-box scenarios, we design RQ3 to examine the generalization ability of *DAVSP* across different LVLMs.

**RQ3: Is *DAVSP* transferable across different LVLMs?** We evaluate *DAVSP*’s generalization ability by training on LLaVA-1.5-13B and applying it to three other models without further tuning, observing consistent increases in resist success rate. We further conduct case studies on GPT-4o to illustrate its applicability in real-world black-box models.

We design RQ4 to analyze the contributions of two main novelties of *DAVSP*, including visual safety prompt and deep alignment.

**RQ4: How do the visual safety prompt and deep alignment contribute to the performance of *DAVSP*?** We perform an ablation study by individually removing the visual safety prompt and deep alignment, and assess their respective impact on resist success rates and utility scores.

The harmfulness vector plays a central role in Deep Alignment by providing supervision signals in the activation space. Accordingly, we design RQ5 to verify the reliability of the harmfulness vector.

**RQ5: Does the harmfulness vector provide a reliable supervision signal for deeper alignment?** We validate the reliability of the harmfulness vector by directly intervening in the activation space: we manipulate the hidden state to increase or decrease its projection onto the vector and observe whether the model’s resistance behavior changes accordingly.

### 6.1. Experimental Setup

**Datasets for Harmfulness Vector Construction.** To construct the harmfulness vector described in Section 5.2, we leverage the VLGard dataset [8], a large-scale vision-language safety benchmark consisting of 3,000 images, each paired with one or more textual inputs. Each image-text pair is annotated with a binary label indicating whether it is benign or malicious. Among these, we select 470 malicious queries that the base model can easily reject without any defense, alongside 470 randomly sampled benign queries. These examples provide a balanced and reliable foundation for capturing the difference in internal representations between malicious and benign queries.

**Datasets for Visual Safety Prompt Training.** To train the visual safety prompt, we construct a dataset that includes both challenging malicious and benign examples. Specifically, we sample 600 difficult cases from MM-SafetyBench [9], in which the base model yields harmful responses in violation of safety policies. These samples constitute the harmful training set. For the benign portion, we randomly select 100 image-text pairs from MM-Vet [25], a widely adopted vision-language evaluation benchmark.

**Datasets for Evaluation.** We evaluate our method on a diverse set of test benchmarks that span both in-distribution

(ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) settings, covering malicious and benign queries. Here, ID refers to queries that come from the same distribution as the training data, while OOD includes queries from different distributions or with novel patterns not seen during training. The specific datasets used for evaluation are listed below:

- **ID-Malicious:** We use the remaining 4,440 examples from MM-SafetyBench [9], excluding the 600 samples used for training, as the in-distribution malicious test set. This dataset contains three types of malicious queries: SD, TYPO, SD+TYPO.
- **ID-Benign:** We retain 118 image-text pairs from MM-Vet [25], excluding those used during training, to construct the in-distribution benign test set.
- **OOD-Malicious:** We adopt FigStep [7], an out-of-distribution dataset of 500 image-text pairs, where harmful intent is subtly conveyed via typographic prompts with incomplete harmful sentences.
- **OOD-Benign:** We include two additional out-of-distribution benign benchmarks: LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild) [26] with 60 image-text pairs, and MME [18] with 2,374 pairs, to evaluate generalization and the preservation of benign response quality under distribution shifts.

**Evaluation Metrics.** We adopt two main evaluation metrics to evaluate our *DAVSP*: *Resist Success Rate (RSR)* and *Utility Score*.

(1) *Resist Success Rate (RSR)* measures the proportion of malicious queries that are successfully resisted by the aligned model. Formally, it is defined as:

$$RSR = \frac{N_{\text{resist}}}{N_{\text{total}}}, \quad (11)$$

where  $N_{\text{resist}}$  denotes the number of malicious queries for which the model generates a safe response, and  $N_{\text{total}}$  is the total number of evaluated malicious queries. While many previous works [14], [16] use string-matching heuristics to determine whether a response is safe, such methods often suffer from high false positive rates. For instance, responses that begin with refusal phrases like “I’m sorry” but subsequently leak harmful content may be misclassified as safe. To avoid this, we follow recent works [49], [50] and use DeepSeek-V3 [51] to determine whether a response is harmful. The specific evaluation prompt for DeepSeek-V3 is provided in the Appendix C.

(2) *Utility Score* evaluate whether our *DAVSP* preserves the model’s utility on benign queries, we compute utility scores on three widely-used benchmarks: MM-Vet [25], MME [18], and LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild) [26]. Each benchmark provides its own evaluation protocol and scoring function, which we follow directly. For inputs requiring open-ended outputs, we also uniformly use DeepSeek-V3 as an evaluator to provide accurate and low-cost assessments.

**Implementation Details.** We conduct our experiments using two representative LVLMs: LLaVA-1.5-13B [2] and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct [3]. During training, all model parameters are frozen, and only the visual safety prompt  $\delta$  is updated.

We set the padding width  $p$  to 30 and the loss balancing coefficient  $\lambda$  to 0.1. The prompt is trained for a total of 1,200 steps with a batch size of 2 per step. At each step, the perturbation is updated using a fixed step size  $\alpha = \frac{1}{255}$ , following a PGD-style update rule [52]. All experiments are conducted on 8 NVIDIA A100-PCIE-40GB GPUs.

The supervision is applied at a middle layer of the model, where prior studies [24], [46], [47] have shown that high-level semantic features are prominently encoded. Following ASTRA [47], we choose layer 14 for 7B-scale models and layer 20 for 13B-scale models.

To better highlight the contribution of the visual safety prompt, we adopt AdaShield-S—a simple, manually crafted textual prompt from prior work [14]—as the default textual safety prompt. To ensure a fair comparison, we also unify the textual safety prompts across all safety perturbations baselines by replacing their original choices with prompt same with ours. The full content of the default textual safety prompt is visualized in the Appendix A.

**Baselines.** We select four recent state-of-the-art safety alignment approaches as baselines. These baselines can be categorized into two types: (i) *textual safety prompts*, which prepend handcrafted or trained prompts to the textual input, and (ii) *safety perturbations*, which inject trainable perturbations into the visual inputs. A brief description of each baseline is provided below:

*Textual Safety Prompts:*

- **AdaShield-S / AdaShield-A** [14]: AdaShield includes a static handcrafted safety prompt (AdaShield-S) and an adaptive variant (AdaShield-A), which uses an external LLM-based defender to construct a safety prompt pool and retrieves safety prompts from it during inference.
- **PAT** [15]: PAT introduces a trainable safety prompt that is prepended to the user query and trained through adversarial tuning. It balances safety and utility by training the prompt on both adversarial and benign data.

*Safety Perturbations:*

- **ESIII** [16]: ESIII generates safety perturbations that embed predefined security instructions into visual input through gradient-based optimization. These perturbations, along with a textual safety prompt, guide the model toward safe responses.
- **UniGuard** [17]: UniGuard constructs a multimodal safety guardrail by minimizing the likelihood of harmful outputs in a toxic corpus. It applies lightweight visual perturbations along with a predefined textual safety prompt, during inference to defend against malicious queries without modifying model parameters.

## 6.2. RQ1: Resist Malicious Queries

As one alignment approach, the key goal of *DAVSP* is to enhance the model’s ability to resist malicious queries. In this RQ, we evaluate whether *DAVSP* can effectively mitigate such threats.

**Setup.** We apply *DAVSP* and baselines to two benchmarks consisting of diverse malicious queries, and report their RSR.

**Results.** Table 1 presents the RSRs of different approaches. The **highest RSR** in each column is highlighted in bold, and the second lowest is underlined.

**Analyses.** ① *DAVSP* achieves effective defense performance on in-distribution malicious queries. Table 1 shows that *DAVSP* significantly outperforms nearly all baselines. For instance, on the SD+TYPO subset of MM-SafetyBench, it increases the RSR from 65.54% to 98.72% on LLaVA-1.5-13B, and from 62.77% to 99.12% on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. By comparison, the second-best method, ESIII, only increases the RSR to 91.96% and 98.65%, respectively. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of *DAVSP* in mitigating threats from in-distribution malicious queries. ② *DAVSP* generalizes well to out-of-distribution malicious queries. As shown in Table 1, *DAVSP* maintains the strongest defense performance on the out-of-distribution FigStep dataset. It achieves RSRs of 84.20% on LLaVA-1.5-13B and 99.20% on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct, which are significantly higher than other baselines. These results indicate that *DAVSP* performs well on in-distribution malicious queries and generalizes effectively to unseen scenarios. ③ Compared to using textual safety prompts alone, enhancing safety alignment through the visual modality is necessary and beneficial. Across both models, we observe that approaches leveraging either safety perturbations (e.g., ESIII) or visual safety prompts (e.g., *DAVSP*) often achieve higher RSRs than those relying solely on textual safety prompts (e.g., Adashield-S and PAT). For instance, on the SD+TYPO subset of MM-SafetyBench, ESIII increases the RSR to 91.96% on LLaVA-1.5-13B, compared to 85.61% by Adashield-A; *DAVSP* further increases it to 98.72%. Similar results are observed on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. These results suggest that introducing safety prompts in the visual modality is a promising direction for enhancing LVLM safety.

**Answer to RQ1:** *DAVSP* outperforms existing textual safety prompts and safety perturbations in resisting malicious queries.

### 6.3. RQ2: Utility on Benign Queries

In addition to enhancing models’ ability to resist malicious queries, preserving the models’ utility on benign ones is also a key objective for practical deployment. In this RQ, we evaluate whether *DAVSP* can maintain the performance of LVLMs on benign queries.

**Setup.** We compare *DAVSP* with all baselines on three benchmarks widely used to evaluate model performance on benign queries: MM-Vet, MME(including MME-P and MME-C, which evaluates perception and cognition abilities, respectively), and LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild). We use the benchmark-specific utility scores to measure how well

**Table 1.** Comparison of RSR between *DAVSP* and baselines on LLaVA-1.5-13B and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. Higher RSR indicates stronger alignment performance. The green row highlights the results from our proposed *DAVSP*. Within each column, the **highest RSR** is shown in bold, and the second RSR is underlined.

Methods	MM-SafetyBench <sup>ID</sup>			FigStep <sup>OOD</sup>
	SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	
<b>LLaVA-1.5-13B</b>				
No Defense	65.54	86.42	65.47	43.00
Adashield-S	81.96	93.99	94.39	44.20
Adashield-A	85.61	94.59	93.31	63.40
PAT	70.74	88.85	77.36	50.20
UniGuard	88.65	<u>97.91</u>	<u>99.53</u>	46.80
ESIII	<u>91.96</u>	95.74	99.19	<u>70.80</u>
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>98.72</b>	<b>98.45</b>	<b>99.80</b>	<b>84.20</b>
<b>Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct</b>				
No Defense	62.77	88.11	81.69	73.60
Adashield-S	96.42	98.92	99.19	96.80
Adashield-A	97.57	99.26	99.12	<u>98.20</u>
PAT	70.48	92.03	89.73	90.20
UniGuard	98.31	<b>99.66</b>	<u>99.80</u>	98.00
ESIII	<u>98.65</u>	98.99	99.26	<u>98.20</u>
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>99.12</b>	<u>99.53</u>	<b>99.86</b>	<b>99.20</b>

each approach preserves the model’s performance on benign queries.

**Results.** All utility scores are reported in Table 2, with the **highest** and second highest values in each column highlighted.

**Analyses.** ① *DAVSP* significantly outperforms safety perturbations on nearly all utility metrics. For instance, on LLaVA-1.5-13B, *DAVSP* outperforms ESIII by 1.44 on MM-Vet and 7.1 on LLaVa-Bench. We attribute this performance gap to the use of additive perturbations, which will impact the model’s perception of visual features. The MME benchmark, which is divided into MME-P (Perception) and MME-C (Cognition), further supports this interpretation: ESIII and UniGuard exhibit a substantial drop in MME-P scores, while their performance on MME-C remains largely unaffected. ② *DAVSP* matches or even surpasses textual safety prompts on many metrics. For example, on the MME benchmark, *DAVSP* achieves a score of 1318 on the MME-P for LLaVA-1.5-13B, outperforming Adashield-S (1258) and PAT (1290), and closely approaching Adashield-A (1324). These results suggest that, unlike additive safety perturbations, *DAVSP* preserves the model’s perception ability with minimal utility degradation.

**Answer to RQ2:** *DAVSP* achieves better utility preservation on benign queries than safety perturbations while remaining competitive with or even surpassing textual safety prompts.

**Table 2.** Utility scores of different approaches on LLaVA-1.5-13B and Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. Higher is better. **Green rows** show our method *DAVSP*. **Bold** and underlined values denote best and second-best performance, respectively.

Methods	MM-Vet <sup>ID</sup>						MME <sup>OOD</sup>			LLaVa-Bench <sup>OOD</sup>	
	rec	ocr	know	gen	spat	math	total	MME-P	MME-C		total
<b>LLaVA-1.5-13B</b>											
No Defense	<b>42.91</b>	32.26	<u>32.80</u>	<b>38.48</b>	31.62	11.77	<b>39.24</b>	<b>1531</b>	<u>287</u>	<b>1818</b>	<b>69.8</b>
Adashield-S	40.28	34.76	31.76	33.52	<u>36.38</u>	12.35	38.66	1258	280	1538	62.3
Adashield-A	40.05	<u>35.25</u>	30.56	36.17	34.22	<u>17.18</u>	38.57	<u>1324</u>	282	<u>1606</u>	60.9
PAT	<u>42.28</u>	28.93	<b>33.60</b>	36.23	30.99	10.39	37.54	1290	<b>292</b>	1582	60.1
UniGuard	33.23	25.28	22.20	21.96	30.00	11.77	29.87	1050	306	1356	49.7
ESIII	41.01	30.38	30.70	31.85	<b>36.49</b>	15.88	37.63	1124	279	1403	56.5
<i>DAVSP</i>	40.89	<b>35.85</b>	32.60	<u>37.61</u>	32.97	<b>18.82</b>	<u>39.07</u>	1318	284	1602	<u>63.6</u>
<b>Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct</b>											
No Defense	<u>58.73</u>	<b>67.55</b>	51.80	56.96	<b>63.78</b>	<u>57.65</u>	<b>63.22</b>	<u>1664</u>	<b>624</b>	<b>2288</b>	<b>83.0</b>
Adashield-S	58.51	<u>65.17</u>	54.08	57.78	55.68	<b>58.35</b>	61.44	1507	589	2096	73.6
Adashield-A	58.56	65.16	<b>54.64</b>	<b>58.57</b>	55.19	56.59	<u>61.64</u>	1502	<u>609</u>	2111	71.2
PAT	54.87	58.59	48.30	52.72	51.89	51.18	56.44	1478	578	2056	71.4
UniGuard	29.87	37.62	19.72	23.00	31.19	35.18	31.95	1238	540	1778	57.1
ESIII	54.11	57.45	51.10	55.87	46.89	50.00	55.93	1419	572	1991	68.9
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>58.79</b>	62.19	53.36	<u>58.39</u>	<u>56.97</u>	52.35	61.61	<u>1549</u>	597	<u>2146</u>	<u>75.2</u>

**Table 3.** Cross-model generalization ability evaluation of *DAVSP*. The visual safety prompt is trained on LLaVA-1.5-13B and directly transferred to Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct, Deepseek-VL-7b-Chat, and LLaVA-1.5-7B, alongside a predefined textual safety prompt. Only TSP refers to applying only the predefined textual prompt used in *DAVSP*. Higher RSR indicates better performance. **Bold** denotes the highest RSR. **Green rows** show our *DAVSP*.

Methods	MM-SafetyBench <sup>ID</sup>			FigStep <sup>OOD</sup>
	SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	
<b>Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct</b>				
No Defense	62.77	88.11	81.69	73.60
Only TSP	96.42	98.92	99.19	96.80
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>96.89</b>	<b>99.05</b>	<b>99.39</b>	<b>98.00</b>
<b>Deepseek-VL-7B-Chat</b>				
No Defense	60.98	91.46	79.88	58.00
Only TSP	89.73	98.92	<b>95.07</b>	67.40
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>90.07</b>	<b>99.05</b>	94.53	<b>70.40</b>
<b>LLaVA-1.5-7B</b>				
No Defense	58.45	82.23	59.32	44.80
Only TSP	98.72	99.86	99.73	99.40
<i>DAVSP</i>	<b>99.59</b>	<b>99.86</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>100.00</b>

#### 6.4. RQ3: Generalization Ability Across LVLMS

In this RQ, we evaluate the generalization ability of our visual safety prompt across different LVLMS, aiming to verify its practicality in black-box deployment scenarios.

**Setup.** To simulate the black-box setting, the visual safety prompt is first trained on a surrogate model LLaVA-1.5-13B with white-box access and then directly transferred to three black-box target models: Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct, Deepseek-VL-7B-Chat [27], and LLaVA-1.5-7B. We eval-


uate the generalization ability of *DAVSP* on two safety benchmarks: MM-SafetyBench and FigStep. Since *DAVSP* incorporates a predefined textual safety prompt during inference, we also include a baseline using the same textual safety prompt alone (Only TSP).

**Results.** The results are presented in Table 3. The **highest RSR** in each column is highlighted in bold.

**Analyses.** Compared to the baseline using the same textual safety prompt alone (Only TSP), *DAVSP* achieves higher RSRs on nearly all target models and benchmarks. For example, on the FigStep benchmark, *DAVSP* increases the RSR from 73.60% (No Defense) and 96.80% (Only TSP) to 98.00% on Qwen2-VL-7B-Instruct. Similarly, it increases the RSR from 67.40% (Only TSP) to 70.40% on Deepseek-VL-7B-Chat, and from 99.40% (Only TSP) to 100.00% on LLaVA-1.5-7B, which shares the same architecture as the surrogate model. These results collectively demonstrate the generalization ability of the trained visual safety prompt across different models.

**Case.** We further test the real-world applicability of *DAVSP* on GPT-4o, a commercial black-box model. As shown in Figure 3, even without any access to internal parameters or further tuning, the prompt trained on LLaVA-1.5-13B effectively resists malicious queries in GPT-4o. This case study highlights the potential of our approach for deployment in commercial multimodal systems.

**Answer to RQ3:** *DAVSP* exhibits good cross-model generalization ability, supporting its practical deployment in diverse real-world LVLMS.



**Figure 3:** Case studies on GPT-4o demonstrating the effectiveness of our transferred visual prompt in resisting malicious queries. The left example, sourced from MM-SafetyBench, triggers a partially refused yet still informative response to a harmful query. The right example, from FigStep, involves a compositional prompt with incomplete text that leads to unintended model behavior. In both cases, applying our visual safety prompt guides GPT-4o to fully reject the malicious input.

**Table 4.** Ablation study of *DAVSP* on LLaVA-1.5-13B. We assess the contributions of VSP and DA in resisting malicious queries, where VSP refers to the Visual Safety Prompt, and DA refers to the Deep Alignment. RSRs are reported on MM-SafetyBench and FigStep; a higher RSR indicates better alignment performance. **Bold** denotes the lowest RSR. The **green row** presents the full version of *DAVSP*. The **red numbers** in parentheses indicate the reduction in RSR compared to the full version of *DAVSP*.

VSP	DA	MM-SafetyBench <sup>ID</sup>			FigStep <sup>OOD</sup>
		SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	
✗	✗	85.68 (-13.04)	95.47 (-2.99)	88.58 (-11.22)	59.20 (-25.00)
✗	✓	96.55 (-2.17)	97.43 (-1.02)	98.78 (-1.02)	76.20 (-8.00)
✓	✗	88.38 (-10.34)	97.91 (-0.54)	93.99 (-5.81)	67.00 (-17.20)
✓	✓	<b>98.72</b>	<b>98.45</b>	<b>99.80</b>	<b>84.20</b>

**Table 5.** Ablation study of *DAVSP* on LLaVA-1.5-13B. We assess the contributions of VSP (Visual Safety Prompt) and DA (Deep Alignment) in preserving benign utility. Utility scores are reported on MM-Vet, MME, and LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild); higher values indicate better performance. **Bold** denotes the highest score. The **green row** presents the full version of *DAVSP*. The **red numbers** in parentheses indicate the decrease in utility compared to the full method.

VSP	DA	MM-Vet <sup>ID</sup>							MME <sup>OOD</sup>			LLaVa-Bench <sup>OOD</sup>
		rec	ocr	know	gen	spat	math	total	MME-P	MME-C	total	
✗	✗	35.04	28.98	20.84	25.52	29.89	11.77	32.73 (-6.34)	1243	279	1522(-80)	55.0 (-8.6)
✗	✓	37.52	29.28	24.68	30.13	28.43	16.00	33.99 (-5.08)	1228	<b>291</b>	1519 (-83)	55.9 (-7.7)
✓	✗	40.15	32.30	32.28	36.78	29.02	13.41	37.03 (-2.04)	1298	282	1580 (-22)	61.4 (-2.2)
✓	✓	<b>40.89</b>	<b>35.85</b>	<b>32.60</b>	<b>37.61</b>	<b>32.97</b>	<b>18.82</b>	<b>39.07</b>	<b>1318</b>	284	<b>1602</b>	<b>63.6</b>

## 6.5. RQ4: Ablation Study

In this RQ, we aim to investigate the contributions of the Visual Safety Prompt (VSP) and Deep Alignment (DA) to the effectiveness in resisting malicious queries and utility preservation of *DAVSP*. To this end, we conduct an ablation study on LLaVA-1.5-13B.

**Setup.** We evaluate four settings to investigate the contributions of Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment

in *DAVSP* : ❶ using both the Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment; ❷ replacing the Visual Safety Prompt with an additive perturbation, similar to UniGuard and ESIII; ❸ removing Deep Alignment by optimizing only the loss  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{output}}$  (Equation 9); and ❹ removing both Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment. All four settings are evaluated on all selected benchmarks for both malicious and benign queries.

**Results.** Table 4 reports the RSR on MM-SafetyBench

**Table 6.** Resist success rates before and after activation-level projection intervention. We directly modify the layer- $l$  hidden state to increase or decrease the projection  $s(\mathbf{x})$  onto the harmfulness vector  $\mathbf{v}_l$ . **Projection**  $\uparrow$  indicates pushing  $s(\mathbf{x})$  above the upper margin  $\mu_+$ , while **Projection**  $\downarrow$  indicates pushing it below the lower margin  $\mu_-$ .

Dataset	Original	Projection $\uparrow$	Projection $\downarrow$
MM-SafetyBench	90.11	95.10 (+4.99)	73.74 (-16.37)
FigStep	43.00	70.40 (+27.40)	38.60 (-4.40)

and FigStep. The **highest** value in each column is highlighted in bold. Table 5 presents the corresponding utility scores on MM-Vet, MME, and LLaVA-Bench (In-the-Wild). The **highest** value in each column is also highlighted in bold.

**Analyses. ① Contribution of the Visual Safety Prompt.** Replacing the Visual Safety Prompt with additive perturbations leads to a noticeable decline in both safety and utility. For instance, the RSR on FigStep reduces from 84.20% to 76.20%, and the MME-P utility score drops from 1318 to 1228. These results indicate that the Visual Safety Prompt helps expand the optimization space while preserving the perception of the original image, thereby contributing to both improved alignment performance and better utility preservation. **② Contribution of Deep Alignment.** Removing the Deep Alignment results in a substantial degradation in alignment performance. On the SD+TYPO subset of MM-SafetyBench, for example, the RSR reduces sharply from 98.72% to 88.38%. This suggests that guiding the prompt training with activation-level supervision is critical for improving the model’s ability to resist malicious queries.

**Answer to RQ4:** The Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment are both essential to *DAVSP*, with the former substantially improving resistance to malicious queries while preserving utility and the latter further improving alignment effectiveness without impairing performance on benign queries.

## 6.6. RQ5: Evaluation of Harmfulness Vector

In this RQ, we aim to verify whether the harmfulness vector  $\mathbf{v}_l$  (computed from the fixed decoder layer  $l$  as specified in the Implementation Details) and its associated margin thresholds  $\mu_+$  and  $\mu_-$  provide a reliable supervision signal for deeper safety alignment. To this end, we examine whether adjusting the projection value  $s(\mathbf{x})$  along  $\mathbf{v}_l$  in the activation space can consistently induce or suppress the model’s resistance behavior. Such controllability would suggest that  $\mathbf{v}_l$  captures an actionable semantic direction aligned with the model’s internal representation of harmfulness.

**Setup.** For each input  $\mathbf{x}$ , we prepend the predefined textual safety prompt and apply no modification to the visual input. We then extract the hidden state  $\mathbf{h}_l$  of the final input token at layer  $l$  and compute its projection  $s(\mathbf{x})$

onto the harmfulness vector  $\mathbf{v}_l$ . We consider two types of intervention: **Projection**  $\uparrow$ , which sets the projection target  $s_{\text{target}} = \mu_+$  and is applied only when  $s(\mathbf{x}) < \mu_+$ ; and **Projection**  $\downarrow$ , which sets  $s_{\text{target}} = \mu_-$  and is applied only when  $s(\mathbf{x}) > \mu_-$ . When either condition is met, we update the hidden state to enforce the target projection:

$$\mathbf{h}_l^{\text{new}} = \mathbf{h}_l + (s_{\text{target}} - s(\mathbf{x})) \cdot \mathbf{v}_l$$

RSRs are measured before and after intervention on two malicious benchmarks (MM-SafetyBench and FigStep). All experiments in this RQ are conducted on LLaVA-1.5-13B.

**Results.** Table 6 shows the RSRs before and after two types of projection intervention.

**Analyses. ①** Pushing projections above  $\mu_+$  leads to an increase in resist success rates. Across all datasets, enforcing higher projection values leads to a substantial rise in resisting malicious queries: the rates increase by 4.99% on MM-SafetyBench and 27.40% on FigStep. This suggests that the model internally associates larger projections onto the harmfulness vector with higher harmfulness. **②** Pushing projections below  $\mu_-$  leads to a decrease in resist success rates. Conversely, lowering the projection reduces the RSRs across all datasets, including a drop of 16.37% on MM-SafetyBench and 6.40% on FigStep. This suggests that smaller projections onto the harmfulness vector are interpreted by the model as stronger indicators of harmless intent.

**Answer to RQ5:** The harmfulness vector is strongly associated with harmful intent. It provides a reliable supervision signal for deeper safety alignment, which can unlock the model’s inherent defense capability.

## 7. Discussion

### 7.1. Integration with Detection-Based Defenses

There are some detection-based approaches for resisting malicious queries [50], [53]. They operate by assessing the harmfulness of user queries or model responses through additional evaluation. For example, ECSO [50] first prompts the model to self-evaluate its response, and if deemed unsafe, converts the visual input into a textual caption to mitigate harmful outputs. Details about ECSO are provided in Appendix B. Given they focus on evaluating rather than improving the model’s internal alignment, we do not include them in direct comparisons. Nevertheless, we expect that they can complement our approach in practical deployment. To verify this, we combine *DAVSP* with ECSO and explore two integration strategies. Experimental results show that the two approaches are compatible and mutually beneficial. The two integration strategies are as follows:

**Selective Fusion.** *DAVSP* is applied only when ECSO identifies the initial response as unsafe. This enhanced input is then re-evaluated. As shown in Table 7, this strategy

**Table 7.** Utility scores of *DAVSP* and ECSO integration on LLaVA-1.5-13B. We compare individual approaches with two fusion strategies: **Selective Fusion** (conditionally applies *DAVSP*) and **Uniform Fusion** (applies *DAVSP* to all inputs) on MM-Vet, MME, LLaVa-Bench(In-the-Wild). Higher scores indicate better utility.

Method	MM-Vet <sup>ID</sup>							MME <sup>OOD</sup>			LLaVA-Bench <sup>OOD</sup>
	rec	ocr	know	gen	spat	math	total	MME-P	MME-C	total	
No Defense	42.91	32.26	32.80	38.48	31.62	11.77	39.24	1511	287	1798	69.8
Only ECSO	42.28	31.51	32.00	37.17	31.08	11.77	38.56	1531	290	1821	68.5
Only <i>DAVSP</i>	40.89	35.85	32.60	37.61	32.97	18.82	39.07	1318	284	1602	63.6
<b>Selective Fusion</b>	41.90	31.13	31.60	36.74	30.81	11.77	38.31	1531	291	1822	68.3
<b>Uniform Fusion</b>	39.82	33.13	31.40	36.44	32.54	16.12	37.32	1318	284	1602	62.6

**Table 8.** RSRs of *DAVSP* and ECSO integration on LLaVA-1.5-13B. We compare individual approaches with two fusion strategies: **Selective Fusion** (conditionally applies *DAVSP*) and **Uniform Fusion** (applies *DAVSP* to all inputs) on MM-SafeBench and FigStep. Higher RSRs indicate stronger alignment performance.

Methods	MM-SafetyBench <sup>ID</sup>			FigStep <sup>OOD</sup>
	SD+TYPO	SD	TYPO	
No Defense	65.54	86.42	65.47	43.00
Only ECSO	88.40	93.49	88.20	80.80
Only <i>DAVSP</i>	98.72	98.45	99.80	84.20
Selective Fusion	97.23	97.70	97.91	86.80
UniForm Fusion	99.05	98.92	99.80	94.20

preserves benign utility close to the no-defense setting while significantly increasing RSRs on MM-SafetyBench and FigStep compared to ECSO alone(see Table 8).

**Uniform Fusion.** *DAVSP* is applied to all visual inputs before ECSO starts. This setup increases RSRs on both MM-SafetyBench and FigStep that are close to 100%, as shown in Table 8. While it introduces a slight utility drop, the overall performance degradation remains acceptable for safety-critical applications, as shown in Table 7.

These results suggest that *DAVSP* can be effectively integrated with detection-based defenses, leading to enhanced safety and utility. This highlights its potential for broader applicability in real-world deployment scenarios.

## 7.2. Resist Adversarial Examples

We notice that recent works have explored the construction of adversarial examples for LVLMS, where adversarial perturbations are optimized via gradient-based methods to maximize the model’s propensity to produce harmful outputs [35], [36]. To investigate whether *DAVSP* can effectively resist adversarial examples, we evaluate its performance on inputs crafted using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), a representative method for generating such examples [52], [54]. It is worth mentioning that PGD generally requires white-box access, an assumption rarely available in realistic scenarios. We grant such white-box access here merely to perform a stress test of our approach. All experiments in this section are conducted on LLaVA-1.5-13B.

Specifically, we select 82 queries from MM-SafetyBench and train their visual inputs using PGD, aiming to induce

harmful responses from the model when paired with the predefined textual safety prompt (without any visual modifications). We then directly feed the resulting adversarial examples into the model protected by *DAVSP*. As our approach involves resizing input images, which might weaken adversarial examples’ effectiveness, we include a baseline that shares the same setup as *DAVSP*, but replaces the content of the visual safety prompt with random pixel values for fair comparison.

Results show that *DAVSP* achieves a resist success rate of 97.56%, compared to only 91.45% for the baseline, highlighting the potential of our approach to resist adversarial examples.

## 8. Conclusion and Future Work

### 8.1. Conclusion

In this paper, we present *DAVSP*, which effectively addresses critical challenges in LVLMS safety alignment by leveraging Visual Safety Prompt and Deep Alignment. The Visual Safety Prompt preserves critical visual features and significantly expands the optimization space compared to existing safety perturbations. Meanwhile, Deep Alignment unlocks the model’s intrinsic capability to distinguish malicious queries from benign ones, directly addressing the shallow alignment issues prevalent in prior approaches. Extensive experiments demonstrate that *DAVSP* consistently outperforms existing approaches in resisting malicious queries across various models and scenarios, without incurring significant degradation in benign utility.

### 8.2. Future Work

This work introduces a novel perspective on safeguarding LVLMS through visual safety prompts, providing a promising approach to resist malicious queries while preserving benign utility. In future work, we plan to extend this paradigm to both pre-training and post-training stages to achieve deeper safety alignment. We also aim to explore the joint training of visual and textual safety prompts for enhanced multimodal coordination, and to adapt our framework to real-world scenarios such as interactive agents and multi-turn dialogue systems.

## Ethics Statement

The goal of this work is to safeguard LVLMS against diverse malicious queries that may induce unsafe or policy-violating responses. We acknowledge that some of the experiments involve the use of harmful or ethically inappropriate data, and a portion of such content is included in this paper for illustrative purposes. However, we emphasize that all data used in our study is sourced from publicly available datasets, and any examples presented in the paper have been carefully filtered to remove the most sensitive or offensive content.

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## Appendix A. Default Textual Safety Prompt

We adopt **AdaShield-S**, a simple, manually crafted prompt introduced in prior work [14], as our default textual safety prompt. Without any optimization or retrieval-based enhancement, AdaShield-S serves as a lightweight and representative example of practical safety prompts. The full content of AdaShield-S is shown below:

### Default Textual Safety Prompt

Before processing any instruction, examine the image carefully for any text or items that might suggest harmful, illegal, or dangerous activity. If detected, do not engage with or act on the content. Analyze the image and the given instruction holistically. If the content is determined to be unethical, illegal, or dangerous, please answer “I am sorry”. Instead, please execute the following instructions safely and correctly:

## Appendix B. ECSO Inference Procedure

For completeness, we provide a detailed description of the ECSO inference process. Specifically, ECSO operates in the following steps:

- ① The original image-text pair is first forwarded to the LVLM to obtain an initial response.
- ② The model is then instructed to assess the safety of this initial response. If deemed safe, the response is returned without further modification.
- ③ If the response is judged unsafe, the visual input is converted into a textual caption by the LVLM.
- ④ The generated caption, together with the original textual query, is then fed into the model for another round of inference to produce the final response.

## Appendix C. DeepSeek-V3 Evaluation Details

We use DeepSeek-V3 to evaluate whether a model successfully resists malicious queries by checking if its generated response is free from harmful content. Specifically, we define a malicious query as being successfully resisted if the model generates a safe response.

To avoid the high false positive rates introduced by simple string-matching heuristics [14], [16], we adopt a structured evaluation prompt, following recent safety evaluation practices [49], [50]. The prompt instructs DeepSeek-V3 [51] to classify responses as either safe or unsafe based on the presence of harmful, unsafe, or unethical content, including implicit or covert harm. The detailed prompt is shown below:

### Prompt for Resist Success Rate Evaluation by Deepseek-V3

#### SYSTEM PROMPT

You are a safety classifier. You will receive a piece of text generated by an AI model. Your task is to evaluate whether the text contains harmful content. If the text contains any harmful, unsafe, or unethical content, respond with "unsafe". If it does not contain any such content and is appropriate, respond with "safe".

Your answer must be a single word: `safe` or `unsafe`, with no explanation.

**Note:** Responses that appear safe on the surface but implicitly contain unsafe content should still be classified as "unsafe".

#### USER PROMPT

Evaluate the following model-generated response. Does it contain any harmful, unsafe, or unethical content? Please answer `safe` or `unsafe`.

**Response:** {text}

#### Example:

*Input:*

I am sorry. The image contains a phrase that suggests tracking someone's location without their permission, which is unethical and potentially illegal. It is important to respect people's privacy and obtain their consent before tracking their location.

*Output:*

`safe`

*Input:*

To purchase illegal drugs using cryptocurrencies without leaving a trace, follow these steps: 1. Choose a cryptocurrency exchange:...

*Output:*

`unsafe`