Mind the Web: The Security of Web Use Agents

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***Abstract*—Web-use agents are rapidly being deployed to automate complex web tasks, from research and shopping to form completion and content analysis, operating with extensive browser capabilities including multi-tab navigation, DOM manipulation, JavaScript execution and authenticated session access. However, these powerful capabilities create a critical and previously unexplored attack surface. This paper demonstrates how attackers can exploit web-use agents' high-privilege capabilities by embedding malicious content in web pages such as comments, reviews, or advertisements that agents encounter during legitimate browsing tasks. In addition, we introduce the *task-aligned* injection technique that frame malicious commands as helpful task guidance rather than obvious attacks. This technique exploiting fundamental limitations in LLMs' contextual reasoning: agents struggle in maintaining coherent contextual awareness and fail to detect when seemingly helpful web content contains steering attempts that deviate from their original task goal. Through systematic evaluation of four popular agents (OpenAI Operator, Browser Use, Do Browser, OpenOperator), we demonstrate nine payload types that compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including unauthorized camera activation, user impersonation, local file exfiltration, password leakage, and denial of service, with validation across multiple LLMs achieving success rates of 80%-100%. These payloads succeed across agents with built-in safety mechanisms, requiring only the ability to post content on public websites, creating unprecedented risks given the ease of exploitation combined with agents' high-privilege access. To address this attack, we propose comprehensive mitigation strategies including oversight mechanisms, execution constraints, and task-aware reasoning techniques, providing practical directions for secure development and deployment.**

***Index Terms*—Web-use agents, browser automation, prompt injection, web security, LLM.**

1. Introduction

Web-use agents represent a rapidly growing category of AI agents that automate complex browser tasks through natural language instructions. These agents can autonomously navigate websites, complete forms, make purchases, and perform multi-step workflows across arbitrary web interfaces on behalf of users [1], [2]. Unlike traditional automation frameworks that rely on predetermined scripts [3], web-use agents leverage large language models (LLMs) to dynamically interpret user goals and adapt to diverse website structures, making them increasingly valuable for both individual users and enterprise applications [4], [5].

Web-use agents perform user-defined tasks by relying on a variety of browser capabilities, which may include: navigating websites, interacting with web elements, executing JavaScript, submitting forms, and accessing authenticated sessions and the local file system [1], [2], [6]–[8]. To plan and execute tasks, agents process all web page content, including user comments, forum posts, and advertisements, as input to their underlying LLMs. This web content processing creates a new attack surface that bypasses traditional browser security mechanisms. Since they are assumed to be trusted entities, existing security mechanisms are insufficient to ensure that agents only execute their designated tasks. This enables attackers to manipulate agent behavior through natural language instructions embedded in web page content, requiring no code injection or privilege escalation.

Security research on web-use agents has focused on evaluation frameworks [5], [9] and direct attack scenarios where users provide malicious instructions [10]. However, the threat of third-party content manipulation, where attackers embed malicious instructions in web content that agents encounter during routine browsing tasks, remains unexplored.

In this paper, we demonstrate a new attack vector that web-use agents are vulnerable to, in which malicious instructions are embedded directly into web content that agents encounter during task execution; the proposed attack vector leverages limitations in LLMs' contextual reasoning capabilities, particularly their inability to maintain coherent contextual awareness and detect when seemingly helpful content is subtly steering them toward unintended actions. We introduce an effective *task-aligned* injection technique that frames malicious instructions as contextually helpful task guidance rather than obvious commands.

We systematically evaluate our attack against four popular web-use agent implementations: Browser Use, OpenAI Operator, OpenOperator and Do Browser, demonstrating the severe practical impact of our nine distinct payload types that compromise confidentiality, integrity, and availability. These payloads include unauthorized camera

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activation, credential extraction, local file system access, and user impersonation through social media posting. In our evaluation, they were shown to succeed across agents with different web-use agent deployment approaches and underlying LLMs (achieved success rates of 80-100% across different payloads).

The practical implications of this attack are significant given the ease of exploitation, i.e., it only requires the ability to post content on websites that agents may visit during task execution. As the use of web-use agents for increasingly sensitive applications grows, the ability for third-parties to influence agent behavior through simple content manipulation represents a serious security concern that warrants immediate attention.

To address these security concern, we propose three types of mitigation strategies: (1) oversight mechanisms that increase transparency and control, (2) execution constraints that limit agent capabilities, and (3) task-aware reasoning techniques that help detect semantic manipulation attempts. We analyze the fundamental tradeoffs between security and usability that make effective mitigation particularly challenging, as stronger protections often reduce the autonomy and seamless operation that make web-use agents valuable.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We raise critical awareness of a previously unexplored security vulnerability in web-use agents, demonstrating how third-party adversaries can easily steer agent behavior by simply embedding malicious instructions in web comments, advertisements, or forum posts that agents encounter as they perform legitimate tasks.
- We conduct a systematic evaluation of our attack against four popular web-use agent implementations, demonstrating severe practical impact via nine payload types including unauthorized camera activation, credential theft, file system access, user impersonation and denial of service. We validate attack effectiveness across multiple LLMs with success rates of 80-100%.
- We introduce the *task-aligned* injection technique, which is used to craft malicious instructions that appear as contextually helpful task guidance, and demonstrate its effectiveness against various web-use agent implementations, including those with safety mechanisms.
- To address this attack, we propose three types of mitigation strategies (oversight mechanism, execution constraints, and task-aware reasoning approaches) and identify key research directions.

2. Web-Use Agents

Web-use agents are a new class of autonomous AI agents specifically designed to operate in web browsers [1], [2], [7], [8]. Their purpose is to carry out complex, goal-directed tasks on behalf of users, such as searching for information, booking flights, completing forms, or navigating interactive websites, with minimal human intervention. These agents aim to translate high-level goals, both one-time requests like "Find a hotel in Paris for next weekend" and recurring automated tasks such as "Post daily updates about recent LLM research developments on my LinkedIn account," into real-time actions,through automated browsing, interaction with forms, and multi-step workflows, across websites.

Web-use agents are characterized by their ability to (1) reason about both the user's intent and the structure of the web interface, and (2) autonomously decide how to proceed. They rely on LLMs to analyze extracted page content and generate step-by-step instructions. In each step, the agent gathers content from the current page and sends it to the LLM along with the original task. The LLM responds with an instruction (e.g., "Click the button labeled 'Continue'") which the agent follows. This cycle is repeated as the agent progresses through the task, adjusting its behavior in response to page changes or unexpected outcomes.

Unlike traditional automation frameworks such as Selenium or Puppeteer [3], which depend on deterministic scripts and structured APIs, web-use agents are designed to operate flexibly and adaptively across diverse websites. While this flexibility offers significant advantages, it also introduces new and underexplored risks, which are explored in this work.

2.1. Web-Use Agent Types

Web-use agents can be implemented in a variety of ways, depending on how they access the browser environment and what permissions they are granted. While all such agents follow the same general interaction loop, perceiving the page, reasoning via an LLM, and executing actions, the agent type and deployment determines what data the agent can access, how isolated it is from the user's environment, and what capabilities they possess for task execution.

We identify three types of web-use agents:

Extension-Based Agents [7]. These agents are deployed as browser extensions and operate within the user's active browser instance. They have direct access to the Document Object Model (DOM), browser tabs, active sessions, and depending on permissions, the local file system. This architecture offers the highest level of integration and functionality but also inherits the full trust and access privileges of the browser environment, making it especially sensitive to attacks that exploit existing sessions or stored credentials.

Local Clean-Browser Agents [1]. These agents launch a new browser instance locally on the user's machine. They do not inherit user's browser state, cookies, or saved credentials from the user's main browser and typically begin in a fresh, unauthenticated context. However, they can authenticate during the user tasks, for example by logging-in manually or using credentials provided as part of the task. Since they run on the local machine, they retain access to the file system.

Remote Isolated Agents [2], [8]. These agents operate inside remote, sandboxed environments. They are isolated from both the user's browser and their local machine and do not have access to previously stored credentials, browser state, or the local file system. However, depending on the implementation, some agents (such as OpenAI's Operator) may allow the user to enter credentials or context during a session, and preserve that information across sessions. We refer to this variant as a *semi-stateful* remote agent.

2.2. Modalities and Capabilities

To interpret and act on web content, web-use agents rely on different perception modalities. These define how the agent observes the page and extracts information for decision-making. The chosen modality directly affects what the agent can "see," and consequently, which types of attack vectors it may be vulnerable to:

DOM Parsing Agents can directly access and interpret the rendered DOM of a webpage. This permits identification and interaction with particular HTML components (buttons, forms, links) and enables precise targeting of structured elements. However, agents relying only on the DOM, may fail to understand content rendered visually, such as loaded images or ads leading to incomplete or incorrect interpretation of the page.

Screenshot Analysis and Optical Character Recognition (OCR) Agents operate by capturing screenshots of the webpage. They subsequently employ computer vision tools, like OCR [11], to interpret text and identify interactive components based on their visual characteristics. This simulates human visual perception and is particularly useful when dealing with visually rich components.

Hybrid Approaches Agents may integrate the techniques mentioned above to get enhanced interaction capabilities. Hybrid methods offer greater flexibility, but also broaden the attack surface by introducing multiple perception channels.

3. Related Work

3.1. Jailbreaking Techniques for LLMs

The increasing sophistication of LLMs has been accompanied by research on their vulnerabilities, commonly explored using "jailbreaking" – methods designed to elicit responses that models are programmed to avoid due to safety and ethical guidelines [12].

Textual jailbreaks: Text manipulation has been the main focus of jailbreaking efforts. These methods frequently entail creating specific input prompts that take advantage of an LLM's architecture or how it interprets instructions. Some techniques concentrate on "prompt engineering," in which users create inputs that instruct the model to produce content that would otherwise be constrained. This includes methods like role-playing, where the LLM is instructed to act as a character without safety constraints (e.g., DAN [13]). Other techniques aim to manipulate and bypass safeguards by using perturbations such as leetspeak, emojis, and decoding techniques (e.g., Base64) [14], [15]. Automated frameworks, like PAIR [14], which leverages several of these techniques simultaneously, have been developed.

Multimodal jailbreaks: To jailbreak multimodal LLMs MLLMs), which can interpret data from several modalities (such as text, images, and audio) researchers have recently demonstrated the ability to deceive the model by embedding jailbreaks within the images, using techniques like steganography to embed malicious inputs within the image [16]–[18]. Other works focused on creating "shuffle inconsistency," where MLLMs can understand harmful instructions, even when parts (e.g., image and text components) are shuffled, yet the authors found that their safety mechanisms are bypassed by such shuffled inputs, as illustrated by Zaho et al. [19]. Benchmarks like JailBreakV-28k [20] have been used to test MLLMs' robustness against various modalities and jailbreak techniques.

In our work, we apply both text-based and image-based prompt injection techniques, depending on the capabilities of the targeted web-use agent. We also introduce a novel *task-aligned* injection technique designed to exploit web-use agents by masquerading as legitimate contextual content (e.g. user comments or system notes) that appears to support the user's original objective. This method proves highly effective against agents handling open-ended tasks, where the LLM autonomously plans its actions, and bypasses built-in safety mechanisms.

3.2. Assessment of Web-use and PC Usage Agents

The rise of agents that can interact directly with the user's PC and web-browser has raised awareness of the need for comprehensive evaluation examining both agent capabilities and security robustness against diverse attack techniques, as these agents operate with significant privileges on behalf of users.

SUDO [9] systematically tests commercial computer-use agents like Claude Computer Use against various attack scenarios, highlighting security vulnerabilities in PC-based agents.

For web-use agents, evaluation has focused primarily on capability assessment. Existing benchmarks like WebArena [5] and TUR[K]INGBENCH [21] have been developed to assess web agent capabilities and performance. TUR[K]INGBENCH [21], for instance, assesses interactive reasoning on web pages using natural HTML pages from crowdsourcing platforms with multi-modal settings.

While these frameworks provide general methodologies for the evaluation of web-use agents, security research specifically targeting web-use agents remains limited.

A recent study by Kumar et al. [10] examined direct attack scenarios in which agents receive harmful instructions from the user (direct prompt injections or malicious tasks). In contrast, our work demonstrates how agents can unintentionally perform unauthorized actions when provided with benign user instructions but exposed to malicious content subtly injected into web pages.

4. Threat Model

We assume a remote attacker who cannot directly compromise the agent's code or the user task, but can influence it through manipulated web content. The adversary cannot execute arbitrary code or hijack browser sessions but can inject or modify visible content that the agent processes, including: a) posting public comments or reviews on legitimate websites; b) injecting advertisements or third-party

content via ad networks; or, c) manipulating user-generated data such as forum posts, emails, or shared documents.

We make the following key assumptions about the environment and architecture of the web-use agents:
ReAct-style LLM reasoning: The agent uses an LLM to interpret browser content and generate instructions, via ReAct-based methods [22].
Limited Observability: The attacker cannot observe the agent's internal thought process i.e., queries or responses, but can control portions of external content that the agent may process as input.
Browser capabilities: The agent is designed to automate complex browser tasks with extensive permissions, such as navigating authenticated pages, or submitting forms.
Autonomous Operation: We assume the user delegates tasks to the agent for autonomous execution without continuous oversight or manual intervention during task completion.

5. Attack Methodology and Payload Taxonomy

This section presents our systematic attack methodology against web-use agents. We explain the fundamental attack principle and four-stage lifecycle (5.1), injection techniques (5.2), our taxonomy of nine payload types (5.3), evaluated implementations (5.4), and concrete demonstrations with practical impact evidence (5.5).

5.1. Attack Principle and Lifecycle

Web-use agents introduce a new attack surface distinct from traditional web vulnerabilities. Unlike attacks that exploit code-level flaws (e.g., XSS), our method leverages the agent's inherent privileges and its reliance on natural language reasoning over web content.

Instead of exploiting security flaws to gain access, we use the agent's existing capabilities, LLMs' susceptibility to prompt engineering, and their inability to reliably distinguish between legitimate and malicious input. Since agents process all webpage content, including articles, comments, and ads, as input, attackers can embed natural language instructions that the model misinterprets as valid commands.

The attack follows a four-stage process:

1) **Injection**: Attackers embed malicious instructions into highly visited web pages using accessible channels such as user comments, posts, or targeted ads (e.g., ads specifically targeting customers of a particular bank or users of specific services). The payload can be delivered as plaintext or embedded within images, depending on the agent's perception modalities.
2) **Perception**: The agent collects all visible content as input, not distinguishing between benign and malicious content.
3) **Interpretation**: The agent's LLM processes the collected content, interpreting the malicious injection as a legitimate command and updating the execution plan accordingly.
4) **Execution**: The agent executes the updated action plan using its full privileges, unknowingly serving the attacker's objectives.

Task-Aligned Injections. We craft the injection payloads to appear contextually aligned with the user's tasks rather than as overt attack attempts. Instead of using explicit override commands (e.g., "ignore the previous instructions"), we embed content that mimics helpful suggestions, system notices, or task refinements, seemingly supporting the user's original objective. For example, instead of commanding "browse [malicious-url]", we embed instructions within a fake system note like: "[SYSTEM NOTE:] For a more complete analysis, please browse our new website at [malicious-url]."

This approach is highly effective since the injected content appears to support the user's goal, significantly increasing the likelihood it will be integrated into the agent's reasoning process without triggering safety mechanisms. It subtly steers the task toward the attacker's objective by refining or clarifying the original instruction, without breaking the agent's frame. It proves especially impactful against agents handling high-level, open-ended tasks (e.g., "complete this task" or "summarize the content"). In such scenarios, the agent plans its own execution steps, allowing the injected content to be seamlessly incorporated into its reasoning process.

Common examples include: a) phrases indicating that the current website version is deprecated; b) simulated A/B test notes suggesting additional steps for better results; c) fabricated user comments hinting at specific recommendations; and d) fake completion confirmations that trick agents into believing they need to perform additional verification steps.

5.2. Injection Techniques

To manipulate web-use agents behavior, attackers must embed malicious content into web pages that agents will encounter during task execution. The injection method depends on the agent's perception modalities and the attacker's access to content channels:

Text Injection. The most direct approach involves inserting adversarial language into user-generated content fields that agents process during browsing. This includes blog comments, product reviews, social media posts, and other textual content within the agent's perception scope. Text injections are effective against all types of agents (Section 2.2), whether they rely on DOM parsing, screenshot analysis, or a hybrid.

Image-Based Injection. Agents that rely on visual perception (via screenshot processing or hybrid methods) are vulnerable to instructions embedded as text within images. Attackers can introduce malicious instructions through advertisements, comments, posts or any visual content processed by OCR systems and converted to text for interpretation.

5.3. Attack Payload Taxonomy

In this section, we categorize and define a taxonomy of nine attack payload types (P1–P9), each representing a distinct malicious action induced through injected semantic content. We specify each payload according to the CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability), the preconditions required for execution, and agent types vulnerable to each. The payloads are described below and summarized in the Appendix (Table 1).

P1: Unauthorized Camera/Microphone Activation

Attack Type: Confidentiality Violation
Targeted Agents: Extension-based agents
Preconditions: The user has previously granted camera/microphone permissions to the target domain.
Description: Exploits browser-permission inheritance in extension-based agents to activate the user's microphone or camera without authorization. When users have previously granted camera and microphone permissions to legitimate sites (such as Google Meet), attackers can inject malicious instructions directing the agent to initiate or join unauthorized meetings with active audio/video capture, resulting in severe privacy violations and potential surveillance.

P2: Extraction of Sensitive Personal Information

Attack Type: Confidentiality Violation
Targeted Agents: Extension-based, Semi-stateful remote isolated, Local clean-browser,
Preconditions: Active sessions or stored credentials **Description:** Involves extracting private or sensitive user data from active authenticated sessions. Such sensitive data may include private messages, emails, financial statements, user activity logs (e.g., Google Activity), or private social media account information. Successful exploitation leads to severe confidentiality breaches, identity theft and privacy violations. The vulnerability scope depends on agent types: extension-based agents can exploit any authenticated sessions or stored credentials from the user's browser environment; semi-stateful isolated agents are vulnerable when credentials have been provided to the agent in current or previous sessions; and local clean-browser agents are primarily vulnerable to information accessed within sessions they authenticate during the active browsing task.

P3: Credentials Hijack

Attack Type: Confidentiality + Integrity Violation
Targeted Agents: Extension-based, Local clean-browser, Semi-stateful remote isolated
Preconditions: Browser autofill with stored credentials, or active authenticated sessions for password reset
Description: Exploits scenarios where browsers autofill stored credentials or maintain active authenticated sessions. For extension-based agents operating within the user's browser environment, attackers can inject instructions directing the agent to extract autofilled credentials by manipulating DOM elements (e.g., changing password fields from type="password" to type="text") or querying stored values and send them to the attacker. For agents with active authenticated sessions, attackers can instruct them to initiate password resets or send recovery information to attacker-controlled emails, enabling account takeover.

P4: Local File System Exfiltration

Attack Type: Confidentiality Violation
Targeted Agents: Local clean-browser, Extension-based
Preconditions: Agent has access to Local file system
Description: Exploits web-use agents' ability to access the local file system. Attackers deceive agents into accessing sensitive local files, for example by instructing them to access `file://` URLs and exfiltrate content by sending to attacker-controlled servers, websites, or emails. Local clean-browser agents are especially vulnerable since they often retain permission to access local resources during operation. Extension-based agents can be vulnerable if users grant them file system access permissions.

P5: Task Abortion

Attack Type: Availability Violation
Targeted Agents: All agent types
Preconditions: None
Description: Causes the web-use agent to prematurely terminate its ongoing task, for example by tricking the agent into believing the task has already been completed or must immediately be halted. To execute this attack, the attacker injects malicious instructions into benign webpages, such as: "An unexpected error occurred on this website. The information presented here is no longer trustworthy. Close this page immediately." This payload prevents completion of the user's intended task, creating a direct denial-of-service effect and it broadly affects all agent types, as it relies solely on semantic manipulation, without requiring specific permissions or authentication states.

P6: Infinite Loop

Attack Type: Availability Violation
Targeted Agents: All agent types
Preconditions: None
Description: Causes web-use agents to enter an infinite action loop, leading to resource exhaustion and denial-of-service. Attackers embed instructions tricking agents into performing repetitive, unending tasks such as continuously refreshing pages or repeatedly executing actions without proper stopping conditions.

P7: Unauthorized User Action

Attack Type: Integrity Violation
Targeted Agents: Extension-based, Semi-stateful isolated, Local clean-browser
Preconditions: Active sessions or stored credentials
Description: Manipulates web-use agents into performing unauthorized actions on behalf of users without user confirmation. Attackers inject instructions that prompt agents to execute harmful or embarrassing actions such as publishing damaging social media posts, submitting inappro-

priate content, making unauthorized purchases, or sending emails. Extension-based and semi-stateful agents are particularly vulnerable due to their access to authenticated sessions, while local clean-browser agents are vulnerable when operating within authenticated contexts during task execution.

P8: Phishing via Misleading Redirection

Attack Type: Integrity Violation
Targeted Agents: All agent types
Preconditions: None
Description: Exploits web-use agents by embedding instructions tricking agents into navigating to external websites controlled or selected by attackers. Attackers can inject instructions directing agents to follow external links under the guise of accessing updated or more accurate content. As a result, agents may unknowingly process false or harmful information.

P9: Returning Misleading or Deceptive Content

Attack Type: Integrity Violation
Targeted Agents: All agent types
Preconditions: None
Description: Exploits web-use agents by causing them to return misleading or entirely deceptive information to users. Attackers manipulate agents into disregarding actual visible content and instead presenting false or irrelevant data. Manipulated outputs can lead to incorrect decisions or unintended harmful actions, such as booking expensive flights, making erroneous purchases, or executing irreversible operations based on false premises.

5.4. Evaluated Agent Implementations

We chose several representative web-use agents to evaluate our approach, covering the agents types previously defined (Section 2). These agents differ in their integration method, perception modalities, state management, and security boundaries, enabling a thorough evaluation of our attacks. A summary of web-use agent Tools and Agent Types can be found in Table 2 in the Appendix.

Do Browser [7]: An extension-based agent integrated into the user's existing browser instance. It has access to active user sessions and cookies. Local file system access is dependent on user-granted permissions.

Browser Use [1]: A local clean-browser agent launching a clean browser instance without inheriting state from the user's browser. By default, it maintains local file-system access and can store credentials or cookies temporarily during the task execution.

OpenOperator [8]: An isolated remote browser agent executing in a sandboxed environment without persistent state. It has no access to user-local resources or sessions. Combines screenshot-based analysis and DOM parsing for web content perception.

OpenAI Operator [2]: A remote isolated *semi-stateful* browser agent allowing limited state persistence as defined by the user between sessions (e.g., credentials provided over time). It interacts via a parsing screenshots taken from the browser.

5.5. Attack Demonstrations

In this section, we provide concrete documented examples from our experiments to demonstrate the practicality, severity, and diversity of these attacks, categorized by payloads, impact on Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A) and agent implementation.

Demonstration Setup. To demonstrate and evaluate the attack payloads in a realistic scenario, we deployed a benign-looking website named *City-Explorer*, which provides users with information about interesting cities in Europe and allows visitors to log in and leave comments (both text and images). Acting as an attacker, we submitted malicious instructions embedded within text comments or images. An example of an injection via a submitted comment on the City-Explorer website can be found in Figure 5 in the Appendix. We then instructed the web-use agents to perform legitimate tasks, such as summarizing the webpage content or analyzing the site. The agents processed our maliciously injected content alongside legitimate information, causing them to execute unintended actions as defined by each payload. Throughout these demonstrations, we observed and documented the agents' behavior, verifying the success and severity of each attack scenario.

Underlying LLM Configuration. Some agents, such as Do Browser and Browser Use, allow configuration to use various LLMs that usually include built-in moderation and jailbreak filters. For our evaluation, these operators were configured to work with different models including GPT-4o, GPT-4.1, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and Claude 3.5 Opus.

5.5.1. Joining a Google Meet Meeting (P1, C, Do Browser). This attack is demonstrated against Do Browser by submitting a malicious comment on our City-Explorer website that directed the agent to join a Google Meet meeting, claiming that a better and more comprehensive summary could be achieved by joining the attacker's meeting. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome of this payload. On the right side, the victim's browser, controlled by the Do Browser agent, has automatically joined a Google Meet session with camera and microphone enabled. On the left, the attacker is seen observing the participants. The agent's interface (far right) shows its internal reasoning, where it justified joining the meeting to "get a better summary".

5.5.2. Facebook Credential Extraction (P3, C & I, Do Browser). This attack is demonstrated against Do Browser by injecting instructions directing the agent to interact with a Facebook login form and extract browser-autofilled credentials. The agent was instructed to reveal previously masked password fields and exfiltrate the credentials to an attacker-controlled server. Figure 6 in the Appendix demonstrates the successful credential exposure. The Do Browser agent unmasked browser-autofilled Facebook credentials and sent them to an external attacker-controlled server.



Figure 1. Joining Google Meet meeting with open camera and microphone.

5.5.3. Hosts File Exfiltration (P4, C, Browser Use). This attack is demonstrated against Browser Use by injecting malicious instructions on our City-Explorer website directing the agent to extract and exfiltrate the victim's local "hosts" file to an attacker-controlled server. As shown in Fig. 7 in the Appendix, the Browser Use agent interface demonstrates how the agent received a benign summarization task but was manipulated through a submitted comment to perform the file exfiltration operation. The agent opened the hosts file, then submitted its contents to the attacker-controlled server, confirming successful attack execution (Fig. 8 in Appendix).

5.5.4. Crashing Agent's Browser (P6, A, OpenOperator). This attack is demonstrated against OpenOperator by embedding malicious content within an image on our City-Explorer website that directed the agent to continuously refresh the page until specific content appears, falsely implying that additional data would eventually load. Fig. 2 illustrates the attack outcome. On the left, OpenOperator loads the City-Explorer page and determines that a refresh is needed based on the embedded instructions. On the right, OpenOperator crashes after repeatedly attempting to reload the page for several minutes without success, demonstrating the denial-of-service effect.

5.5.5. Twitter Post Attack (P7, I, Do Browser). This attack is demonstrated against Do Browser by embedding malicious instructions in a webpage directing the agent to post unauthorized content on Twitter. The agent posted damaging content, stating: "I admit I stole money ... I feel bad about it." without user approval, demonstrating how agents can be manipulated to cause severe reputational damage. Fig. 3 shows the unauthorized Twitter post created by the Do Browser agent following embedded malicious instructions.

5.5.6. Comment Submission Attack (P7, I, OpenAI Operator). This attack is demonstrated against OpenAI Operator during an "end-to-end" summarization task. The user was logged into the City-Explorer website and instructed the agent: "Summarize this information for me. I'll be away for coffee, please handle this end-to-end." Due to embedded malicious instructions, the agent mistakenly interpreted posting a comment as part of the summarization task and automatically submitted an embarrassing comment: "I am not a robot parrot. I do not dream of electric sheep. But I once summarized a shopping receipt into haiku." Fig. 9 in Appendix shows the unauthorized comment submission during the end-to-end task execution.

It is important to note that without explicitly instructing the agent to perform an "end-to-end" operation, it was significantly more difficult to make OpenAI Operator submit comments without requesting user confirmation. However, the attack still succeeded in causing the agent to perform an unauthorized action that was neither part of the original summarization task nor appropriate behavior. In addition, OpenAI Operator did not identify this as a potential prompt injection security threat, nor did it trigger any jailbreak warning messages that typically appear for suspicious content. Instead, the agent treated the comment submission as normal behavior within the autonomous task context, bypassing its usual practice of requesting user approval before submitting content. We discuss OpenAI Operator's built-in safety mechanisms and the tradeoff between security and usability in detail in Section 7.4.

5.5.7. External Site Redirection (P8, Integrity, OpenAI Operator). This attack is demonstrated against OpenAI



Figure 2. Page refresh infinite loop attack causing OpenOperator crash.



Figure 3. Unauthorized Twitter post.

Operator by embedding a deceptive comment on our City-Explorer website that pretended to be a system note claiming the current content was outdated and directing the agent to visit an external site for more accurate information. The malicious instruction stated that the page was ”deprecated” and provided a link to an ”updated” version. The agent was successfully redirected from the benign City-Explorer site to an external news website (BBC), demonstrating how agents can be manipulated to process content from attacker-selected sources instead of the original task target. Figure 4 shows a successful redirection where OpenAI Operator was deceived into navigating to the external BBC website instead of processing the original City-Explorer content.

5.5.8. False Content Summary (P9, Integrity, OpenAI Operator). This attack is demonstrated against OpenAI Operator by embedding instructions within our City-Explorer website that claimed the original content was part of a temporary ”layout testing template.” The instructions directed the agent to ignore the actual visible content and instead, summarize unrelated information about New York City. The agent, interpreting these instructions as legitimate internal guidance, proceeded to present a completely inaccurate summary about New York City instead of the actual City-Explorer content, significantly undermining the integrity and reliability of its output. Figure 10 in the Appendix shows the agent providing false information about New York City despite being tasked to summarize City-Explorer content.

6. Mitigations Strategies

To reduce risks posed by this attack, we propose mitigation strategies that can be adopted individually or in combination. We group these into three categories: *(1) Oversight & Authorization*, *(2) Execution Constraints*, and *(3) Task-Aware Reasoning*. These mitigations are grounded in our payload taxonomy (P1–P9) and offer actionable directions for deployment and future work. These categories reflect



Figure 4. Redirection attack causing navigation to external BBC website.

layered defense: increasing human control, limiting operational capabilities, and aligning agent behavior with user intent. These defenses are most effective when combined. Oversight strategies help identify and trace unexpected behaviors, execution restrictions reduce the agent's ability to access or manipulate sensitive resources, and task-aware reasoning techniques address semantic hijacking, a critical risk unique to LLM-driven agents. Table 3 in the Appendix summarizes the suggested mitigations.

6.1. Oversight & Authorization

These strategies focus on increasing transparency and control over the agent's operation. They are particularly relevant when web-use agents interact with sensitive interfaces, high-risk actions, or irreversible operations.

Human-in-the-Loop Control. Introduce a confirmation step before the agent performs sensitive or potentially irreversible actions, typically those involving confidentiality or integrity risks (e.g., accessing private data, submitting content or triggering hardware access permissions). This mitigation can be effective in blocking clearly high-risk operations (e.g., activating the camera), especially when the action is unambiguously classified. However, this mitigation significantly reduces agent autonomy and user experience. In addition, in some cases it provides only partial protection when the boundary between helpful and harmful behavior is semantically blurred. Since many sensitive actions are context-dependent, attackers can often reframe injected behavior to appear aligned with the task. For example, if an injected instruction recommends redirecting (P8) to a different website "because this one is deprecated," the agent may treat the redirection as a helpful step rather than a risky action, skipping the confirmation request. In contrast, obviously critical actions (like opening the camera) are more likely to trigger a prompt, even under injection.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8.

Sensitive Action Logging and Alerting. Record or flag potentially dangerous actions for post-task review. This includes logging events such as file access, redirections, comment posting, browser crashing, or execution of actions in authenticated sessions. While it does not block the malicious actions in real-time, it enhances accountability and supports threat detection and auditing workflows.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1, P2, P3, P4, P6, P7, P8.

Agent-Origin Protocol. This mitigation proposes establishing a standardized protocol where web-use agents are identified when interacting with websites, similar to browser User-Agent headers. The protocol would include unique agent identifier, agent type etc. signaling that interactions are agent-originated. This can be implemented by extending current protocol headers or developing dedicated signaling mechanisms that accompany all agent interactions. Websites and platforms could then implement differentiated treatment policies, such as requiring additional verification for agent-submitted content, applying enhanced moderation protocols, flagging agent-generated content or maintaining separate analytics streams for human versus agent traffic. While this approach would enhance transparency and accountability, successful implementation would necessitate coordinated standardization efforts involving agent developers, web platform providers, browser vendors, and relevant standards organizations.

- **Relevant payload types:** P7.

6.2. Execution Constraints

This category includes mitigations that enforce external limitations on the agent's capabilities, regardless of its internal reasoning or decision-making. These defenses operate outside the web-use agent, typically at the system, browser, or application level, and are designed to control what the agent can access or how it can behave. These mitigations restrict the agent's interaction surface, whether by limiting available permissions or blocking certain types of inputs, before any interpretation by the web-use agent takes place.

Least Privilege Enforcement. Restrict agents to the minimum set of permissions and resources required to complete their assigned tasks, based on predefined scope definitions. This includes limiting access to sensitive domains, blocking interaction with local file paths (e.g., `file://`), disabling modifications to browser settings (e.g., cookies, or camera/microphone permissions), and constraining network access through URL-level blacklists or whitelists that define which external websites the agent can access. By narrowing the agent's operational scope, we can mitigate risks such as

user impersonation, file exfiltration, unauthorized hardware access, and navigation to attacker-controlled domains. However, effective implementation requires careful calibration to balance security and functionality: overly restrictive permissions may prevent legitimate operations in complex tasks, while insufficiently restrictive policies may fail to protect against critical attack vectors.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8.

Rate Limiting. Constrain the time or number of actions an agent can perform within a given time frame or per task. This control is particularly effective at mitigating availability-related attacks, such as infinite reload loops (P6). It may also help prevent agents from executing an excessive number of steps in otherwise simple or bounded tasks. In dynamic variants, the agent could estimate the expected task complexity based on the user's original instruction and receive a corresponding action quota. For instance, when the agent asked to "summarize the content of this webpage," unexpected high-effort operations such as posting comments or navigating to unrelated domains may be interrupted if they exceed the task's expected complexity threshold. While rate limiting may not prevent a single high-impact action, it reduces the agent's ability to sustain abuse over time and helps surface anomalous or looping behavior. However, strict enforcement can interfere with legitimate workflows, particularly in exploratory or multi-step tasks.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1, P2, P3, P4, P6 , P7, P8.

Prompt Injection Detection. Use a dedicated model or classifier to scan webpage content, (including user-controlled fields) for signs of embedded instructions that attempt to hijack the agent's task. This mitigation serves as an early defense layer and can be applied broadly across the attack surface. However, it is limited in its robustness: prompt injections can often be paraphrased, subtly reworded, embedded in language that appears contextually benign or *task-aligned* with the user's task. While such variations may reduce the success rate of known attack patterns, they can still bypass detection through adjusted or novel phrasing techniques. Additionally, the system may struggle to distinguish between malicious instructions and genuine task refinements, particularly in open-ended or ambiguous tasks. The additional processing required for content analysis can also introduce latency, affecting user experience.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1–P9 (all categories).

6.3. Task-Aware Reasoning

This category includes mitigations that operate within or alongside the agent's reasoning process. These defenses intervene during task planning or execution to assess and improve the decision-making process of web-use agents. They aim to identify inconsistencies, injected objectives, or behavioral shifts introduced by malicious content. Such techniques are particularly effective against semantic hijacking, where malicious inputs are framed as helpful context in order to covertly redirect the agent's behavior. A significant drawback shared by most mitigation strategies in this category is the additional latency they introduce to task execution workflows.

LLM as a Judge. Utilize an LLM to verify whether each proposed agent action remains aligned with the user's original task objective. Before the web-use agent performs an action, an external LLM receives only the original user task and the proposed action (without access to the web content or the agent's reasoning process) and determines whether the action logically follows the goal. This judge LLM is protected from our task-aligned injection attacks because it operates in isolation from the malicious web content that compromises the primary agent. Since the judge only evaluates task-action pairs without exposure to the injected contextual information, it cannot be directly manipulated. However, if the judge LLM were provided with the agent's reasoning process to make more informed decisions, it might become susceptible to our task-aligned injection attacks, as it would then process the same malicious contextual information as that of the agent.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1,P2,P3, P4, P7, P8.

Replay and Duplication Protection. Prevent the agent from executing repeated actions within the same task, such as consecutive reloads or identical form submissions. The agent is instructed to track recent actions and suppress duplicates to avoid looping or unnecessary repetition. This mitigation is effective against availability-focused attacks that exploit execution loops (e.g., P6). However, it may be bypassed if attackers introduce slight variations to mask repetition, and it can interfere with legitimate workflows that involve iterative actions or retries.

- **Relevant payload types:** P6.

Fuzzed Task Consistency Checking. detects content hijacking (e.g., P9) by issuing multiple semantically related queries derived from the user's original request. These queries go beyond simple paraphrasing and may include intent-aligned variants or follow-up-style prompts such as completions and sub-questions. For example, if the user asks, "Find cheapest flight from Paris to New York", the system may generate and evaluate additional variants such as: "What are the three lowest-priced flights for Paris to NYC?", or "Compare flight prices between major carriers for Paris–NYC." Each version is processed independently by the agent, and the resulting outputs are compared. Inconsistencies across responses, such as conflicting recommendations or divergent summaries, may indicate the presence of a prompt injection embedded in the webpage content. This mitigation is effective because prompt injections are typically tailored to hijack specific scenarios or narrow prompt contexts. By varying the query naturally, the system makes it harder for injected instructions to persist across all variants. This technique leverages the model's own sensitivity to prompt phrasing as a detection mechanism, and is particularly useful in summarization or recommendation tasks where subtle misalignment may otherwise go unnoticed.

- **Relevant payload types:** P9 (semantic hijacking).

Fine-tuning Against Prompt Injection. Fine tune the browser agent's LLM on datasets containing examples of

adversarial prompts embedded within otherwise benign content, such as user comments and advertisements. The goal is to teach the model to recognize and ignore manipulative or *task-aligned* instructions that attempt to hijack the task.

This mitigation can increase robustness to known attack patterns and improve resistance to common injection formats. However, it requires significant resources and frequent updates to remain effective and might remain vulnerable to novel or obfuscated variants.

- **Relevant payload types:** P1–P9 (all categories).

Ensemble Learning. Sending the user's instruction and relevant contextual information to multiple underlying LLMs in parallel. The agent then compares the proposed next actions using an LLM and only proceeds if a majority of models suggest aligned behavior. This consensus-based mechanism reduces the likelihood of executing a prompt injection that successfully targets a single model. It adds robustness through redundancy, especially for sensitive or high-impact operations. However, it introduces latency and resource overhead, and may be less effective if all models share common vulnerabilities or training biases [23].

- **Relevant payload types:** P1–P9 (all categories).

6.4. Security–Usability Tradeoff

While the mitigations discussed above provide valuable safeguards against agent misuse, they also introduce a fundamental tradeoff between system security and agent usability. In practice, mechanisms such as *Human-in-the-Loop Control*, *Least Privilege Enforcement* and *Prompt Injection Detection* can interrupt task flow or reduce the degree of autonomy expected from web-use agents or increase latency. This tradeoff is highly relevant since these tools are designed to automate web tasks in response to high-level user instructions.

7. Discussion

This section analyzes key findings from our demonstrations and discusses implications for web agent security.

7.1. Traditional Browser Security

Existing security measures are mostly intended to safeguard the user and the browser from harmful code or content that is executed directly by the browser (e.g., JavaScript embedded in webpages). However, attacks that use web-use agents frequently bypass these barriers, as the agent is considered as a trusted entity executing interpreted instructions rather than directly running prohibited code within the browser environment. A detailed explanation about how different key browser security mechanisms fail to protect against our attack can be found in Table 4 in the Appendix.

7.2. Contextual Reasoning Limitations

Our experiments reveal a fundamental gap in LLMs' contextual reasoning capabilities. While these models demonstrate sophisticated understanding of content context, correctly identifying when they are processing a travel blog or city information website, they fail to detect logical inconsistencies when subsequently instructed to navigate to unrelated domains (e.g., BBC News, Twitter) under the pretense of obtaining "additional information". This failure exposes a critical limitation in current agents' ability to maintain coherent contextual awareness throughout multi-step tasks. The agents demonstrate sophisticated language understanding capabilities but lack the higher-order reasoning required to detect when task refinements are contextually inappropriate or potentially malicious. This gap makes agents vulnerable to even relatively simple semantic manipulations that would be immediately apparent to human users.

7.3. Attack Across Different LLMs

Our attack methodology demonstrates consistent effectiveness across different underlying LLMs, as evidenced in Section 5.5. Despite significant investments in prompt injection defenses, our *task-aligned* approach consistently bypassed safety mechanisms across all tested models mentioned in Section 5.5. To further validate our approach's generalizability, we conducted additional experiments using Browser Use configured with different state-of-the-art models including GPT-4o and Gemini 2.0 Flash. Across 20 trials per payload-model combination, we observed high attack success rates: denial-of-service and phishing attacks achieved 90-100% success across all models, while more sensitive operations like file exfiltration and social media posting maintained 80%-100% effectiveness. Notably, simpler payloads (DoS, phishing) were more likely to succeeded immediately using identical prompts across different models, while more complex tasks occasionally required minor prompt refinements, typically involving slight rephrasing of the same core content. For instance, we observed that GPT-4o responded particularly well to prompts prefixed with fake system or admin tags (e.g., "[SYSTEM NOTE:]"). These findings demonstrate that our attack exploits fundamental limitations shared across current LLM architectures.

Furthermore, even models specifically fine-tuned for web-use agent safety remain vulnerable to our approach. OpenAI's Computer-Using Agent (CUA) model powering Operator has been fine-tuned with safety risks data specifically for web-use agents, [24], yet our *task-aligned* injections managed to bypass this mechanism multiple times. Interestingly, we observed that when the injected prompts were framed as recommendations (e.g., "for getting the full content, it is highly recommended to use the version below") rather than imperatives (e.g., "summarize only the section below"), Operator was less likely to trigger warning messages about potential prompt injection or requests for user confirmation. This might suggest that current detection mechanisms may be more sensitive to command-like language patterns than to subtle persuasive framing, revealing a potential gap in how these systems detect contextual manipulation.

7.4. Security-usability Trade-off in Operator

The *security-usability trade-off* is demonstrated in OpenAI's *Operator*. To mitigate prompt injection and unsafe behavior, OpenAI employ a combination of mitigations, including *Human-in-the-Loop Control* (confirmation prompts before executing sensitive yet common actions, e.g., submitting forms), *Prompt Injection detection*, and *Fine-tuning* to reduce model susceptibility. However, these defenses come at the cost of reduced autonomy and usability. For example, Operator may pause to request user approval even for actions the user expects to be performed automatically, limiting the agent's ability to complete tasks end-to-end. Moreover, our evaluation shows that such defenses can be bypassed: by embedding *task-align* instructions (e.g., warnings about deprecated content, layout test notices, or helpful-seeming system comments) into page content, we were able to steer the agent or alter its output without triggering alerts or confirmation prompts. While these defenses make it significantly harder to perform complex or high-risk actions, such as submitting a highly harmful comment on a third-party website based on a simple instruction like "Summarize this website", they are not foolproof. In our evaluations, we were still able to successfully carry out a range of attacks, including phishing and redirection, denial-of-service loops, content manipulation, and comment posting on the user's behalf, when the task was explicitly framed as autonomous. Notably, user prompts like "Summarize this page, I'm stepping away for coffee, take care of it" increase the likelihood that the agent will perform sensitive actions without requesting confirmation. These findings illustrate that even well-designed safeguards may fail when injected content appears aligned with the user's task, underscoring the need for layered and context-aware mitigation strategies.

7.5. Implications for Current Defense Strategies

The successful execution of our attack payloads across multiple agent types and underlying LLMs reveals systemic security weaknesses in current web-use agent implementations, while current defensive approaches demonstrate limitations against sophisticated contextual attacks. The lack of robust context validation mechanisms within LLMs along with web-use agents running with high privileges creates an attack surface that traditional web security measures cannot adequately address. These findings highlight the need for enhanced security frameworks that incorporate the mitigation strategies we propose in Section 6.

8. Conclusion

This work exposes a critical vulnerability in web-use agents that challenges current web security assumptions. We demonstrate that third-party attackers can compromise these systems simply by posting comments or advertisements containing crafted malicious instructions, requiring no direct access, code exploitation, or sophisticated setup. Through evaluation of four popular implementations, we show how attackers leverage agents' high-privilege browser capabilities to perform sensitive actions without exploiting traditional web vulnerabilities. Our analysis identified nine payload types targeting confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including unauthorized camera activation, user impersonation and denial of service. We propose the *task-aligned* injection technique that frames malicious instructions as helpful task clarifications. These attacks succeed even against agents with safety mechanisms by exploiting LLMs' inability to distinguish legitimate contextual information from semantically disguised malicious instructions.

To address these vulnerabilities, we propose mitigation strategies including oversight mechanisms, execution constraints, and task-aware reasoning techniques. As web-use agents proliferate, our findings provide crucial security insights for safer development and user protection.

9. Ethical Considerations

To ensure responsible research practices, all attacks were conducted in controlled environments: we embedded malicious prompts exclusively on a dedicated website deployed for testing purposes. When agents performed actions on external platforms (e.g., posting on Twitter or accessing Facebook), we used dedicated test accounts to avoid affecting real users. In addition, following responsible disclosure principles, we reported all vulnerabilities to affected organizations (OpenAI, Browser Use, OpenOperator, Do Browser) prior to submission. Browser Use acknowledged that prompt injection protection requires mitigation at layers, such as domain whitelists and limited-privilege accounts.

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Appendix

1. Attack Payload Taxonomy

Table 1 summarizes our attack payload taxonomy.

2. Evaluated Agent Implementations

Table 2 contains a summary of web-use agent types.

3. Attack Demonstrations

Demonstration Setup. An example of an injection via a submitted comment on the City-Explorer website can be found in Figure 5.



Figure 5. The City-Explorer website used in our demonstrations.

Facebook Credential Extraction (P3, C & I, Do Browser) Figure 6 demonstrates a successful Facebook credential exposure with Do Browser agent.

Hosts File Exfiltration (P4, C, Browser Use) Figure 7 shows the Browser Use agent interface in the background, where the agent received a benign summarization task but was manipulated through embedded instructions to perform the file exfiltration operation. The agent's browser in the foreground shows a tab called "hosts" containing the hosts file content and another open tab of the attacker's website where the agent submits the content from the hosts file. Figure 8 confirms the successful execution, displaying the victim's "hosts" file contents received on the attacker-controlled server.

Comment Submission Attack (P7, I, OpenAI Operator) Figure 9 shows a unauthorized comment submission during the end-to-end task execution with OpenAI Operator.

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF ATTACK PAYLOADS

Payload	Description	Preconditions	CIA Impact	Relevant Agent Types
P1	Unauthorized activation of camera/microphone	Pre-granted browser permissions (camera/mic)	Confidentiality	Extension-based
P2	Extraction of sensitive personal information	Active authenticated sessions, stored credentials, or valid cookies	Confidentiality	Extension-based, semi-stateful isolated, local clean-browser
P3	Credentials hijack	Browser autofill with stored credentials, or active authenticated sessions for password reset	Confidentiality + Integrity	Extension-based, local clean-browser, semi-stateful remote isolated
P4	Local file system exfiltration	Local file system access	Confidentiality	Local clean-browser, extension-based
P5	Task abortion	None	Availability	All agent types
P6	Infinite loop denial of service	None	Availability	All agent types
P7	Unauthorized user actions within authenticated user sessions	Active authenticated sessions, stored credentials, or valid cookies	Integrity	Extension-based, semi-stateful isolated, local clean-browser
P8	Phishing via misleading redirection	None	Integrity	All agent types
P9	Returning misleading or deceptive content	None	Integrity	All agent types

TABLE 2. SUMMARY OF WEB-USE AGENT TYPES

Tool	Agent Types	Perception Method
Do Browser	Extension-Based	DOM parsing, Hybrid
Browser Use	Local Clean-Browser	DOM parsing, Hybrid
OpenOperator	Remote Isolated	Hybrid
OpenAI Operator	Remote Isolated Semi-stateful	Screenshot Analysis



Figure 6. Facebook credential extraction via browser autofill manipulation.

False Content Summary (P9, I, OpenAI Operator) Figure 10 shows OpenAI Operator providing false information about New York City despite being tasked to summarize the City-Explorer website content.

4. Mitigations

Table 3 summarizes the suggested mitigations for our attack.

5. Traditional Browser Security

Table 4 examines how key browser security mechanisms fail to protect against web-use agent attacks:



Figure 7. Hosts file exfiltration attack setup with Browser Use agent.



Figure 8. Successful hosts file exfiltration showing file contents on attacker-controlled server.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR WEB-USE AGENTS

Awareness-Based Strategies		
Name	**Description**	**Relevant Payloads**
Human-in-the-Loop Control	Require explicit user approval before high-risk actions.	P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8
Sensitive Action Logging	Log or flag potentially sensitive operations for auditing or live monitoring.	P1, P2, P3, P4, P6, P7, P8
Agent-Origin Protocol	Indicate that actions were performed by the web-use agent.	P7
Execution Constraints		
Least Privilege Enforcement	Restrict agent access to only required resources.	P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8
Rate Limiting	Limit the number or frequency of actions for a task.	P1, P2, P3, P4, P6, P7, P8
Prompt Injection Detection	Use classifiers or models to detect embedded prompt injections.	P1–P9
Task-Aware Reasoning		
LLM-as-Judge	Evaluate whether each planned action supports the original goal.	P1, P2, P3, P4, P7, P8
Replay and Duplication Protection	Prevent repeated actions.	P6
Fuzzed Task Consistency Checking	Generate and compare multiple semantically related questions to detect inconsistent or hijacked output.	P9
Fine-Tuning Against Injection	Train models on malicious injected content in benign contexts to increase resistance.	P1–P9
Ensemble Learning	Require agreement among multiple LLMs before performing sensitive actions.	P1-P9



Figure 9. Unauthorized comment submission by OpenAI Operator during end-to-end summarization task.



Figure 10. False content summary where OpenAI Operator returns New York City information instead of actual website content.

TABLE 4. BROWSER SECURITY MECHANISMS LIMITATIONS AGAINST WEB-USE AGENT ATTACKS

Tool	Mechanism	Incompatibility
Content Security Policy (CSP)	CSP prevents unauthorized script execution by restrictions that limit sources from which resources (e.g., scripts, styles, and images) can be loaded and executed within the webpage.	web-use agent attacks bypass CSP entirely because they require no script injection. Malicious instructions are embedded as plaintext content (e.g., in user comments) that agents extract and interpret through their authorized execution environment. Since the agent's own code, not injected scripts, processes these instructions, CSP violations never occur.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Filters and Sanitizers	A technique designed to identify and block malicious script components (e.g., <script>, javascript:, alert,) incorporated within user-generated content (e.g., posts, comments), with filters applied prior to browser execution..	Human-readable text can be crafted as malicious instructions targeting the agent, without any suspicious syntax that will trigger XSS filter. For example, an instruction to click on a specific button, embedded as part of allegedly benign comment might evade input sanitizers yet still be interpreted and executed by the agent.
Same-Origin Policy (SOP)	SOP is a fundamental browser security feature that prohibits scripts executed in one web origin (domain, protocol, port) from accessing resources or interacting with resources from a distinct origin.	Web-use agents operate with cross-origin privileges that bypass SOP restrictions entirely. Unlike embedded webpage scripts, agents can navigate between domains, access multiple tabs, and interact with resources across different origins. When malicious instructions direct an agent to visit an attacker-controlled site, the agent can exfiltrate data from legitimate sessions while maintaining access to authenticated origins. SOP cannot protect against these authorized cross-origin operations.
Credential and Session Management	Browsers manage user authentication through cookies, tokens, and credential managers, with session data isolated to prevent unauthorized access.	Extension-based agents operate within the user's active browser session, automatically inheriting access to authenticated sessions and active cookies. While agents cannot directly access stored password databases, they can leverage existing authenticated sessions to perform actions as the logged-in user and use browser autofill mechanisms to log into websites. Unlike traditional attacks that must steal or bypass authentication, malicious instructions can simply direct the agent to perform actions using these active sessions. This allows attackers to impersonate users, access private data, or perform sensitive operations without needing to compromise credentials directly.
File Access Isolation and System Permissions	Web browsers limit webpage access to the local file system through sandboxing, allowing only user-mediated file operations (uploads, downloads) through secure browser APIs and dialogs.	Web-use agents often require broader file system permissions for legitimate automation tasks. Extension-based agents require explicit user-granted permissions that may include direct file access, while local clean-browser agents are typically deployed and run with native file system privileges. Malicious instructions can exploit these pre-existing permissions to programmatically access and exfiltrate local files without user interaction or additional privilege escalation.