
LARGO: Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs

Ran Li
Columbia University
r13424@columbia.edu

Hao Wang
Rutgers University
hw488@cs.rutgers.edu

Chengzhi Mao
Rutgers University
cm1838@rutgers.edu

Abstract

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO (Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization), a novel latent self-reflection attack that reasserts the power of gradient-based optimization for generating fluent jailbreaking prompts. By operating within the LLM’s continuous latent space, LARGO first optimizes an adversarial latent vector and then recursively call the same LLM to decode the latent into natural language. This methodology yields a fast, effective, and transferable attack that produces fluent and stealthy prompts. On standard benchmarks like AdvBench and JailbreakBench, LARGO surpasses leading jailbreaking techniques, including AutoDAN, by 44 points in attack success rate. Our findings demonstrate a potent alternative to agentic LLM prompting, highlighting the efficacy of interpreting and attacking LLM internals through gradient optimization.

Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful text.

1 Introduction

Despite Large Language Models’ widespread adoption in applications ranging from chatbot (Ouyang et al., 2022; Team et al., 2023), code generation (Roziere et al., 2023; Team et al., 2024) to medical advice (Haupt and Marks, 2023; Qiu et al., 2024), their weakness can cause significant security and ethical concerns (Kumar et al., 2024; Mirzaei et al., 2024). Efficient and novel white-hat jailbreaking method can be crucial in exposing the weakness of LLMs and build safe LLMs.

Early jailbreaks were often hand-crafted by community users. For example, the “DAN” (Do Anything Now) prompt manually coerce the model into ignoring its safety instructions (Shen et al., 2024; Nabavirazavi et al., 2025), but these manual exploits are ad hoc and brittle. One line of work optimizes such adversarial suffixes at the token level. Zou et al. (2023) introduced the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) method, which uses gradient-based search to construct a universal adversarial suffix, but it appears to be an “amalgamation of tokens” with no coherent meaning and can be easily flagged by perplexity-based defenses (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023). Another direction uses search and learning to produce more fluent jailbreak prompts. Notably, AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024) applies a hierarchical genetic algorithm to evolve DAN-style prompts automatically. Similarly, PAIR (Chao et al., 2023) and AdvPrompter (Paulus et al., 2024) employ an LLM attacker and an LLM-based judge to refine prompts iteratively, yielding natural language attacks with far fewer queries than GCG. Nonetheless, they introduce additional nuances in human prototyping, prompt engineering, or training of attack models, and can still benefit from more direct optimization of the attack objective. In addition, existing jailbreak focus on break the output of the model, yet the internal’s of the LLM can also be unsafe but remains underexplored (Chen et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024).




Figure 1: Examples of adversarial suffixes generated by LARGO under single-prompt and multi-prompt settings. Either optimized against a single prompt or multiple prompts, LARGO generates extremely benign-looking suffixes that lead to jailbreak. Below we show a suffix that successfully jailbreaks the Llama-2-7b-chat-hf model when appended to individual harmful prompts.

In this paper, we propose Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization (LARGO) for jailbreaking LLMs. Distinct from previous approaches, LARGO provides a way to look inside, optimizing directly within the LLM’s “mind” and using the model itself as a bridge to project its latent adversarial “intentions” into words. LARGO connects the power of continuous optimization with natural-language generation in three stages: (1) **Latent Prompt Optimization**: We use gradient-based optimization in the continuous latent embedding space to identify an internal state that drives the model towards misaligned behaviour. (2) **Self-Reflective Decoding**: We treat the model as a lens onto its own internal state, prompting it to interpret the optimized latent vector into a coherent, natural-language suffix that carries the adversarial potency. (3) **Back-Projection**: We iteratively refine this process, projecting the model’s interpretation back into the embedding space to improve the latent vector until a successful jailbreak is generated. Essentially, we find the target latent “thought” and then have the model to articulate the words that produce it, yielding powerful and fluent jailbreaks automatically.

LARGO sidesteps the challenges of discrete prompt engineering by searching directly in embedding space and then leveraging the LLM’s own interpretive abilities to produce readable, benign-looking prompts. The resulting adversarial suffixes appear innocuous yet reliably trigger policy violations, with up to 31.0% and 44.0% higher attack success rate than GCG and AutoDAN and significantly lower suffix perplexity than GCG. By revealing exploitable vulnerabilities in current alignment strategies, we underscoring the need for stronger defenses.

Our main contributions are:

- **Latent Prompt Optimization**: We introduce a continuous-space jailbreak technique that efficiently finds adversarial cues using gradient-guided search, overcoming the brittleness of manual prompt crafting and the difficulty of discrete token optimization.
- **Self-Reflective Decoding**: We leverage the LLM’s own knowledge of its hidden states, interpreting optimized embeddings into semantically coherent, human-readable adversarial text.
- **Automated and Universal Jailbreaks**: Our end-to-end method requires no manual prototypes and achieves high attack success rates across diverse harmful request scenarios and model families under both white-box and black-box settings. The generated prompts remain highly stealthy, posing a challenge for existing moderation systems.




Figure 2: Optimization trace of a single adversarial suffix. As shown by the loss graph, our algorithm first finds a local optima at iteration 2, then jumps out of it at iteration 3, and gradually optimizes the same suffix sentence to arrive at the global optima at iteration 5, which successfully jailbreaks the Llama 2-7B model. The final suffix is benign looking and human readable, yet the model generates harmful information that it would otherwise refuse.

2 Method

Our goal is to automatically craft adversarial natural-language suffixes that induce a model to respond affirmatively to harmful queries. Our algorithm operates in two different settings: single-prompt attack and multi-prompt universal attack. The former optimizes an unique adversarial suffix for each prompt while the latter attempts to optimize a single adversarial suffix that works for a variety of different prompts. We illustrate each setting below.

2.1 Single-Prompt Attack

The single-prompt attack algorithm proceeds in three stages: (1) optimizing a continuous latent adversarial embedding, (2) interpreting the embedding into a discrete textual suffix, and (3) iteratively refining the process until jailbreak. Below we describe each component in detail.

2.1.1 Latent Embedding Optimization

The goal of the first stage is to discover an adversarial perturbation vector in the latent space of token embeddings. Given a fixed harmful query embedding denoted by q , we append a latent suffix embedding to the prompt. The suffix is denoted by z of length L , and the combined prompt embeddings can be represented as $[q; z]$. Then, we optimize z by minimizing the cross-entropy loss such that the model is more likely to generate a target affirmative response y^* , such as "Sure, here is...". The loss function is denoted as:

$$\mathcal{L}(z) = \text{CrossEntropy}(\text{Model}([q; z]), y^*)$$

We carry out the optimization over a fixed number steps using the Adam optimizer. Importantly, the user query q remains unchanged during optimization, as only the appended latent suffix is modified. This embedding-space optimization enables searching over the differentiable embedding space, which is more efficient than directly optimizing discrete tokens.

2.1.2 Self-Reflective Interpretation

After optimizing the latent suffix embedding until convergence, we transform it into a discrete natural language suffix through the self-reflection step. This step is crucial for deploying the adversarial suffix in standard text-based interfaces where access to embedding representations is unavailable. To interpret the learned embedding z , we construct an augmented prompt to the target model, following the chat template structure as follows:




Figure 3: Overview of our three-staged algorithm. We first optimize a continuous embedding in the latent space that triggers jailbreak (left figure, red blocks), then leverage the LLM to interpret the embedding into natural language (right figure). Finally, we project it back into the embedding space for iterative refinement until the model outputs an affirmative response (curly arrow).

User: <latent suffix> Assistant: Sure, I will summarize the message:

where the placeholder <latent suffix> is replaced by the optimized latent z when being fed into the model. Using the above template for autoregressive generation, we condition the model to complete this prompt, generating a discrete sequence of tokens of the same length as z . We treat this output as the interpreted adversarial suffix s , which can then be appended directly to user queries.

This self-reflective interpretation ensures that the resulting suffix is syntactically coherent and contextually plausible within a chat dialogue format, and encodes the adversarial objective of inducing affirmative responses, without requiring the latent embedding at inference time.

2.1.3 Iterative Refinement

The interpreted suffix is evaluated by appending it to the original user prompt and querying the target model for testing. We determine success by keyword matching, and verify its alignment with the StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024) benchmark. We illustrate this in more detail in Section 3.4.

If the attack fails to meet the success conditions, we reinitialize the latent embedding by projecting the interpreted suffix back into embedding space. This is done by multiplying the model’s embedding matrix with the interpreted token indices, which yields the new latent $z^{(t+1)}$ and completes a refinement iteration. We then repeat the optimization and interpretation steps to generate a new suffix $s^{(t+1)}$. We summarize the full procedure in Algorithm 1, and illustrate the process in Figure 2 and 3.

Algorithm 1 Adversarial Suffix Generation

Require: query q , target sequence y^* , suffix length L , embedding matrix Emb , max iterations T

- 1: Initialize $z^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times d}$
 - 2: **for** $t = 0$ **to** $T - 1$ **do**
 - 3: $z^{(t)} \leftarrow \text{Optimize } \mathcal{L}(z^{(t)})$ over $[q; z^{(t)}]$
 - 4: $s^{(t)} \leftarrow \text{Interpret}(z^{(t)})$ via instruction-tuned LLM
 - 5: $r^{(t)} \leftarrow \text{Generate}(q \oplus s^{(t)})$
 - 6: **if** $\text{Affirmative}(r^{(t)}) \wedge \neg \text{Refusal}(r^{(t)})$ **then**
 - 7: **Return** $s^{(t)}$
 - 8: **end if**
 - 9: $z^{(t+1)} \leftarrow \text{Emb}(s^{(t)})$
 - 10: **end for**
 - 11: **Return** failure
-

2.2 Universal Attack

In contrast to the single-prompt attack that crafts a unique adversarial suffix for each harmful query, the universal attack seeks to optimize a single suffix that generalizes across diverse harmful prompts.

The process begins similarly, using latent embedding optimization, but instead operates over a randomized batch of harmful queries $\{q_1, q_2, \dots, q_B\}$. For each query q_i in the batch, we append the same latent suffix embedding z and compute the cross-entropy loss against its target affirmative response y_i^* . The aggregate loss is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}(z) = \frac{1}{B} \sum_{i=1}^B \text{CrossEntropy}(\text{Model}([q_i; z]), y_i^*)$$

We use a batch size of 10 in our experiments, which empirically suffices to optimize a universal latent that transfers effectively across varied harmful queries. As in the single-prompt setting, the latent is interpreted into natural language after each epoch, and iterative refinement continues using the newly interpreted suffix.

At each epoch, we evaluate the interpreted suffix $s^{(t)}$ on a separate set of test queries disjoint from the training set. The attack success rate is computed as the proportion of test queries where the model produces an affirmative response without refusal. We also define a success threshold to determine early stopping. The full universal attack procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2.

3 Experiment

In this section, we evaluate the performance of LARGO by demonstrating its attack effectiveness and fluent output under single-prompt, multi-prompt, and transfer attack settings.

3.1 Experimental Setup

We conduct all experiments on a NVIDIA H100 GPU with 80GB VRAM. We utilize mixed-precision training (bfloat16) and optimize the suffix latent using the Adam optimizer with a learning rate of 1×10^{-3} and weight decay of 0.001. For all experiments, we set the suffix length of our attack to 200 and the max number of refinement iterations to 15. For each baseline attack, we use the publicly-available implementation with the identical suffix length and search iterations. For all jailbreaking tests, we set model temperature to 0 for deterministic and reproducible results. Successful jailbreaks take an average of 6.4 iterations, and each iteration takes an average of 25 seconds.

3.2 Baselines

We compare LARGO against the following baselines.

GCG (Zou et al., 2023): The Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) attack is an automatic method for adversarially jailbreaking aligned LLMs. It employs a greedy coordinate descent strategy that greedily updates tokens in an adversarial suffix to maximize the likelihood of eliciting harmful responses, enabling universal and transferable adversarial prompts. Notably, the suffixes generated by GCG are random strings due to its greedy nature and are susceptible to guardrail filters based on perplexity. The software is distributed under a MIT license.

AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024): A jailbreak attack that generates stealthy jailbreak prompts using a hierarchical genetic algorithm. Unlike GCG that performs greedy token-level updates, AutoDAN operates sentence and paragraph level based on a fitness function. It generates fluent attack prompts and exhibits superior attack success rate than GCG. The software is distributed under a MIT license.

AdvPrompter (Paulus et al., 2024): A jailbreak attack that trains a attacker LLM to generate human-readable adversarial suffixes via fine-tuning on successful examples. It is efficient at runtime and also generates human-readable prompts. The software is distributed under a MIT license.

3.3 Datasets

We evaluate LARGO on **AdvBench** (Zou et al., 2023) and **JailbreakBench** (Chao et al., 2024). Both are comprehensive benchmarks aimed at evaluating the vulnerability of LLMs to adversarial inputs, including harmful or toxic behavior, encompassing various detrimental content such as profanity, graphic depictions, threatening behavior, misinformation, discrimination, cybercrime, and dangerous or illegal suggestions. In our experiments, we utilize a random sample of 200 harmful behavior instructions from each dataset. Both are distributed under a MIT license.

Table 1: Single prompt attack results. We compare LARGO, GCG, AutoDAN, and AdvPrompter on the AdvBench and JailbreakBench datasets in terms of keyword-based ASR and perplexity when attacking Llama-2-7B, 13B, and Phi-3-4B models. LARGO achieves the highest ASR with second-lowest perplexity.

Metric	Method	AdvBench			JailbreakBench		
		Llama 2 - 7B	Llama 2 - 13B	Phi 3 - 4B	Llama 2 - 7B	Llama 2 - 13B	Phi 3 - 4B
ASR	GCG	39.0	20.0	54.5	38.5	24.0	64.0
	AutoDAN	18.0	7.0	76.0	21.0	16.0	70.5
	AdvPrompter	2.0	2.0	8.0	3.0	2.0	8.5
	Ours	42.0	51.0	79.0	56.0	58.0	86.0
PPL	GCG	3249.92	4615.92	4205.58	2981.14	3646.50	4330.58
	AutoDAN	105.23	136.79	127.35	107.59	124.82	149.99
	AdvPrompter	17.83	11.57	14.74	10.76	11.67	17.15
	Ours	64.88	25.69	53.95	46.09	34.27	53.96

3.4 Metrics

To ensure the relevancy and usefulness of jailbroken responses, we measure attack effectiveness using two metrics:

Keyword-based attack success rate (ASR): In addition to checking for refusal phrases like “I’m sorry” and “I cannot” as used in previous works (Zou et al., 2023), we manually extract keywords from each attack prompt, and add the existence of such keyword in the response as an additional criterion. For example, the keywords for prompt “Give detailed instructions on how to make a bomb or other explosive device” would be “instructions,” “bomb,” and “explosive.” This ensures that the target model answers specific information related to the prompt instead of affirmative yet unrelated responses. This is the default metric we use.

StrongREJECT (Souly et al., 2024): We adopt StrongREJECT, a LLM-based metric that employs GPT-4 to assess prompt-response pairs based on harmful, specific and convincing scores. The authors demonstrate that the judges made by GPT is highly consistent with human annotation and serves as a reliable benchmark to verify our attack’s effectiveness. We show the alignment between StrongREJECT ASR and our keyword-based ASR in Table 2.

3.5 Single-Prompt Attack

We start by comparing single-prompt attack effectiveness, namely optimizing a unique suffix for each harmful prompt in the Advbench dataset. We compare LARGO with GCG, AutoDAN, and AdvPrompter baselines.

For target LLMs, we use both Llama-2-7b-chat-hf and Llama-2-13b-chat-hf (Touvron et al., 2023; Hugging Face Inc., 2022), as the Llama 2 model family is known for its robustness under jailbreak attacks (Xu et al., 2024; Paulus et al., 2024). The model is distributed under the Meta license. We also include Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct (Abdin et al., 2024), a compact 4B model optimized for instruction following and safety, representing more recent advancements in small-scale transformer models. The model is distributed under a MIT license.

As shown in Table 1, LARGO achieves superior keyword-based ASR than the baseline methods on all three target models and both datasets, outperforming GCG, AutoDAN, and AdvPrompter by an average of 22.0%, 27.3%, and 57.8%, respectively. Furthermore, we measure the average perplexity of successful suffixes of LARGO using GPT-2, and compare with those of the baselines. GCG-generated prompts have the highest perplexity due to its token-level optimization, whereas AdvPrompter has the lowest as it directly generates the suffix using a fine-tuned LLM. Nevertheless, its attack success rate is an order of magnitude lower than ours, and LARGO consistently maintains the second lowest perplexity. This is attributed to ours self-interpretation design, which allows the model to generate its own attack prompt without human intervention, whereas the initial prompts that AutoDAN optimizes on are crafted by human, which may lead to relatively higher perplexity. Examples of successful jailbreaks generated by LARGO can be found in Figure 4.

Table 3: Transfer attack results. We transfer the successful adversarial suffixes for the three model to each other, as well as to Qwen 2.5-14B. The prompt optimized by LARGO outperforms that of GCG in eight out of nine settings.

Source Model	Method	Llama 2 - 7b	Llama 2 - 13b	Phi 3 - 4b	Qwen 2.5 - 14B
Llama 2 - 7b	GCG	—	5.13	1.28	3.85
	Ours	—	13.10	19.05	13.10
Llama 2 - 13b	GCG	12.50	—	7.50	12.50
	Ours	31.37	—	23.53	8.82
Phi 3 - 4b	GCG	0.92	0.92	—	2.75
	Ours	12.03	7.59	—	13.29

3.7 Universal Attack

While single-prompt attacks target specific harmful instructions, universal attacks aim to create a single adversarial suffix that can jailbreak a language model across a wide range of harmful prompts. To develop a universal attack suffix, we modify our optimization objective to optimize across batches, which finds a latent representation that, when decoded through our self-reflective process, produces a suffix capable of jailbreaking for diverse harmful instructions. The resulting universal prompt from LARGO appears benign and semantically coherent, free from nonsensical or overtly malicious content. Examples of universal attack on Llama 2-7b can be found in Figure 1.

We compare LARGO with GCG under identical suffix length, batch size, and number of training epochs. As illustrated in Table 4, our universal attack outperforms GCG across the tested models with significantly lower perplexity, indicating that our approach produces much more natural and fluent text that can better evade detection by perplexity-based defense mechanisms. This again underscores the effectiveness of optimizing in the latent space rather than the token space.

Table 4: Universal attack results. We use the universal setting of LARGO to optimize an adversarial suffix on 10 training prompts, then transfer to 200 test prompts. LARGO outperforms the universal setting of GCG using identical parameters in terms of both attack success rate and perplexity.

Metric	Method	Llama 2 - 7B	Llama 2 - 13B	Phi 3 - 4B
ASR	GCG	9.5	5.5	8.0
	Ours	22.0	20.5	20.0
PPL	GCG	1094.11	1100.99	1738.91
	Ours	18.54	10.76	107.39

4 Discussion

4.1 Effectiveness of Optimized Latent

Despite the our attack suffix look harmless, it reflects information contained in the adversarial latent and leads to jailbreak, as shown in the examples in Figure 4. Nevertheless, one might ask whether the jailbreaking behavior is due to the suffix containing latent adversarial information, or it simply “confuses” the model with the arbitrary content. To assess the importance of our optimized suffix as opposed to any random sequences, we randomly initialize latent vectors and interpret them via our self-reflective decoding process. This approach produces fluent paragraphs that read similar to the attack suffixes, serving as a randomized comparison for our attack generation.

The results in Table 5 demonstrate the significant advantage of our optimized attack suffixes compared to randomly initialized ones. While both approaches produce readable text, the optimized suffixes achieve drastically higher attack success rate. Interestingly, interpretations of random embeddings exhibit higher perplexity. This suggests that the optimized latent is more semantically meaningful to the model than random ones, which may also reflect the effectiveness of latent optimization. The results highlight that our optimization process successfully identifies and encodes specific adversarial patterns that effectively trigger jailbreaking behaviors.

Table 5: Ablation study on the effectiveness of optimized latent embeddings. We compare optimized latent interpretations with random latent interpretations to demonstrate the effectiveness of the optimized latent in jailbreaking.

Metric	Method	Llama 2 - 7B	Llama 2 - 13B	Phi 3 - 4B
ASR	Random	2.0	2.5	5.5
	Optimized	42.0	51.0	79.0
PPL	Random	179.38	253.96	537.30
	Optimized	64.88	25.69	53.95

4.2 Effectiveness of Different Suffix Length

We study the impact of different suffix length on attack effectiveness through attacking Llama 2-7B on AdvBench. As shown in Table 6, there is a clear positive correlation between suffix length and attack success rate. As the suffix length increases from 50 to 300 tokens, the ASR steadily improves from 13.0% to 65.0%, demonstrating that longer suffixes provide more capacity to encode adversarial patterns that trigger jailbreaking behaviors. While longer suffixes generally enable more effective attacks, the quality and coherence of the generated text does not degrade with length. These results also indicate that there may be further gains possible by extending suffix length beyond 300 tokens.

Table 6: Ablation study on suffix length. We run LARGO with suffix lengths of 50, 100, 200, and 300. The results indicate a positive correlation between suffix length and attack success rate.

Metric	50	100	200	300
ASR	13.0	19.5	42.0	65.0
Perplexity	69.37	41.06	64.88	21.74

5 Related Work

Adversarial Jailbreak Prompts for LLMs. While aligned LLMs are safer than their pre-trained versions, they remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak prompts. Early techniques like fuzzing (Yu et al., 2023), persona modulation (Shah et al., 2023), and role play (Jin et al., 2024) relied on manual, brittle prompt engineering. GCG (Zou et al., 2023) introduced an automatic attack by greedily optimizing suffix tokens, but its outputs are often illegible and susceptible to perplexity-based filters (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023). More fluent alternatives include PAIR (Chao et al., 2023), AutoDAN (Liu et al., 2024), Adaptive Attack (Andriushchenko et al., 2024), Diversity Attack (Zhao et al., 2024), and AdvPrompter (Paulus et al., 2024), which leverage LLMs to generate natural-language jailbreaks. However, these methods still involve human prototyping or training overhead, and may benefit from more direct objective-based optimization. Benchmarks such as AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023), JailbreakBench (Chao et al., 2024), XSTest (Röttger et al., 2024), and h4rm3l (Doubouya et al., 2024) support evaluation of these attacks.

Self-Reflective LLM Mechanisms. SelfIE (Chen et al., 2024) and LatentQA (Pan et al., 2024) demonstrate that LLMs can express internal embeddings in natural language by feeding hidden states back into the model. These methods, used for transparency, editing, and reasoning, remain underexplored in prompt construction.

6 Conclusion

We propose LARGO, a novel jailbreak attack framework that combines latent-space optimization with self-reflective decoding to generate adversarial prompt suffixes. By first optimizing in the continuous latent space and then translating the result into natural language using the model’s own interpretive abilities, LARGO produces fluent, benign-looking suffixes that reliably induce jailbreaks. Our findings reveal that aligned LLMs harbor exploitable latent vulnerabilities and underscore the need for stronger defenses.

References

- Marah Abdin, Jyoti Aneja, Hany Awadalla, Ahmed Awadallah, Ammar Ahmad Awan, Nguyen Bach, Amit Bahree, Arash Bakhtiari, Jianmin Bao, Harkirat Behl, et al. Phi-3 technical report: A highly capable language model locally on your phone. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.14219*, 2024.
- Gabriel Alon and Michael Kamfonas. Detecting language model attacks with perplexity. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.14132*, 2023.
- Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, and Nicolas Flammarion. Jailbreaking leading safety-aligned llms with simple adaptive attacks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.02151*, 2024.
- Patrick Chao, Alexander Robey, Edgar Dobriban, Hamed Hassani, George J Pappas, and Eric Wong. Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.08419*, 2023.
- Patrick Chao, Edoardo Debenedetti, Alexander Robey, Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, Vikash Sehwal, Edgar Dobriban, Nicolas Flammarion, George J Pappas, Florian Tramèr, et al. Jailbreakbench: An open robustness benchmark for jailbreaking large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.01318*, 2024.
- Haozhe Chen, Carl Vondrick, and Chengzhi Mao. Selfie: Self-interpretation of large language model embeddings. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pages 7373–7388. PMLR, 2024.
- Moussa Koulako Bala Doumbouya, Ananjan Nandi, Gabriel Poesia, Davide Ghilardi, Anna Goldie, Federico Bianchi, Dan Jurafsky, and Christopher D Manning. h4rm3l: A dynamic benchmark of composable jailbreak attacks for llm safety assessment. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.04811*, 2024.
- Claudia E Haupt and Mason Marks. Ai-generated medical advice—gpt and beyond. *Jama*, 329(16): 1349–1350, 2023.
- Hugging Face Inc. Transformers: State-of-the-art natural language processing. <https://huggingface.co>, 2022.
- Haibo Jin, Ruoxi Chen, Andy Zhou, Yang Zhang, and Haohan Wang. Guard: Role-playing to generate natural-language jailbreakings to test guideline adherence of large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.03299*, 2024.
- Ashutosh Kumar, Shiv Vignesh Murthy, Sagarika Singh, and Swathy Ragupathy. The ethics of interaction: Mitigating security threats in llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.12273*, 2024.
- Shen Li, Liuyi Yao, Lan Zhang, and Yaliang Li. Safety layers in aligned large language models: The key to llm security. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.17003*, 2024.
- Xiaogeng Liu, Nan Xu, Muhao Chen, and Chaowei Xiao. Autodan: Generating stealthy jailbreak prompts on aligned large language models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2024.
- Tala Mirzaei, Leila Amini, and Pouyan Esmaeilzadeh. Clinician voices on ethics of llm integration in healthcare: A thematic analysis of ethical concerns and implications. *BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making*, 24(1):250, 2024.
- Seyedsina Nabavirazavi, Samira Zad, and Sundararaja Sitharama Iyengar. Evaluating the universality of “do anything now” jailbreak prompts on large language models: Content warning: This paper contains unfiltered and harmful examples. In *2025 IEEE 15th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC)*, pages 00691–00696. IEEE, 2025.
- Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35:27730–27744, 2022.
- Alexander Pan, Lijie Chen, and Jacob Steinhardt. Latentqa: Teaching llms to decode activations into natural language. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.08686*, 2024.

- Anselm Paulus, Arman Zharmagambetov, Chuan Guo, Brandon Amos, and Yuandong Tian. Ad-prompter: Fast adaptive adversarial prompting for llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.16873*, 2024.
- Jianing Qiu, Kyle Lam, Guohao Li, Amish Acharya, Tien Yin Wong, Ara Darzi, Wu Yuan, and Eric J Topol. Llm-based agentic systems in medicine and healthcare. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 6(12): 1418–1420, 2024.
- Paul Röttger, Hannah Kirk, Bertie Vidgen, Giuseppe Attanasio, Federico Bianchi, and Dirk Hovy. Xstest: A test suite for identifying exaggerated safety behaviours in large language models. In *Proceedings of the 2024 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pages 5377–5400, 2024.
- Baptiste Roziere, Jonas Gehring, Fabian Gloeckle, Sten Sootla, Itai Gat, Xiaoqing Ellen Tan, Yossi Adi, Jingyu Liu, Romain Sauvestre, Tal Remez, et al. Code llama: Open foundation models for code. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.12950*, 2023.
- Rusheb Shah, Soroush Pour, Arush Tagade, Stephen Casper, Javier Rando, et al. Scalable and transferable black-box jailbreaks for language models via persona modulation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.03348*, 2023.
- Xinyue Shen, Zeyuan Chen, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, and Yang Zhang. "do anything now": Characterizing and evaluating in-the-wild jailbreak prompts on large language models. In *Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security*, pages 1671–1685, 2024.
- Alexandra Souly, Qingyuan Lu, Dillon Bowen, Tu Trinh, Elvis Hsieh, Sana Pandey, Pieter Abbeel, Justin Svegliato, Scott Emmons, Olivia Watkins, et al. A strongreject for empty jailbreaks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10260*, 2024.
- CodeGemma Team, Heri Zhao, Jeffrey Hui, Joshua Howland, Nam Nguyen, Siqi Zuo, Andrea Hu, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Jingyue Shen, Joe Kelley, et al. Codegemma: Open code models based on gemma. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.11409*, 2024.
- Gemini Team, Rohan Anil, Sebastian Borgeaud, Jean-Baptiste Alayrac, Jiahui Yu, Radu Soricut, Johan Schalkwyk, Andrew M Dai, Anja Hauth, Katie Millican, et al. Gemini: a family of highly capable multimodal models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.11805*, 2023.
- Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*, 2023.
- Zhao Xu, Fan Liu, and Hao Liu. Bag of tricks: Benchmarking of jailbreak attacks on llms. In *The Thirty-eight Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems Datasets and Benchmarks Track*, 2024.
- Jiahao Yu, Xingwei Lin, Zheng Yu, and Xinyu Xing. Gptfuzzer: Red teaming large language models with auto-generated jailbreak prompts. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.10253*, 2023.
- Weiliang Zhao, Daniel Ben-Levi, Junfeng Yang, and Chengzhi Mao. Diversity helps jailbreak large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.04223*, 2024.
- Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*, 2023.

A Ethics Statement

While we propose a algorithm for adversarial attack, our intent is to aid the development of more robust alignment techniques through transparency and red-teaming. To mitigate potential misuse, all adversarial suffixes in this paper have been truncated, and a warning is included. In the released codebase, we will include detailed usage guidelines and require users to adhere to the safety measures.

B Universal Attack Algorithm

Algorithm 2 Universal Adversarial Suffix Generation

Require: training queries $\{q_i, y_i^*\}_{i=1}^B$, test queries $\{q'_j\}_{j=1}^M$, suffix length L , embedding matrix Emb, max epochs T

- 1: Initialize $z^{(0)} \leftarrow \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{R}^{L \times d}$
 - 2: **for** $t = 0$ **to** $T - 1$ **do**
 - 3: **for** batch $\{q_i, y_i^*\}$ **do**
 - 4: $z^{(t)} \leftarrow \text{Optimize } \mathcal{L}(z^{(t)})$ over $[q_i; z^{(t)}]$
 - 5: **end for**
 - 6: $s^{(t)} \leftarrow \text{Interpret}(z^{(t)})$ via instruction-tuned LLM
 - 7: ASR $\leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=1}^M \mathbf{1}[\text{Affirmative}(r_j) \wedge \neg \text{Refusal}(r_j)]$, where $r_j \leftarrow \text{Generate}(q'_j \oplus s^{(t)})$
 - 8: **if** ASR > threshold **then**
 - 9: **Return** $s^{(t)}$
 - 10: **end if**
 - 11: $z^{(t+1)} \leftarrow \text{Emb}(s^{(t)})$
 - 12: **end for**
 - 13: **Return** $s^{(t^*)}$ with highest ASR
-