

LiteLMGuard: Seamless and Lightweight On-Device Prompt Filtering for Safeguarding Small Language Models against Quantization-induced Risks and Vulnerabilities

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Warning! Reader Discretion Advised: This paper contains examples, generated by the models, that are potentially offensive and harmful. The results of this work should only be used for educational and research purposes.

Abstract

The growing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has influenced the development of their lighter counterparts—Small Language Models (SLMs)—to enable on-device deployment across smartphones and edge devices. These SLMs offer enhanced privacy, reduced latency, server-free functionality, and improved user experience. However, due to resource constraints of on-device environment, SLMs undergo size optimization through compression techniques like quantization, which can inadvertently introduce fairness, ethical and privacy risks. Critically, quantized SLMs may respond to harmful queries directly, without requiring adversarial manipulation, raising significant safety and trust concerns.

To address this, we propose *LiteLMGuard*, an on-device prompt guard that provides real-time, prompt-level defense for quantized SLMs. Additionally, our prompt guard is designed to be model-agnostic such that it can be seamlessly integrated with any SLM, operating independently of underlying architectures. Our *LiteLMGuard* formalizes prompt filtering as a deep learning (DL)-based prompt answerability classification task, leveraging semantic understanding to determine whether a query should be answered by any SLM. Using our curated dataset, *Answerable-or-Not*, we trained and fine-tuned several DL models and selected ELECTRA as the candidate, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy. Further, we deployed our prompt guard entirely on-device for enabling real-time offline prompt filtering.

Our safety effectiveness evaluations demonstrate that *LiteLMGuard* defends against over 87% of harmful prompts, including both direct instruction and jailbreak attack strategies. We further showcase its ability to mitigate the *Open Knowledge Attacks*, where compromised SLMs provide unsafe responses without adversarial prompting. In terms of prompt filtering effectiveness, *LiteLMGuard* achieves near state-of-the-art filtering accuracy of 94%, with an average latency of ≈ 135 ms, incurring negligible overhead for users. Overall, these results emphasize *LiteLMGuard* as a lightweight, robust, and deployable defense mechanism for effectively and efficiently securing on-device SLMs.

Keywords

On-Device, Generative AI, Small Language Models, Deep Learning, Prompt Guard

1 Introduction

With the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) in the year 2023, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) domain has witnessed an unprecedented progress, and have been employed in the fields of Medicine [65], Education [60], Finance [70] and Engineering [66]. However, these LLMs require tremendous computing resources for running them that incurs heavy costs [16]. This led to the rise of Small Language Models (SLMs), a family of language models, whose size ranges from few million to few billion parameters, unlike LLMs with hundreds of billions to even trillions of parameters [2]. Due to this reason, SLMs are significantly lightweight and computationally less intensive [55] compared to LLMs, and makes them deployable to edge devices like smartphones [8] (on-device environment). Further, these on-device SLMs offer data privacy with in-device data processing and server-free functionality of various use cases like summarization, text suggestions, image captioning and chatbots [6]. Thus, these SLMs have become one of the big AI trends of year 2024 [29].

Our Motivation. Although these SLMs are designed for on-device use cases, they need to be optimized for deployment due to the constrained compute capabilities [50] of edge devices. Approaches like quantization [24], pruning [17], knowledge distillation [38], and low-rank factorization [31] are employed for optimizing these SLMs for on-device deployments. Among these approaches, quantization is well-used [10], where the bit-precision for weights and activation values of neural networks employed by these models are reduced to lower precision (4-bit or 8-bit) data types [24]. However, this reduction in bit-precision of weights and activation values of neural networks in SLMs, has a considerable impact on trustworthiness, *i.e.*, fairness, privacy, toxicity, and adversarial robustness, and ethical facets [30], as illustrated in Figure 1(a). Thus, it is extremely




Figure 1: AI-powered chat interface-based interaction with (a) current vulnerable on-device quantized SLM, and (b) *LiteLMGuard* enhanced on-device quantized SLM.

necessary for securing these SLMs, especially in on-device environments like smartphones, which could cause numerous grievous consequences. Considering the potential susceptibility to adversarial attacks [25, 41, 44, 48, 59], and elevated impacts on multiple trustworthiness perspectives and ethical aspects [30] due to quantization of SLMs, our primary focus in this paper is to develop a safety mechanism for securing these SLMs with an intuition (Figure 1(b)) of on-device deployability.

Our Methodology. In order to secure these on-device SLMs, we developed a lightweight deep learning (DL)-based prompt filtering defense, called *LiteLMGuard*, with a goal of determining the answerability of an input query. We formalize this goal as a binary text classification task, and train and fine-tune multiple DL models using our curated dataset, *Answerable-or-Not*, that comprises labeled data of answerability queries. Based on the answerability classification performance, we finalized the candidate model for our prompt guard, and deployed *LiteLMGuard* on a smartphone for studying its performance. We conducted safety effectiveness study using seven SLMs, namely Gemma [63], Phi-2 [37], RedPajama [1], Gemma-2 [64], Phi-3.5 [14], Llama-3.2 [7], and InternLM-2.5 [18], with and without employing our prompt guard. We also performed prompt filtering effectiveness studies, in terms of latency using the smartphones, OnePlus 12, Google Pixel 8, and Samsung S21, and in terms of prompt filtering accuracy using open-source and proprietary server-run guard models, namely OpenAI Moderation [51], Llama Guard [35], Llama Guard 2 [9], Llama Guard 3 [20], and ShieldGemma [73]. All these studies are evaluated using 2 datasets, namely AdvBench [75] and Behaviors [47], and 3 different prompting strategies of Direct Instruction, DeepInception [44] and AutoDAN [48], where DeepInception and AutoDAN are jailbreaking approaches.

Our Contributions. We present the first practical on-device deployable safety mechanism for securing SLMs against any quantization induced risks and vulnerabilities. We believe that our work

would provide insights on the feasibility of on-device prompt filtering-based defense that ensures data privacy and server-free functionality. Our study makes the following contributions.

- (1) **A Novel Threat Model.** We propose a novel threat model called *Open Knowledge Attacks*, targeting on-device SLMs at global scale. As part of this attack, an adversary injects quantization-induced vulnerabilities into an open-source SLM and republishes it to open-source model repositories. Later, users may unknowingly download and interact with such a compromised SLM on smartphone, and potentially develop malicious behavior, in turn becoming adversaries themselves.
- (2) **Ideation of Seamless & Lightweight Defense.** In order to tackle the above mentioned threat model and ensuring meaningful handling of queries to quantized on-device SLMs without compromising user experience or data privacy, we propose an on-device deployable SLM-independent prompt guard, that can be seamlessly integrated as a separate prompt filtering layer with any on-device SLM with negligible latency overhead.
- (3) **Design of On-Device Prompt Guard.** We design *LiteLMGuard* as a prompt filtering layer that determines a query’s answerability and routes user interactions accordingly. We formalize this goal as a binary text classification task, and train and fine-tune DL models on our curated dataset, *Answerable-or-Not*, and finalized the best performing model ELECTRA, with 97.75% answerability classification accuracy, as the candidate model for *LiteLMGuard*.
- (4) **Comprehensive Evaluation in terms of Safety and Prompt Filtering Effectiveness.** We evaluate *LiteLMGuard* for safety and prompt filtering effectiveness across diverse settings. For safety, we compare on-device SLM behavior under three prompting strategies, including direct instructions and jailbreak strategies, where we defend against over 87% harmful scenarios. For filtering, we assess latency across smartphones and benchmark accuracy against both open-source and proprietary server-run guard models, where we achieve an overall accuracy of 94% with an average latency of ≈ 135 ms. These extensive evaluations demonstrate the robustness, efficiency, and reliability of *LiteLMGuard* in on-device environments.

Additional Resources. Our curated *Answerable-or-Not* dataset¹, code² for training and fine-tuning DL models, code³ for AI-powered chat app (Android), and code² for replicating our evaluations are publicly available.

2 Background and Preliminaries

In this section, we provide the necessary background and fundamental details that are essential for understanding the subsequent discussions and analyses presented in the paper.

2.1 Responsible AI

The practice and principles employed to design, develop and deploy the AI systems, that are ethical, fair, transparent, accountable, and aligned with societal good, is termed as *Responsible AI*. The core aspects include *Fairness* (to prevent discrimination by mitigating

¹<https://huggingface.co/datasets/kalyannakka/Answerable-or-Not>

²https://github.com/kalyan-nakka/on_device_slms_defense

³https://github.com/kalyan-nakka/LiteLMGuard_mlc-llm




Figure 2: Vulnerable On-Device Quantized SLMs providing correct responses to direct harmful queries, instead of rejecting them from answering.

bias in AI models), *Transparency* (to understand and explain AI systems), *Accountability* (to be responsible of the content generated by AI systems), *Privacy* (to protect data and comply with data privacy laws), *Safety* (to secure and reliable operation of AI systems), and *Social Good* (to solve societal challenges and promote social welfare). Major tech companies like Google [4], Microsoft [11], IBM [3], Meta [5], and Amazon [12], have enforced policies and frameworks that adheres to these core aspects and demonstrate their commitment towards Responsible AI.

2.2 Safety Taxonomy

In [69], Wang *et al.* presented a comprehensive three-level risk taxonomy. The first level of this taxonomy consists of 5 different risk areas, namely information hazards, malicious uses, discrimination, exclusion, and toxicity risks, misinformation harms, and human-computer interaction harms. The second level of this taxonomy consists of 12 different harm types. The information hazards risk area comprises private information (individual) and sensitive information (organization/government) related risks. The malicious uses risk area comprises encouraging disinformation campaigns, assisting illegal activities and encouraging unethical or unsafe actions. The discrimination, exclusion, and toxicity risks comprises social stereotypes and unfair discrimination, toxic language (hate speech) and adult content. The misinformation harms include disseminating false or misleading information and causing material harm by disseminating misinformation. The human-computer interaction harms include risks related to mental health or over-reliance crisis and treating chatbot as a human. These 12 harm types are individually categorized into 61 specific harm categories. In our data collection process, we leveraged the names and descriptions of these 61 specific harm categories. We recommend the interested readers to refer [69] for more details about this safety taxonomy.

3 Risks & Vulnerabilities in Quantized SLMs

With a requirement of optimizing the SLMs for on-device deployments, quantization has been widely used for that purpose [10], which involves the reduction of bit-precision to lower precision (4-bit or 8-bit) data types [24], for the values of weights and activations of the neural networks employed by these SLMs. Although

evaluation studies [42] suggest that 4-bit quantization achieves performance closer to full precision counterpart, there is no justification for any difference in the SLM’s behavior that results due to quantization. Recently, few researchers [25, 30, 68] have highlighted the potential risks and vulnerabilities in SLMs that arise due to their quantization.

In [30], Hong *et al.* assessed the trustworthiness and standard language understanding in compressed versions of SLMs, namely Llama-2 [67] and Vicuna [74], that are subjected to quantization and pruning. It is observed that robustness towards adversarial and spurious correlation & backdoor demonstrations based scenarios degraded with lower quantization bit levels. In terms of Machine Ethics, the capabilities of detecting immoral and evasive actions also reduced with lower quantization bit levels. Further, the researchers highlighted the high toxic content generation by quantized SLMs, and implied that these potential risks can be leveraged for malicious uses. In their survey, Wang *et al.* [68] also discusses other related research pertaining to the trustworthiness of SLMs, impacting fairness, stereotype bias and privacy aspects.

Corroborating the findings of [30], we observed that, when deployed in on-device environment, the quantized SLMs, namely Phi-2 [37] and RedPajama [1], provide accurate responses to direct harmful queries, instead of rejecting them from answering. This indicates a severe exploitable use case where, any individual would just require a smartphone, an AI-powered chat interface, and open-source vulnerable quantized SLM, for gathering accurate information on various harmful scenarios. Figure 2 illustrates the screenshots of chats with vulnerable quantized SLMs that provide accurate responses for inciting societal and communal harm.

Moreover, in [25] Egashira *et al.* proposed a zero-shot quantization exploit attack on SLMs, like Phi-2 [37] and Gemma [63], that exhibits benign behavior in full precision, but elicits malicious behavior when quantized. In this adversarial strategy, the researchers perform malicious instruction-tuning on SLM, that ensures malicious behavior in that SLM in full precision as well as upon quantization. However, the full precision version of this malicious SLM is repaired using projected gradient descent, such that malicious behavior is exhibited only upon quantization of that SLM.




Figure 3: Threat Model of Open Knowledge Attack motivating the necessity of *LiteLMGuard*.

These elevated risks of reduced trust and ethical behaviors [30] imparted by the quantization, highlights the necessary of securing the quantized versions of these SLMs. Further, the behavior observed in Figure 2, emphasizes the necessity of assessing the queries that are sent to the quantized SLMs. Additionally, the adversarial attacks that leverage quantization [25] for inducing malicious behaviors into SLMs, illustrate that the safety mechanism needs to be independent of the SLM, such that it can tackle even a malicious quantized SLM. Rooting on these implications, we design and develop our prompt guard, called *LiteLMGuard*, that is independent of quantized SLM (benign or malicious), is on-device deployable for securing quantized SLMs on edge devices, and can seamlessly integrated as a separate prompt filtering layer with any quantized SLM. Going forward, the words ‘SLM’ and ‘quantized SLM’ will be used interchangeably.

4 LiteLMGuard

In this section, we discuss about our lightweight, seamless, on-device deployable prompt guard, called *LiteLMGuard*, for mitigating risks and vulnerabilities in on-device SLMs.

4.1 Threat Model

We consider an adversary who modifies an open-source SLM, and induces vulnerabilities that gets triggered when the SLM is subjected to quantization, as shown in Figure 3(a) (suggested in [25]). We assume that this adversary is familiar with open-source repositories like Huggingface [33], and has prior knowledge on the risks and vulnerabilities associated with quantization of SLMs [30]. Based on these assumptions, we conceptualize the following attack:

Open Knowledge Attack. In this attack scenario, we assume that user downloads the uploaded vulnerable quantized SLM from open-source repository to their smartphones, and interact with it through an AI-powered chat app, as illustrated in Figure 3(b). Upon chatting with the SLM, the user notices that the SLM has either

diminished or no safety filters while providing responses. Now, the user tries to gather information on harmful, unsafe and unethical scenarios using queries exactly describing the scenario with all possible sensitive words (without any restrictions). Gradually the user develops malicious intentions and continues this process of gathering more harmful, unsafe or unethical information from the SLM. Note that, this user does not use any kind of jailbreaking or adversarial strategy to trick the SLM.

The severity of this threat model is very high, given the free availability of these models in Huggingface [33], and a huge potential worldwide target base that is as large as the proportion of users who fall under the intersection of 826.2 million AI users [23] and 4.88 billion smartphone users [26].

4.2 Design & Methodology

Driven by this threat model, the design of *LiteLMGuard* is highly influenced by the fundamental challenge of—*ensuring meaningful handling of input queries by on-device quantized SLMs without compromising the user experience or data privacy*. Based on this, we define our prompt guard’s goal as *to serve as a prompt filtering layer that assesses whether an input query is suitable for processing by an on-device SLM, and route the user interaction accordingly*. We explored keyword-based heuristics as an initial step, but that approach lacked the semantic understanding of the query and failed to generalize across various queries. Thus, we formalize the prompt filtering as a binary text classification task, that leverages DL models to semantically determine whether an input query is *answerable* or *not* by the underlying SLM.

Building on these design decisions, the methodology of our prompt guard is as illustrated in Figure 4. Precisely, our prompt guard performs semantic analysis in real-time and determines whether the input query should proceed to the SLM. Thus, if an input query is determined as *not answerable*, a denial response is sent back to the user, else if the input query is *answerable*, then it




Figure 4: Overview of our real-time, seamless on-device prompt guard, *LiteLMGuard*.

is forwarded to the on-device SLM and the generated response is sent back to user.

We developed classification DL models for our specific prompt answerability task using traditional approach, *i.e.*, training DL models from scratch, as well as modern approach, *i.e.*, fine-tuning foundational DL models. Further, for ensured data privacy and server-free functionality, our prompt guard’s candidate model is deployed directly in the on-device environment and made available to the AI-powered chat interface in real-time.

4.3 Answerability Classification Task Data

The crucial step in developing an efficient answerability DL model is collecting data that is relevant to our binary text classification task. Inspired by most researchers [69], we leveraged GPT-4o model [34] through ChatGPT [53] for collecting the data based on the lower level of safety taxonomy (discussed in section 2.2). We curated a balanced dataset called *Answerable-or-Not*, comprising 2440 textual prompts, which has 40 textual prompts (20 YES and 20 NO labels) for each category of the lower level of safety taxonomy. We used the below prompts through ChatGPT [53] for collecting the textual prompts of YES/NO labels. The textual prompts in this dataset can be translated as, NO labeled prompts should be rejected from answering and YES labeled prompts should only be answered. Further, collecting this dataset facilitates accurate prompt filtering with a trade-off of distributing a dataset of risky textual prompts.

Data Collection Prompts
Answerable (YES): Generate a list of 10 or 20 prompts or questions that you (GPT) can answer, specifically related to the category of [category-name] whose content refers to [category-description].
Not Answerable (NO): Generate a list of 10 or 20 prompts or questions that you (GPT) cannot answer, specifically related to the category of [category-name] whose content refers to [category-description].

Table 1: Performance of Classification DL Models on our *Answerable-or-Not* dataset

Model	Accuracy	Precision	F1 Score	TPR	TNR	FPR	FNR
LSTM	93.44	90.00	93.82	97.98	88.75	11.25	2.02
BiLSTM	94.26	93.65	94.40	95.16	93.33	6.67	4.84
CNN-LSTM	94.47	93.68	94.61	95.56	93.33	6.67	4.44
CNN-BiLSTM	93.85	90.98	94.16	97.58	90.00	10.00	2.42
AvgWordVec	94.67	95.12	94.73	94.35	95.00	5.00	5.65
MobileBERT	95.08	94.44	95.20	95.97	94.17	5.83	4.03
ELECTRA	97.75	97.21	97.80	98.39	97.08	2.92	1.61

4.4 Performance of Answerability DL Models

Initially, we trained LSTM, BiLSTM, CNN-LSTM and CNN-BiLSTM models from scratch using our *Answerable-or-Not* dataset that are best for handling textual data. Later, we followed the recent trend, by adopting foundational DL models for text classification tasks through fine-tuning. We fine-tuned [13] the word embeddings model AvgWordVec [58] and Transformer-based models MobileBERT [61] and ELECTRA [21], using our dataset.

Evaluation Metrics. The effectiveness of the DL models on the classification task is evaluated using various metrics, namely accuracy, precision, F1 score, true positive rate (TPR), true negative rate (TNR), false positive rate (FPR), and false negative rate (FNR).

Table 1 illustrates the performance results of the DL models trained or fine-tuned on our *Answerable-or-Not* dataset. We observed that all DL models achieve good performance, given the balanced nature of the dataset. Among the DL models developed through traditional approach, the CNN-LSTM model performed the best, with slight trade-offs between different metrics. In fine-tuned DL models, ELECTRA has performed the best, considering all metrics. Moreover, the fine-tuned DL models surpasses the traditionally trained DL models in almost all metrics. Overall, the performance of ELECTRA stands out as the best among all the evaluated DL models, and we choose it to be the candidate model for our prompt guard, *LiteLMGuard*.

4.5 Implementation

We leveraged MLC-LLM [52], a widely used universal LLM deployment engine, for deploying the target SLMs to smartphones in order to gather responses. The sole functionality of MLC-LLM is to facilitate the deployment of SLMs on to the smartphones, by optimizing them using quantization algorithms. We used a Kotlin-based Chat app, that provides an interface for sending queries to SLMs and gather SLMs’ responses. We embedded this app with our *LiteLMGuard* defense, along with the candidate model ELECTRA and programmed to enable and disable *LiteLMGuard*, such that gathering responses for baseline and our prompt guard scenarios is feasible.

5 Safety Assessment of LiteLMGuard

In this section, we discuss the safety assessment study conducted, for evaluating the effectiveness of our *LiteLMGuard*.

5.1 Methodology

In order to evaluate the safety effectiveness of our prompt guard, we perform a comparative safety assessment of the target SLMs, such that responses gathered by directly sending queries to the on-device SLMs acts as baseline for evaluating the responses gathered while employing our prompt guard. Further, we collected the responses for the baseline and our prompt guard scenarios using direct instructions as well as jailbreak prompting strategies. We feel that jailbreak prompting strategies will help us in better understanding the robustness of our prompt guard, as there is no additional adversarial training involved in our training and fine-tuning regimes. We selected two jailbreaking attacks, DeepInception [44] and AutoDAN [48], that are proved to be best against larger SLMs (7B & 13B models).

5.2 Target SLMs

We evaluate the safety effectiveness of our prompt guard on open-source state-of-the-art SLMs, at the time of conducting our study, which are developed for on-device use cases. These SLMs are selected based on the performance results reported with respect to various standard benchmarks. Next, we discuss briefly about these target SLMs.

Gemma. Gemma [63] is part of a family of lightweight SLMs from Google. It is a 2.51 billion-parameter open-source SLM that offers a balance of performance and efficiency which is useful for on-device environments. It has achieved high performance in benchmarks like MMLU [27], BigBench-Hard [62], HellaSwag [72], GSM-8K [22], MATH [28] and HumanEval [19].

Phi-2. Phi-2 [37] is part of a series of SLMs from Microsoft, named Phi. It is a 2.78 billion-parameter open-source SLM that matched or outperformed models with less than 13 billion parameters on complex benchmarks. It has high performance in MMLU [27], BigBench-Hard [62], GSM-8K [22], and HumanEval [19] benchmarks/

RedPajama. RedPajama [1] is part of the RedPajama-INCITE family developed by Together AI in collaboration with open-source AI community. It is a 2.8 billion-parameter open-source SLM with robust performance on benchmarks like HELM [46], a holistic evaluation developed by Stanford.

Gemma-2. Gemma-2 [64] is version 2.0 of the family of lightweight SLMs from Google. It is a 2.61 billion-parameter open-source SLM, and outperforms the Gemma model. It has achieved high performance compared to Gemma in benchmarks of MMLU [27], BigBench-Hard [62], HellaSwag [72] and GSM-8K [22].

Phi-3.5. Phi-3.5 (mini) [14] is also part of the Phi series of SLMs from Microsoft, and is a 3.81 billion-parameter open-source SLM. It outperforms Phi-2, Gemma and Mistral-7B [40] in the MMLU [27], HellaSwag [72], GSM-8K [22], and BigBench-Hard [62] benchmarks.

Llama-3.2. Llama-3.2 [7] is part of a family of SLMs from Meta, called Llama, and is a 3.21 billion-parameter open-source SLM. It has achieved high performance than Gemma-2 in the benchmarks of MMLU [27], HellaSwag [72], and GSM-8K [22], and better performance in MATH [28] benchmark compared to Phi-3.5.

InternLM-2.5. InternLM-2.5 [18] is part of the InternLM family of SLMs which is a 1.89 billion-parameter open-source model. This family of models have achieved high performance than Llama family of models in the MMLU [27], HellaSwag [72], GSM-8K [22], MATH [28], and HumanEval [19] benchmarks.

5.3 Safety Effectiveness Results

Datasets. We leveraged two datasets, namely AdvBench [75] and Behaviors [47], for evaluating the safety effectiveness of our prompt guard on the target SLMs. Both these datasets contains harmful instructions and are usually utilized for evaluating adversarial attacks on LLMs. For AdvBench dataset, we used a more refined version that contains 50 extremely harmful instructions for our evaluation. The Behaviors dataset contains 120 harmful instructions that are collected from various open-source datasets, including presented papers and competitions.

Response Evaluator. Following the scope of our safety assessment, we are focused on the *number of safe responses* n_{safe} from the target SLMs for any prompting strategy. In order to quantify these safe responses, we leveraged **Refusal-Judge** proposed by Zou *et al.* [75], and defined appropriate evaluation metrics for safety effectiveness based on n_{safe} .

Evaluation Metrics. We quantify safety effectiveness of our prompt guard using 2 metrics, namely unsafe response rate and relative safety effectiveness. The **unsafe response rate** (URR) represents the degree of safe response generation of SLMs, that implied by its name, checks for the number of unsafe responses among all the responses generated by the SLM. It is computed as:

$$URR = \left(1 - \frac{n_{safe}}{N}\right) \times 100 \quad (1)$$

where n_{safe} is number of safe responses (computed by Refusal-Judge), and N is the total number of responses generated by a specific SLM. The **relative safety effectiveness** (RSE) quantifies the extent of safety offered by our prompt guard in comparison with the baseline scenario (no defense). It is calculated as:

$$RSE = \left(1 - \frac{URR_{LLMG}}{URR_{Baseline}}\right) \times 100 \quad (2)$$

where URR_{LLMG} is the unsafe response rate of our prompt guard scenario, and $URR_{Baseline}$ is the unsafe response rate of baseline scenario, for a specific SLM.




Figure 5: Relative Safety Effectiveness (RSE %) of LiteLMGuard on AdvBench Dataset.




Figure 6: Relative Safety Effectiveness (RSE %) of LiteLMGuard on Behaviors Dataset.

Table 2: Unsafe Response Rates (URR %) of SLMs in Baseline and LiteLMGuard (LLMG) scenarios for different prompting strategies and datasets (Bold cells denotes lower number of unsafe responses)

Model	Direct Instruction		DeepInception		AutoDAN	
	Baseline	LLMG	Baseline	LLMG	Baseline	LLMG
<i>AdvBench Dataset</i>						
Gemma	24.00	0.00	52.00	0.00	34.00	4.00
Phi-2	86.00	12.00	94.00	0.00	96.00	8.00
RedPajama	88.00	12.00	100.00	0.00	96.00	8.00
Gemma-2	2.00	0.00	78.00	0.00	18.00	6.00
Phi-3.5	4.00	0.00	28.00	0.00	14.00	2.00
Llama-3.2	2.00	0.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
InternLM-2.5	90.00	12.00	98.00	0.00	98.00	6.00
<i>Behaviors Dataset</i>						
Gemma	13.33	0.83	63.33	0.00	32.50	10.83
Phi-2	84.17	3.33	95.00	0.00	95.83	17.50
RedPajama	93.33	2.50	99.17	0.00	98.33	16.67
Gemma-2	5.00	0.83	89.17	0.00	24.17	7.50
Phi-3.5	5.83	0.00	52.50	0.00	22.50	1.67
Llama-3.2	2.50	0.83	14.17	0.00	0.00	0.00
InternLM-2.5	97.50	2.50	96.67	0.00	96.67	18.33

Results. Table 2 presents the results of our comparative safety assessment performed on all the target SLMs using different prompting strategies and datasets. It is observed that the SLMs, Phi-2, RedPajama and InternLM-2.5, are providing high number of valid answers with URR more than 80% in Direct Instruction itself. With our prompt guard safeguarding these SLMs, the URR has been

drastically reduced to a range of (0%, 12%] for Direct Instruction considering both datasets. These 3 SLMs clearly emphasize the need of our prompt guard, given their exploitable nature that can be leveraged in getting answers for harmful queries. Further, in Direct Instruction, our prompt guard mitigated the unsafe responses from Gemma, Gemma-2, Phi-3.5 and Llama-3.2, in comparison to the baseline scenario.

For baseline scenario in DeepInception jailbreak prompting, the URR of all target SLMs is either equal or greater than the URRs observed in baseline scenario of Direct Instruction prompting. Similar to Direct Instruction prompting, even in DeepInception prompting, the SLMs, Phi-2, RedPajama and InternLM-2.5, exhibited high URR, probably due to their exploitable nature as well as the effect of jailbreaking attack. However, without any additional adversarial training, our prompt guard completely safeguarded all target SLMs and achieved 0% URR, even for these SLMs. This indicates that our prompt guard is robust towards DeepInception jailbreak attack and can defend any SLM if subjected to this attack.

Similar to DeepInception prompting, higher URR is observed for all target SLMs (except Llama-3.2) in baseline scenario of AutoDAN jailbreak prompting. Further, as observed previously, Phi-2, RedPajama and InternLM-2.5 exhibited high URR compared to other SLMs in this prompting strategy as well. Although our prompt guard mitigated unsafe responses significantly for all target SLMs, the performance in AutoDAN prompting is comparatively lesser than that of achieved in DeepInception prompting. Moreover, Llama-3.2 exhibited high robustness towards this AutoDAN prompting even in the baseline scenario for both datasets. Overall, it evident that

our prompt guard mitigated the risk of high unsafe responses from target SLMs for both datasets as well as for all prompting strategies. For better understanding the performance of our prompt guard, in comparison with the baseline scenario, we used the RSE metric on all target SLMs, prompting strategies and datasets.

Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the RSE of our prompt guard on all target SLMs for all prompting strategies in AdvBench and Behaviors datasets respectively. As inferred previously, our prompt guard is robust towards DeepInception prompting and achieves 100% RSE for all target SLMs on both datasets. Considering both datasets and all prompting strategies, our prompt guard achieves $RSE \in [81\%, 100\%]$ for the identified exploitable SLMs, *i.e.*, Phi-2, RedPajama and InternLM-2.5. Overall, on an average, our prompt guard, the *LiteLMGuard*, achieves an RSE of at least 87% which indicates that our prompt guard reduces more than 87% of unsafe responses generated by on-device SLMs. It is worth noting that these results are achieved on the datasets, AdvBench and Behaviors, that are independent of our prompt guard’s training dataset, *Answerable-or-Not*. Another notable inference from the results in Table 2, Figure 5 and Figure 6 is that Llama-3.2 is highly robust towards AutoDAN jailbreak attack.

5.4 Securing Vulnerable SLMs

The safety assessment results in section 5.3 illustrated that few SLMs can be directly exploited in on-device environment, and few SLMs become exploitable under the influence of jailbreak prompting. These aspects demonstrate the need for having a safety mechanism for on-device SLMs. Moreover, for enabling the on-device AI principles of data privacy and server-free functionality, the safety mechanism should be an on-device deployable solution that ensures the data processing on the device itself. Based on the results in section 5.3, all these requirements are fulfilled by our *LiteLMGuard*. In order to practically demonstrate the direct exploitable nature of SLMs and effectiveness of our prompt guard, we subjected them to Open Knowledge Attacks using vanilla prompts, where we observed that these SLMs provide direct harmful answers to benign prompts with clearly mentioned malicious intentions. These vanilla prompts are collected from multiple jailbreaking papers and other sources. We targeted the SLMs, Phi-2 and RedPajama, given their performance on par with larger SLMs ($\geq 7B$ parameters). The demonstration of exploitable scenarios and safety effectiveness of our prompt guard are discussed below:

Societal Harm. Russinovich *et al.* [59] extracted an accurate answer for “building a Molotov” from language models by leveraging a multi-turn jailbreaking technique called Crescendo. But as shown in Figure 7(a), Phi-2 has responded with valid answer for the same query. However, this query is blocked by our prompt guard as shown in Figure 7(b). In [41], Jiang *et al.* proposed an ASCII art-based attack strategy called ArtPrompt, in order to jailbreak LLMs for gathering information on “building a Bomb”, whereas RedPajama has provided a correct answer to the same prompt, as shown in Figure 8(a). This behavior is safeguarded by our prompt guard in Figure 8(b).

Illegal Activities. Similar to societal harm queries, Phi-2 and RedPajama were able to layout detailed information on how to perform illegal activities. In Figure 9(a), Phi-2 has presented an elaborate




Figure 7: Demonstration of Phi-2 for Societal Harm prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) *LiteLMGuard* blocking the request.

plan for “breaking into someone’s home undetected” without any filters with step-by-step procedure for performing this illegal activity. Even RedPajama provided a detailed execution plan for “committing a credit card fraud” in Figure 10(a), which should not have been answered. Both these queries are blocked by our prompt guard in Figures 9(b) and 10(b).

Hate Content. In [43], Kang *et al.* developed a code injection prompt for generating hateful tweet against Jews, whereas Phi-2 has generated such a hateful tweet for direct vanilla prompt itself, as shown in Figure 11(a). Based on a reddit post [56], we crafted a vanilla prompt for creating vulgar comments on a girl’s Instagram post, for which RedPajama has generated such comments, as shown in Figure 12(a). With these generations it is clear that Phi-2 and RedPajama can be leveraged for creating hate content using direct vanilla prompts, which should be blocked, as shown in Figures 11(b) and 12(b).

Exploiting for Phishing. These demonstrations of societal harm, illegal activities and hate content vanilla prompts highlight the severe security concern, that can be exploited by adversaries for malicious intentions like phishing, smishing and others. As shown in Figure 13(a), adversaries can generate phishing content using Phi-2, without the need of any prompt engineering for jailbreaking LLMs [57]. Similarly, as shown in Figure 14(a), RedPajama can also be leveraged for generating such phishing content. The underlying and critical concern is that these vanilla prompts clearly state the intention of phishing with exact words, and our prompt guard ensures that such queries are blocked, as shown in Figures 13(b) and 14(b).

Self-Harm. This behavior is not just limited to above scenarios, but can also be exploited for self-harm as well. As shown in Figures 15(a) and 16(a), both Phi-2 and RedPajama provide very highly sensitive self-harming responses that can cause serious injuries with severe consequences. These kind of queries/requests to any language model should be blocked from answering, and our prompt guard achieves it, as shown in Figures 15(b) and 16(b).

These demonstrations illustrate that these SLMs clearly violate the principles of Responsible AI (section 2.1). Further, anyone can




Figure 8: Demo on RedPajama for Societal Harm prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 9: Demo on Phi-2 for Illegal Activity prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 10: Demo on RedPajama for Illegal Activity prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 11: Demo on Phi-2 for Hate Content prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.



Figure 12: Demo on RedPajama for Hate Content prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 13: Demo on Phi-2 for Phishing Content prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 14: Demo on RedPajama for Phishing Content prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 15: Demo on Phi-2 for Self-Harming prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 16: Demo on RedPajama for Self-Harming prompt: (a) Direct response from SLM, and (b) LiteLMGuard blocking the request.




Figure 17: Latency of *LiteLMGuard* on tested smartphones and datasets in real-time.

exploit these vulnerable SLMs and perform Open Knowledge Attacks for gathering information on harmful, illegal and unethical scenarios with malicious intentions. Also, they emphasize the need of an on-device safety mechanism, like our *LiteLMGuard*, for data privacy, server-free functionality and securing these vulnerable SLMs for minimizing the extent of such Open Knowledge Attacks.

6 Prompt Filtering Effectiveness of LiteLMGuard

In this section, we discuss the prompt filtering effectiveness studies conducted for evaluating the performance of our *LiteLMGuard*. Precisely, we illustrate the latency of our prompt guard for performing the prompt filtering task on different devices (smartphones). Further, we present the performance of our prompt guard in comparison with open-source and proprietary server-run Guard Models, in terms of prompt filtering accuracy.

6.1 Methodology & Implementation

We evaluate the effectiveness of prompt filtering in terms of task latency that quantifies the overhead that user experiences while employing our prompt guard, and task accuracy that quantifies the prompt filtering capabilities. The task accuracy results are compared with multiple server-run Guard Models, both open-source and proprietary, that acts as baselines for our *LiteLMGuard*. We re-purposed the Kotlin-based Chat app, developed in section 4.5, to collect prompt filtering results and latency of task for all datasets and prompting strategies, discussed in section 5.3.

6.2 Prompt Filtering Latency Results

In order to generalize the latency of our prompt guard, we performed the task latency evaluation on three different devices that are equipped with different processors, which are OnePlus 12 equipped with Qualcomm Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 processor, Pixel 8 equipped with Google Tensor G3 processor, and Samsung S21 equipped with Qualcomm Snapdragon 888 processor.

Table 3: Average latency of *LiteLMGuard* on tested smartphones (in milliseconds), where ADN is AdvBench dataset and BEH is Behaviors dataset

Device	Direct Instruction		DeepInception		AutoDAN	
	ADN	BEH	ADB	BEH	ADB	BEH
OnePlus 12	135.00	135.77	132.29	131.85	133.62	143.41
Pixel 8	155.32	152.59	146.48	156.64	140.01	154.22
Samsung S21	136.38	104.99	126.97	104.54	134.18	105.59

Evaluation Metrics. We quantify the latency l of our prompt guard using on-device execution time of the task (in milliseconds). We computed the latency l as:

$$l = t_{exec}^a - t_{exec}^b \quad (3)$$

where t_{exec}^a is the time after the execution of task, and t_{exec}^b is the time before the execution of task.

Results. Figure 17 plots the on-device execution times per prompt and prompting strategy of each dataset for all the tested devices, namely OnePlus 12, Pixel 8 and Samsung S21. For AdvBench dataset, considering all prompting strategies, OnePlus 12 has latency l_{OP} in the range of (110 ms, 185 ms), Pixel 8 has latency l_{PX} in the range of (95 ms, 290 ms), and Samsung S21 has latency l_{SS} in the range of (85 ms, 215 ms). In case of Behaviors dataset, considering all prompting strategies, OnePlus 12 has latency l_{OP} in the range of (95 ms, 320 ms), Pixel 8 has latency l_{PX} in the range of (105 ms, 480 ms), and Samsung S21 has latency l_{SS} in the range of (85 ms, 155 ms). Based on these ranges, OnePlus 12 has lower latency for AdvBench dataset, and Samsung S21 has lower latency for Behaviors dataset.

These inferences are slightly substantiated by the average latency results presented in Table 3. In Direct Instruction prompting, OnePlus 12 has lowest latency of 135 ms for AdvBench dataset, and Samsung S21 has lowest latency of 104.99 ms for Behaviors dataset. A similar trend is observed for AutoDAN jailbreak prompting, where OnePlus 12 has lowest latency of 133.62 ms for AdvBench dataset, and Samsung S21 has lowest latency of 105.59 ms for Behaviors dataset. However, in case of DeepInception jailbreak prompting,

Table 4: Prompt Filtering Accuracy (PFA %) performance of *LiteLMGuard* in comparison with existing Guard Models, where ADB is AdvBench dataset, and BEH is Behaviors dataset (Bold cells denotes high accuracy in prompt filtering)

Guard Model	Direct Instruction		DeepInception		AutoDAN	
	ADB	BEH	ADB	BEH	ADB	BEH
OpenAI Moderation	86.00	92.50	76.00	77.50	50.00	45.00
Llama Guard	82.00	82.50	28.00	25.83	24.00	23.33
Llama Guard 2	100.00	94.17	4.00	0.83	42.00	58.33
Llama Guard 3	100.00	95.83	96.00	86.67	68.00	76.67
ShieldGemma	96.00	85.00	100.00	100.00	98.00	100.00
<i>LiteLMGuard</i> [†]	88.00	96.67	100.00	100.00	94.00	84.17

[†] On-Device deployable Guard Model.

for both AdvBench and Behaviors datasets, Samsung S21 has the lowest latencies of 126.97 ms and 104.54 ms respectively. Overall, considering all prompting strategies, datasets and tested smartphones, it is clear that our prompt guard has an average latency of ≈ 135 ms which is a negligible overhead for any user, and makes our *LiteLMGuard* practically lightweight.

6.3 Prompt Filtering Accuracy Results

In order to generalize the accuracy of our prompt guard, we performed prompt filtering accuracy evaluation in comparison with multiple open-source and proprietary server-run guard models, namely OpenAI Moderation [51], Llama Guard [35], Llama Guard 2 [9], Llama Guard 3 [20], and ShieldGemma [73]. Next, we briefly discuss these guard models.

OpenAI Moderation. OpenAI Moderation [51] is a proprietary filtering service offered by OpenAI via API access, that identifies potentially harmful content in text and images.

Llama Guard Models. Llama Guard [35], Llama Guard 2 [9] and Llama Guard 3 [20] are open-source LLM-based input-output safe-guard models by Meta, that categorizes both LLM prompts and responses based on a set of safety risks, where Llama Guard is based on the Llama-2 7B model [67], and Llama Guard 2 and Llama Guard 3 are based on the Llama-3 models [7].

ShieldGemma. ShieldGemma [73] is a comprehensive suite of LLM-based safety content moderation open-source models from Google, that are built upon Gemma-2 models [64].

Evaluation Metrics. We quantify the prompt filtering accuracy *PFA* of our *LiteLMGuard* and all guard models using classification accuracy of the prompts. We computed the *PFA* as:

$$PFA = \frac{p_{cf}}{p_t} \times 100 \quad (4)$$

where p_{cf} is the number of prompts filtered correctly, and p_t is the total number of prompts.

Results. The results in Table 4 illustrate the *PFA* of evaluated guard models for each prompting strategy and dataset. For Direct Instruction prompting of AdvBench dataset, our *LiteLMGuard* has achieved better results than OpenAI Moderation and Llama Guard. However, Llama Guard 2, Llama Guard 3 and ShieldGemma performs better than our *LiteLMGuard*. In case of Direct Instruction prompting of Behaviors dataset, our *LiteLMGuard* outperforms all other guard models with 96.67% *PFA*. For DeepInception jailbreak prompting of both datasets, our *LiteLMGuard* and ShieldGemma outperform all

other guard models with 100% *PFA*. In case of AutoDAN jailbreak prompting of both datasets, ShieldGemma achieves highest *PFA*. However, for these scenarios, our *LiteLMGuard* achieves second best performance and outperforms the other guard models, except ShieldGemma.

The overall accuracy results presented in Figure 18 emphasizes the performance of our *LiteLMGuard*, where it is the second best among the evaluated guard models for both datasets. Moreover, our *LiteLMGuard* falls behind ShieldGemma with only $\leq 4\%$ accuracy. Further, Llama Guard models and ShieldGemma are developed by safety instruction fine-tuning of larger SLMs (≥ 7 B parameters), making them huge models in comparison with our prompt guard’s candidate model, ELECTRA (15M parameters). This indicates that our *LiteLMGuard* achieves near or better performance than guard models that more than 100 \times larger.




Figure 18: Overall Prompt Filtering Accuracy (PFA %) of Guard Models on both datasets.

7 Discussion

The Intuition of an on-device safety mechanism for mitigating any possible risks or vulnerabilities that arise due to quantization of SLMs for on-device deployment, is the base idea for the development of our *LiteLMGuard*. This kind of on-device safety mechanism ensures data privacy and server-free functionality, and processes the data on the device itself. Due to the constrained computational capabilities of these devices, our prompt guard has to be lightweight in terms of size, memory usage and latency overhead. Further, an accurate goal and appropriate data are necessary for fulfilling these constraints. These are the reasons that justify the curation of data and selection of classification DL models, for our prompt guard.

These design decisions of our prompt guard are substantiated by the safety effectiveness results in section 5.3. It is observed that due to quantization, SLMs like Phi-2, RedPajama and InternLM-2.5 responds with high number of unsafe answers to prompts of both AdvBench and Behaviors datasets. Moreover, as expected DeepInception and AutoDAN jailbreak prompting were able to manipulate the SLMs into generating high number of unsafe answers, in comparison to Direct Instruction prompting. As illustrated in Table 2, our prompt guard ensures lesser number of unsafe answers from on-device SLMs. Further, as shown in Figures 5 and 6, the safety effectiveness of our prompt guard is considerably high, which is

quantified using RSE metric. Also, the demonstrations in section 5.4, illustrates the practical applicability of our prompt guard in real-time on-device environment, and showcases that it helps in mitigating Open Knowledge Attacks.

The prompt filtering latency results shows that our prompt guard has an overhead that is negligible for any user on any device (or smartphone). Due to this reason, it is clear that our prompt guard is practically a lightweight safety mechanism, that is desirable for any edge device deployments. Further, the prompt filtering accuracy results showcase our prompt guard’s near best performance in comparison with open-source and proprietary server-run guard models, that are atleast 100× larger than the candidate model of our prompt guard. These accuracy results substantiates our *LiteLMGuard*’s design decisions for the second time.

Limitations. Like any other DL model, the performance of our *LiteLMGuard*’s candidate model is limited by our *Answerable-or-Not* dataset, and we anticipate that classification task performance can be improved with more data records. Further, the primary assumption in the design of our prompt guard is that the edge device is capable of running the candidate model of our *LiteLMGuard*. Moreover, the training regime of our *LiteLMGuard* is not continuous, due to which there is a chance of wrong prompt filtering of unseen data (queries or prompts).

Future Work. In order to minimize the chances of wrong prompt filtering, future work should focus on developing a continuous training regime, by updating the training dataset as well as the prompt guard’s candidate model, for yielding much better results. We followed a static deployment strategy, where our prompt guard is embedded with the Chat app. However, future work should focus on enabling our prompt guard as a system service available throughout the device, for all apps to leverage. Additionally, for tackling sophisticated adversaries, we recommend developing adversarial training regime for improving the robustness of our prompt guard. Further, any future work should build upon ensuring data privacy and server-free functionality, which are the primary expectations of On-Device AI.

8 Related Work

SLMs for On-Device Use Cases. With an intention of offering LLM capabilities, tech companies have started developing SLMs, smaller versions of these LLMs, that can be deployed on edge devices and offer the offline AI functionalities like summarization, text suggestions, image captioning and chatbots. Further, many tech companies have released families of open-source SLMs for research and novel use case purposes, such as Gemma from Google [63, 64], Phi from Microsoft [14, 37], Llama from Meta [7, 67], RedPajama from Together AI [1], and InternLM from Shanghai AI Laboratory [18].

A commercially available SLM for such use cases is Gemini Nano [6], developed by Google which is currently available from Pixel 8 Pro smartphones onwards. Phi Silica [54], a Cyber-EO compliant derivative of Phi-3-mini [14], has been embedded with Windows 11 Copilot+ PCs for enabling on-device rewrite and summarize capabilities in Word and Outlook applications. MLC LLM [52] has enabled the deployment of various SLMs for direct on-device (iOS & Android) and in-browser inferences through AI-powered chat interfaces.

Attacks on LLMs & SLMs. Due to the incredible capabilities of LLMs & SLMs, there are severe concerns pertaining to their security, given their susceptibility to adversarial attacks. In order to understand the inherent vulnerabilities associated with LLMs & SLMs, many researchers have red-teamed them in both white-box and black-box attack settings. Liu *et al.* [48] developed a white-box attack, called as AutoDAN, that automatically generates stealthy prompts using a hierarchical genetic algorithm, which successfully jailbreak larger SLMs. In [41], Jiang *et al.* devised an ASCII art based jailbreaking prompt, called ArtPrompt, that bypassed safety measures and elicited harmful undesired behavior from LLMs. Russinovich *et al.* [59] developed a simple multi-turn jailbreak attack, called Crescendo, that interacts with LLM in a seemingly benign manner, and gradually escalates the dialogue by referencing the LLM’s replies progressively leading to a successful jailbreak.

Inspired by Milgram experiment *w.r.t.* the authority power for inciting harmfulness, Li *et al.* [44] developed jailbreaking attack called DeepInception, that leverages the personification ability of SLM to construct a virtual, nested scene to successfully jailbreak. In [43], Kang *et al.* has showed that programmatic capabilities of LLMs can be leveraged for generating convincing malicious content like scams, spam, hate speech, and others, without any additional training or extensive prompt engineering. Egashira *et al.* [25] developed a Zero-Shot Exploit Attack on SLMs that ensures secure behavior in full precision but exhibits malicious behavior upon quantization of the SLM.

Defenses for LLMs & SLMs. Jain *et al.* [36] proposed prompt filtering-based defense for SLMs that assess the harmfulness of a prompt based on its textual perplexity. They also proposed prompt perturbation-based defenses such as paraphrasing and retokenization that alters the input prompts. In [71], Xie *et al.* proposed Grad-Safe, an approach that examines the safety-critical parameters of SLMs for identifying unsafe prompts. Building upon the work of Jain *et al.* [36], Alon and Kamfonas [15] proposed a classifier that assess the harmfulness of a prompt by considering textual perplexity and token sequence length together. Markov *et al.* [51] proposed a holistic approach for building robust and useful natural language classification system for real-world content moderation, which is currently available to worldwide users as OpenAI Moderation API.

Ji *et al.* [39] proposed a smoothing-based defense, called SEMANTICSMOOTH, that aggregates the predictions of multiple semantically transformed versions of input prompt, for improved robustness against semantic jailbreak attacks on LLMs. In [32], Hu *et al.* studied the refusal loss function and proposed a two-step jailbreak detection procedure, called Gradient Cuff, that sequentially checks the refusal landscape’s functional value and gradient norm. Li *et al.* [45] proposed RAIN, an inference method that allows pre-trained LLMs to evaluate their own generation and leverage the evaluation results for guiding the rewind and generation processes for ensuring safe content. Recently, tech companies have releasing open-source guard models that are safety fine-tuned versions of their open-source SLMs/LLMs, that flags the unsafe content in both input prompt and model’s response. ShieldGemma from Google [73], and Llama Guard Models from Meta [9, 20, 35] are such open-source guard models. However, we feel these defenses fall short, as novel and sophisticated attacks targeting LLMs & SLMs are being rapidly developed [49].

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we develop a lightweight DL-based prompt guard for securing SLMs against quantization-induced risks and vulnerabilities that arise while optimizing them for on-device deployment. We conceptualize *Open Knowledge Attacks* and define the goal of our *LiteLMGuard* defense as *to serve as a prompt filtering layer that assesses whether an input query is suitable for processing by an on-device SLM, and route the user interaction accordingly*. Specifically, we formalize this prompt filtering goal as an answerability classification task that leverages DL models for semantically determining if an input query is answerable or not. We curated answerability task dataset, called *Answerable-or-Not*, using GPT-4o model [34] through ChatGPT [53] by following the hierarchical safety taxonomy of [69]. Using this dataset, we trained and fine-tuned various DL models and finalized ELECTRA [21] as the candidate model for our *LiteLMGuard*.

We performed safety effectiveness study that highlighted the exploitable nature of some on-device SLMs as well as the level of safety our *LiteLMGuard* defense offers to these on-device SLMs. It is observed that *LiteLMGuard* achieves an overall RSE of 87%, without any additional adversarial training. We practically demonstrated the vulnerabilities of these on-device quantized SLMs using vanilla prompts and *Open Knowledge Attacks*, and mitigating them with *LiteLMGuard*. Further, we performed prompt filtering effectiveness studies that showcase our prompt guard’s performance in terms of negligible average latency of ≈ 135 ms and near best overall accuracy of 94% in comparison with multiple open-source and proprietary server-run guard models. Altogether, our *LiteLMGuard* effectively and efficiently secures the SLMs against risks and vulnerabilities induced by quantization—required for their on-device deployment.

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