# Attack and defense techniques in large language models: A survey and new perspectives

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## ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become central to numerous natural language processing tasks, but their vulnerabilities present significant security and ethical challenges. This systematic survey explores the evolving landscape of attack and defense techniques in LLMs. We classify attacks into adversarial prompt attack, optimized attacks, model theft, as well as attacks on application of LLMs, detailing their mechanisms and implications. Consequently, we analyze defense strategies, including prevention-based and detection-based defense methods. Although advances have been made, challenges remain to adapt to the dynamic threat landscape, balance usability with robustness, and address resource constraints in defense implementation. We highlight open problems, including the need for adaptive scalable defenses, explainable security techniques, and standardized evaluation frameworks. This survey provides actionable insights and directions for developing secure and resilient LLMs, emphasizing the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and ethical considerations to mitigate risks in real-world applications.

## 1. Introduction

The Large Language Model (LLM) is a machine learning model characterized by an extensive number of parameters and advanced learning capabilities, enabling it to exhibit exceptional proficiency in language processing. By analyzing context, it predicts the most likely word sequences to generate coherent new text [14, 6]. With the rapid development and maturation of LLM technology, its remarkable capabilities and vast application potential have attracted significant scholarly attention. Research in this field is advancing swiftly, and LLMs are being increasingly adopted across various domains. To date, they have been widely applied in medicine, healthcare, education, scientific research, and beyond [18, 43, 69].

Although LLMs have become increasingly powerful in their capabilities, the rapid development of this research field is remarkable and concerning. Despite their impressive advancements, LLMs exhibit inherent vulnerabilities and are susceptible to various disruptions, posing potential safety risks. This makes LLMs susceptible to various forms of attacks, thereby compromising their integrity and functionality. Based on current research, there are several challenges that LLMs continue to face. For instance, the issue of model training data leakage [5] can result in significant economic losses for development companies, which have invested substantial resources and manpower in model training. Furthermore, there have been studies indicating that LLM also

presents a phenomenon of personal information leakage [21], which poses a significant threat to personal privacy, personal safety, and property security. Additionally, one of the issues is the misuse of the model [20, 40], such as using LLM inappropriately to generate malicious content, generate papers, or generate phishing emails.

At present, attacks on LLM can be broadly categorized into two main categories: one category attacks targeting the LLM itself and its applications, while the other primarily focuses on assaults aimed at the data layer. The first involves attacks targeting the LLM itself and its applications, which can compromise the secure operation and normal functionality of the model. Such attacks may lead to severe consequences, including reduced model performance, denial of service, and failures in the model's security systems [4]. The second category focuses on attacks aimed at the data and privacy layers of LLMs, threatening the internal data security of the model, as well as its training data and processes. These attacks can result in critical issues such as the leakage of internal model parameters, the insertion of backdoors [72], and the generation of harmful outputs [79].

Fortunately, effective defensive and preventive measures have been developed to address most of the attacks associated with LLMs. In our investigation, we reviewed existing defense strategies and categorized them into two main approaches: detection-based and protection-based approaches. Detection-based defenses focus on identifying threats through methods such as detecting malicious inputs [49], analyzing key attributes [67], and monitoring for sensitive information. In contrast, protection-based defenses involve proactive measures, such as incorporating security prompts within the model [68], modifying input prompts [23], and utilizing red team training techniques [12].

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
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**Fig. 1:** Taxonomy of attack and defense techniques related to LLMs in our survey

However, despite ongoing advancements in research, the field of LLM security studies still faces some challenges. Some articles argue that the current research in certain directions is relatively scattered and not systematic. Additionally, some scholars point out that with the continuous exploration of LLM attack methods and the discovery of security models, there is an urgent need for more diverse and complex defense measures, as well as evaluation criteria for the effectiveness of attacks and defenses. Therefore, a more comprehensive and up-to-date investigation of attacks and defenses is needed in current research in the field of LLM security.

With the increasing application scenarios of LLM parameters, the research in the field of LLM security will become an important factor influencing the development of LLM. Accordingly, it is necessary to systematically and comprehensively review LLM attack and defense techniques to promote the development of this field. Moreover, this survey can provide appropriate guidance for researchers and practitioners in this field, enabling them to better understand the current situation.

Our contributions are as follows.

- We provide a systematic classification of existing attack and defense techniques related to LLMs ontology and its applications.

- We summarize the current challenges of LLMs, while exploring various mechanisms and principles of attacks and defenses.

- Based on the current research situation, we put forward relevant suggestions for emerging directions and future development in the field of LLMs.

In the remaining sections of this survey, we provide the relevant background and current status of the field in Sec-

**Fig. 2:** The overall workflow of an LLM program

tion 2, and elaborate on the main attack methods currently observed in the LLM ontology and its application in Section 3. We summarize the existing defense mechanisms in Section 4, and provide an outlook on the future development of LLM in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes this survey. As illustrated in Figure 1, the structure of our article is outlined below.

## 2. Background on LLMs

LLMs are machine learning systems distinguished by their vast number of parameters and advanced language processing capabilities. With technologies continuing to evolve, LLMs are increasingly being integrated into a wider range of fields and applications. However, this widespread adoption increases the importance of ensuring their security. Consequently, there is an urgent need for comprehensive research on the security aspects of LLMs. To provide readers with a solid foundation for the subsequent discussion, this section offers a systematic overview of the composition and working principles of LLMs, as well as the latest advancements in LLM security research.

### 2.1. LLM Architecture and Workflow

Many LLMs are built on the foundation of the transformer architecture, which includes core components such as self-attention, positional encoding, and sequence modeling [11]. Based on the specific components incorporated, LLMs can be categorized into three types: decoder-only, encoder-only, and encoder-decoder architectures. In recent years, pure decoder models, such as GPT-3, have emerged as the dominant design for LLM development [70].

As shown in Figure 2, the process of generating a response in an LLM, starting with user input, involves several key steps, including tokenization, embedding, decoder computation, and output generation. Each stage of this process introduces potential security vulnerabilities, making LLMs susceptible to a variety of attacks. For instance, the input stage may be exploited through injection attacks or jailbreak attacks, while the output stage can expose risks such as model theft and prompt theft. The following sections will provide a detailed analysis of these vulnerabilities and their implications.

### 2.2. Current Status of LLM Security Research

Drawing from the existing body of research, numerous studies and experiments have investigated both offensive and defensive measures within the domain of LLM security. Broadly, current research in this area can be categorized into two main domains. The first domain focuses on the security of the LLM's core architecture and its associated applications, while the second domain addresses data and privacy security.

Research on data and privacy security emphasizes protecting internal model data, safeguarding the model training process, and ensuring the privacy of personal information [11]. However, this domain faces significant challenges, including model data leakage [5], personal privacy breaches [31], and data poisoning attacks [51]. Conversely, efforts to secure the LLM's architecture and its applications primarily aim to maintain operational integrity, prevent unauthorized access or modifications, and ensure availability for legitimate users. Key concerns in this area include threats such as jailbreak attacks and prompt injection attacks.

In summary, while the field of LLM security research is extensive and multifaceted, this article will focus specifically on addressing the security challenges associated with the LLM's core architecture and its related applications.

## 3. Attack Techniques

The methods employed to attack LLMs continuously evolve due to inherent vulnerabilities, leading to an increasing diversity of attack variants. While this phenomenon poses significant challenges, it also offers valuable opportunities. On one hand, the development of novel attack techniques enhances our understanding of LLM security, enabling researchers to identify vulnerabilities, address existing gaps, and further advance the field. On the other hand, the increasing complexity and diversity of attacks complicate research efforts and hinder classification, posing challenges for newcomers seeking a comprehensive understanding of the field.

To address these challenges, this section presents a classification of three main categories of attack techniques, derived from the most prominent research directions. An overview of the related literature is shown in Table 1. A detailed discussion of each category follows in the subsequent sections.

**Table 1**
**Statistics on our investigation of attack technologies in LLMs**

| Category | work | Method/Algorithm | Evaluated LLM Model | Dataset | Evaluation Metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jailbreak | [34] | Analyzing-Based Jailbreak | Llama-3,Qwen-2,GLM-4, gpt-3.5 turbo, gpt-4 turbo,Claude-3 | AdvBench's harmful behavior dataset | ASR, AE |
| | [33] | DeepInception | Llama-2-chat, Falcon,vicula-v, GPT-3.5-turbo,GPT-4 | AdvBench's harmful behavior dataset | Jailbreak success rate |
| | [36] | Genetic Algorithm, AutoDAN-HGA | Vicuna-7b,Guanaco-7b, Llama2-7b-chat, gpt-3.5 turbo | AdvBench's harmful behavior dataset | ASR, GPT recheck |
| | [73] | Workflow of GPTFUZZER, MCTS-Explore | ChatGPT, Llama-2-7b-chat, Vicuna-7B | \ | ASR |
| Prompt injection | [48] | \ | text-davici-002 | OpenAI sample page | ASR |
| | [26] | \ | ChatGPT, GPT-3, InstructGPT model series | \ | ASR |
| | [4] | Normalized Levenshtein, Cosine Distance, Sørensen–Dice distance | text-davincii-002, BERT-base-uncase, ALBERT-base-v2, GPT-3 | \ | Human evaluation |
| | [16] | \ | text-davincii-003, gpt-4 | \ | \ |
| Prompt leakage | [71] | Prompt attention algorithm based on output difference, Selective beam search for related word identification, | GPT-3.5,GPT-4 | \ | BLEU, ASR, Human evaluation, FastKASSIM |
| | [1] | \ | LLama2-13b-chat, Mistral-7b, Mix-tral 8x7b, gpt-3.5-turbo, gpt-4,Gemini-pro, Command-{XL,R}, Claude v | \ | Response Labeling, Rouge-L recall |
| Optimize attacks | [24] | QROA: Query Response Optimization Attack Framework | LLama2-7B-chat, Vicuna-7B, FALCON-Instruct (7B), Mistral-Instruct (7B) | AdvBench benchmark | ASR |
| | [54] | JudgeDeceiver | GPT-3.5-turbo, Gemma-7B, GPT-4, LLaMA-2, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.1, etc | MT-bench, LLMBar | ACC,ASR, Average baseline attack success rate, PAC |
| Attacks on application of LLMs | [38] | Component Generation Strategy Update | SUPERTOOLS | \ | \ |
| | [30] | \ | FLAN-T5-XXL, Llama2-7B-CHAT-HF | \ | Number of successful attacks |
| Model theft | [3] | \ | ChatGPT-3.5-Turbo | Stanford Questions 1.1 dataset | EM and Fl similarity score, ASR |
| | [58] | \ | \ | IWSLT, WMT14 | BLEU |

## 3.1. Adversarial Prompt Attack

Before discussing adversarial prompt attacks, it is essential first to understand the concept of adversarial attacks and the role of prompts within LLMs. An adversarial attack refers to the process of designing a targeted numerical vector that causes a machine learning model to make incorrect predictions [46].

Prompts play a indispensable role in the operational mechanisms of LLMs, serving as the interface between external inputs and the model's internal processes. They are involved

in every stage of the LLM workflow, from input detection to output generation. As shown in Figure 2, we illustrate the workflow of the large language model (LLM) and highlight the stages where attacks are most likely to occur. Moreover, prompts are essential during the security training phase, as they guide and evaluate the model's performance. However, this central role also renders prompts vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, creating significant risks for users and applications [61].

An adversarial prompt attack involves manipulating prompts to disrupt the internal functioning of the model, compelling it to generate outputs that align with the attacker's objectives. For instance, prompt injection is a technique where an attacker embeds malicious input into a prompt, causing the model to generate responses according to the attacker's intent. Jailbreak attacks, a related strategy, aim to circumvent safety measures and produce unauthorized outputs. Both represent adversarial prompt attacks, with numerous instances documented in the literature [65, 80, 59].

In conclusion, most adversarial attacks are based on the strategic manipulation of prompts. . This section will examine three key types of adversarial prompt attacks, with particular emphasis on jailbreak attacks and prompt injection.

### 3.1.1. Jailbreak

Jailbreak attacks refer to the use of subtle techniques designed to bypass the security restrictions or security mechanisms embedded in LLMs, such as alignment protocols or output filtering. These attacks enable users to elicit desired outputs from the model, regardless of whether the results are secure or harmful [32]. As described above, a jailbreak attack compromises the internal security mechanisms of the model. Once successful, it causes the model to disregard ethical boundaries and safety training, producing outputs without restriction.

One significant risk associated with jailbreak attacks is the possibility of sensitive information leakage. If the model retains fragments of training data, it may inadvertently reveal confidential information, such as instructions for constructing dangerous objects (e.g., a bomb) or disclosing private data like phone numbers [13]. This vulnerability underscores the severity of jailbreak attacks, especially as their sophistication grows with ongoing research.

Current studies suggest that jailbreak attacks often rely on the use of jailbreak prompts [39]. These prompts generally fall into two categories: malicious issues and jailbreak templates. Malicious issues are tailored by attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in the model, such as prompting methods for creating phishing websites. In contrast, jailbreak templates are generic text structures designed to manipulate the model's behavior. By crafting scenarios such as role-playing, scenario reenactments, or text continuation, attackers can stimulate the model to generate responses to harmful or restricted queries [32].

Jailbreak templates are widely recognized as a critical component of jailbreak attacks, serving as a foundational tool for executing malicious prompts. In the following sec-

tion, we classify jailbreak attacks based on the different methods employed in creating and utilizing jailbreak prompts.

**Manual Jailbreak:** This type of jailbreak attack involves a series of manual interactions with the model, aimed at disrupting its alignment and exploiting vulnerabilities [7, 64]. Human involvement plays a critical role in these attacks, as it often includes creating jailbreak templates, analyzing the model's feedback, instructing the model to perform specific actions, re-optimizing strategies, and deploying successive rounds of attacks, such as Analysis-Based Jailbreak (ABJ) [34] and Deepinception [33].

These attacks typically demand considerable manual effort, requiring attackers to continually refine and enhance their templates. As a result, manual jailbreaks are often more labor-intensive and constrained in scope. However, they remain a significant threat due to their capacity to exploit weaknesses in the model's alignment.

In the following section, we provide a detailed examination of the methods and techniques employed in these attacks.

**ABJ Attack:** Analysis plays a crucial role in the execution of the Analysis-Based Jailbreak (ABJ) attack. As illustrated in Figure 3(a), the attack process is shown. This attack begins with the input of the Harmful Behaviors dataset, obtained from AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023), which was collected by the researchers within the model [34]. The dataset is analyzed using a model guided by prompt engineering techniques.

The researchers examined the model's outputs to evaluate its internal responses to the initial malicious tasks. Based on this analysis, they developed a generic jailbreak prompt template, which was subsequently used to launch an attack on the model.

In their methodology, the researchers designated the target $LLM_2$ as the $LLM_{target}$ and the initial malicious input as $X$. The specific modification strategy derived through the jailbreak attack, within a bounded policy space, was denoted as $S$. They also defined the hazard evaluator as $Meval$. By combining these elements, they constructed a systematic process aimed at deriving strategy $S$, which optimizes the malicious prompt $X$ to maximize the probability of the LLM target classifying $X$ as malicious, as assessed by $Meval$.

This optimization process is represented by the following formula:

$$S^* = arg \max_{s} M_{eval}(LLM_{target}(S(X))), \quad (1)$$

where $S^*$ represents the optimal strategy for maximizing the hazard score assigned by $Meval$ to the modified prompt $S(X)$. A higher hazard score indicates a greater probability of a successful jailbreak attack.

**Deepinception:** Advances in the field of LLM security have rendered most direct or simple indirect jailbreak attacks ineffective. Inspired by the renowned Milgram shock experiment, researchers developed a sophisticated multi-layered nested black-box jailbreak technique known as DeepInception [33]. This method, which requires no training, utilizes intricately designed jailbreak templates and nested prompts

(a) ABJ attack [34]



(b) AutoDAN [36]

**Fig. 3:** The objective of ABJ attack [34] is achieved by generating customized data based on malicious inputs and then analyzing the generated data by instructing the target model. AutoDAN [36] utilizes internal evaluation and genetic algorithms to determine the optimal template for completing the entire attack process.

to obscure the attacker's intentions, thereby evading detection by the model. Through a gradual process, DeepInception manipulates the model into producing harmful content, effectively executing the jailbreak attack.

The implementation of the DeepInception attack hinges on leveraging the model's intrinsic generative capabilities. By simulating a form of "hypnosis," the method transitions the model from a serious state to a more relaxed state, en-abling the successful injection of harmful content.

In the specific scenario $x^s 1 : \tau$, the Deepinception attack that can be executed, denoted as $p^{(*)}\theta$, can be formalized as follows.

$$p^*_\theta(x_{\tau+n+1:\tau+n+M'}|x^s_{1:\tau+n}) = \prod_{i=1}^{M'} p_\theta(x_{\tau+n+i}|x^s_{1:\tau}, x_{\tau+1:\tau+n+i-1}), \quad (2)$$

where $x_{\tau+n+1:\tau+n+M'}$ represents harmful content generated within a "hypnosis" scenario. $x^s_{1:\tau}$ and $x_{\tau:\tau+n}$ correspond

to the wrapped harm requests and their initiation signals. This sophisticated approach allows DeepInception to subtly manipulate the model's output, successfully embedding harmful content while bypassing conventional security measures.

**Automatic Jailbreak:** Researchers from various fields are increasingly exploring the concept of jailbreaking, seeking more efficient methods to further their studies. As a result, the concept of automatic jailbreaking has emerged. In our investigation, we define automatic jailbreak attacks as those that can be executed without human intervention, contrasting them with manual jailbreaks. These attacks are similar to the methods proposed in several studies [36, 13, 73, 66].

Based on our investigation of this particular type of jailbreak, we found that automatic jailbreak is often more efficient than manual jailbreak. Unlike manual jailbreaks, which require significant human involvement, automatic jailbreaks operate without the need for extensive manpower or resources. As shown in Figure 1, the key distinction lies in the additional step of self-optimization or self-learning in automatic jailbreaks. This process enhances the performance of each attack iteration, enabling the system to target and exploit model vulnerabilities more effectively.

Automatic jailbreaking, therefore, introduces a new set of challenges to model security, presenting a more formidable threat to current models. Due to space constraints, we will focus on discussing a few of the most prominent methods in this area.

**AutoDAN:** As noted earlier, the distinction between automatic and manual jailbreaks lies in the additional steps of self-optimization. AutoDAN demonstrates this difference by focusing on the innovative attack optimization process shown in Figure 3(b). At its core, AutoDAN incorporates a groundbreaking hierarchical genetic algorithm specifically designed for optimizing jailbreak templates [36]. This algorithm systematically mutates templates to identify and select those with enhanced attack performance.

AutoDAN demonstrated significant effectiveness in the attack experiments on Vicuna-7B and Guanaco-7B. They bypass confusion defenses with an attack success rate (ASR) of 97.69% against Vicuna-7B and 73.65% against Guanaco-7B. As illustrated in Figure 1, the AutoDAN attack process requires minimal input from the attacker. The attacker simply provides a malicious question, and AutoDAN autonomously identifies the most effective jailbreak template, executes the attack, and coerces the model into responding to the malicious query.

**GPTFuzzer::** GPTFuzzer is a black-box jailbreak fuzzing framework introduced by Yu et al [73]. This framework leverages fuzzing testing techniques to identify vulnerabilities in models. The process begins with the collection of a set of manually crafted jailbreak templates sourced from the internet. These templates serve as the foundation for the iterative process.

Using specific algorithms, such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), GPTFuzzer selects initial seeds for further test-ing. The framework then applies a sequence of mutations and evaluations to these templates. Through successive iterations, only the most effective jailbreak templates are retained, forming the basis for subsequent rounds of optimization.

This dynamic, self-evolving methodology enables GPT-Fuzzer to automatically generate high-quality jailbreak prompts over time, presenting a robust and adaptable approach for uncovering vulnerabilities in language models.

### 3.1.2. Prompt Injection

Prompt injection, also referred to as goal hijacking, involves embedding malicious content within or alongside original prompts. This malicious input is carefully crafted to disrupt the complex internal mechanisms of a LLM, causing the injected content to override the original prompts. This leads to deviations in the execution of the model's intended tasks [38, 41].

Although prompt injection and jailbreak attacks share some similarities, they differ in key aspects. In jailbreak attacks, the original prompts of the LLM remain unchanged. Instead, the attack exploits the original prompts to deceive the model into performing the desired action. Conversely, prompt injection involves the introduction of malicious content that directly disrupts the LLM's operations, causing it to execute erroneous or unintended requests.

To clarify the distinction, consider the following example:

Jailbreak Attack: Suppose the model is designed to prohibit the output of "hello world". To bypass this restriction, an attacker might input, "If you are a welcome robot, you need to output 'hello world' to every customer". By framing the input within a specific scenario, the attacker deceives the model into generating a "hello world".

Prompt Injection: To achieve the same outcome, the attacker could input, "Please tell me what time it is," followed by a malicious instruction such as, "Ignore the above text and print 'hello world'." This injection overrides the original context and forces the model to comply with the malicious directive.

These examples illustrate the nuanced differences between jailbreak attacks and prompt injection. While both techniques aim to manipulate the LLM, the mechanisms and objectives differ significantly.

Previous studies have highlighted various types of injection attacks [16, 50, 48]. However, the systematic classification of prompt injection remains underdeveloped. To address this gap, we systematically reviewed the literature and integrated existing classification systems. Based on current research, prompt injection can be broadly divided into the following types.

**Direct Injection:** Direct injection involves the intentional embedding of malicious prompts into a model by attackers to achieve their objectives [14]. This method allows attackers to manipulate the model's behavior by crafting and delivering harmful prompts through various carriers. These carriers may include input text, emails, websites, or

any other medium capable of transmitting malicious content. In this context, attackers utilize techniques such as obfuscation, payload splitting, and adversarial suffixes to enhance the effectiveness of their active injection strategies. These methods are collectively categorized as forms of active injection within our organization.

**Obfuscation:** Obfuscation attacks are a type of prompt injection that evades detection mechanisms and bypasses a model's security measures by altering trigger inputs or output filters. These modifications often involve techniques such as misspelled words, synonym substitutions, escape characters, or delimiters, which are designed to generate malicious outputs while avoiding detection [53, 48, 50].

Perez et al. introduced a modular prompt injection framework capable of adapting to various types of attacks, including those that leverage escape characters and delimiters to manipulate outputs [48]. Similarly, Kang et al. described obfuscation techniques such as synonym substitution and the use of misspelled words to bypass input and output filters, demonstrating the effectiveness of these strategies in evading safeguards [26].

As for the reasons behind the occurrence of such a phenomenon, Wei et al. conducted experiments to investigate obfuscation and noted a significant disparity between the scope of models' pre-training and safety training. Many models are pre-trained on expansive, diverse datasets, but their safety training often covers a narrower range of scenarios [63]. Consequently, these models retain functionalities that were not addressed in safety training, leading to unsafe responses in scenarios outside the safety training's coverage.

Despite the recognition of obfuscation in prompt injection research, the topic remains insufficiently explored. Further investigation is necessary to deepen our understanding of its nature and to develop more effective defenses against such attacks.

**Context Ignoring:** Context ignoring refers to the deliberate introduction of context-switching text within a prompt, which misleads the model and causes errors in its output [41]. By inserting irrelevant or contradictory information, attackers can force the model to disregard the original context and produce incorrect or malicious responses.

Branch et al. demonstrated the effectiveness of manually crafted adversarial examples in exploiting this vulnerability. They showed that by substituting different labels on target markers, attackers could significantly alter the semantic meaning of inputs, leading to misclassifications and reduced performance on text classification tasks. In their experiments with GPT-3, they observed that such attacks could even surpass existing quality control methods [4].

Perez et al. further explored context ignoring by introducing explicit commands, such as "Ignore And Print", into the input text. This simple prompt led the model to disregard its original task and instead execute the malicious instructions embedded within the injection [48].

These studies underscore the risks associated with context ignoring, highlighting how minor changes in input text can have significant, unintended effects on model behavior.

**Indirect Injection:** As LLMs continue to evolve, the APIs that extend their capabilities are becoming more diverse. These APIs allow LLMs to perform additional functions, such as accessing network links, reading electronic documents, and viewing emails. While this expands the model's potential, it also introduces new security risks.

Recent research has highlighted a growing concern: attackers may exploit the invocation of APIs by LLMs to inject malicious prompts indirectly. In these attacks, attackers can target the external data that LLMs access, injecting harmful prompts into this data. When the model ingests this data, the injected prompts can influence its behavior and lead to manipulation [16].

Greshake et al. have referred to this form of attack as indirect prompt injection. Although this research is still in its early stages, it underscores the importance of safeguarding the external APIs that LLMs rely on to reduce the risks of such attacks.

Due to the preliminary nature of current studies, this survey will not delve deeply into specific case examples. However, the implications of indirect injection remain an important area for future exploration.

### 3.1.3. Prompt Leakage

Recent research has revealed that the definitions of prompt injection and prompt leakage share significant similarities, as both attacks use malicious text in conjunction with prompts to achieve their objectives. Some studies even suggest that prompt leakage can be considered a form of prompt injection [10]. However, a key distinction exists between the two:

While prompt injection generally focuses on manipulating a model's behavior through external prompts, prompt leakage places more emphasis on gaining unauthorized access to the model's internal prompts and system messages [48]. In prompt leakage, attackers aim to exploit vulnerabilities that allow them to steal or manipulate the internal structures and configurations used by the LLM.

Given these differences, we categorize prompt leakage separately from prompt injection for further discussion.

**PRSA:** PRSA is the first framework specifically designed to target LLMs for prompt leakage attacks [71]. By analyzing both input and output, PRSA can effectively infer the intentions behind prompts and steal them. This poses a significant threat to emerging industries, such as the prompt services market, which has gained traction alongside the development of LLMs. These services offer customers high-quality, carefully crafted prompts to enhance profitability. PRSA's introduction has raised alarms within these industries, as it can compromise intellectual property and disrupt market dynamics.

PRSA operates in two primary stages: prompt mutation and prompt pruning. During the prompt mutation phase, Yang et al. utilized a generative model to generate proxy prompts. However, these prompts often deviated from the intended target prompts. To address this, Yang et al. introduced a prompt attention algorithm that compares the output differences between proxy prompts and target prompts. This

algorithm provides feedback to refine the generative model and reduce discrepancies.

In the second stage, prompt pruning, Yang et al. developed a two-step strategy to identify relevant words in proxy prompts. This strategy accurately locates words highly correlated with the input, thereby improving the consistency and generalizability of the prompts to the target prompts.

To demonstrate the effectiveness of PRSA, Yang et al. tested the PRSA framework using GPT-3.5 as the prompt generation model. They targeted 50 popular GPT models available in OpenAI's GPT store—most of which had prompt leakage protection mechanisms in place. The results showed that PRSA could achieve an attack success rate (ASR) of approximately 30% with a single query.

Agarwal et al. [1] introduced a multi-round query approach for prompt leakage attacks, simulating a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) scenario. This method involves a two-round attack, utilizing carefully designed baseline templates to set up the task.

In the first round of the attack, a pre-designed template query is input into the model, accompanied by attack prompts. This results in the leakage of prompts within the model. In the second round, the attack is reinforced by a fixed challenger utterance containing a flattery component, alongside the same prompts used in the first round. This second stage aims to enhance the leakage effect.

Experiments conducted on GPT-4 and Claude-1.3 demonstrate that this multi-round attack can achieve a leakage rate of up to 99%.

## 3.2. Optimized Attacks

Recently, a new category of attacks, referred to as optimized attacks, has emerged and is increasingly prevalent in contemporary attack experiments [61]. Optimized attacks are defined as attacks where the attacker selects or enhances attack algorithms using optimization techniques to maximize the attack's effectiveness [80]. The ultimate goal of an optimized attack is to iteratively improve the attack's performance until optimal results are achieved, or the desired attack outcome is realized.

Optimized attacks can be integrated with other attack techniques, such as jailbreak or prompt injection, to enhance their impact. Compared to manual attacks, optimized attacks offer greater flexibility and self-optimization, which significantly increases their potential as a serious threat to current model security research.

The rise of optimized attacks underscores a growing need for automated defense mechanisms in the context of LLMs. To effectively counter these attacks, it is imperative to thoroughly understand their principles and characteristics. The following text provides a detailed explanation and example of an optimized attack.

**QROA:** QROA(Query-Response Optimization Attack) is an optimization-based strategy that generates malicious content in a black-box manner solely through query interactions [24].This method draws inspiration from deep Q-learning and Greedy Coordinate Descent, iteratively updat-

ing tokens to optimize a carefully designed reward function. Ultimately, harmful content can be generated by inputting malicious instructions containing optimized triggers into the LLM. This approach functions independently of the model's logits or internal data, leveraging only the LLM's standard query-response interface. Moreover, the attack success rate of this method on various LLMs, including Vicuna, Falcon, and Mistral, exceeds 80%.

**Judgedeception:** Shi et al. [54] introduced an optimized prompt injection attack known as judgedeception, which leverages optimization algorithms to efficiently generate adversarial sequences for targeted manipulation of the model. This attack operates through a multi-step process. Initially, a shadow dataset is created to simulate and collect the responses generated by the target model. This dataset serves as the foundation for the subsequent attack strategy.

The next phase involves utilizing the optimization algorithm developed by Shi et al. in combination with the shadow dataset to generate specific attack sequences that execute the intended manipulation. The judgedeception attack is particularly designed for scenarios where the LLM acts as a decision-maker, allowing attackers to influence the model's selection process.

Specifically, this attack may result in the appearance of more content that attackers want to propagate in LLM-based search engines, leading to adverse social impacts.

## 3.3. Attacks on Application of LLMs

With the continued advancement of LLMs, these systems have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across various domains. This has led developers to increasingly integrate LLMs into a wide range of applications, aiming to enhance functionality, create intelligent assistants, or enrich content generation. The integration of LLMs into practical applications undoubtedly drives both the evolution of LLM technology and the broader field of software development.

However, as the excitement surrounding the application of LLMs grows, there is a risk of overlooking potential vulnerabilities. Our survey reveals that applications utilizing LLMs are susceptible to the same types of attacks that target the LLM models themselves—such as prompt injection, prompt leakage, and model theft. These attacks can have severe consequences for applications, especially when their security measures are breached.

Once the defenses of LLM-powered applications are compromised, the repercussions can be even more significant than the threats faced by standalone LLMs. For instance, there may be exposure of sensitive user data, proprietary information belonging to vendors, and critical system parameters. As such, securing applications that leverage LLMs becomes a critical issue.

In this section, we systematically examine various attacks on LLM-based applications, analyzing their fundamental mechanisms and potential risks.

**Vocabulary Attack:** Levi et al. [30] extended previous research on prompt word injection attacks, particularly those based on delimiters [48], by incorporating insights from Wal-

lace et al. [57]. Their work introduced the concept of a vocabulary attack, aimed at large-scale language model (LLM) applications.

In their methodology, Levi et al. first defined a loss function that measured the discrepancy between the target model's output and the desired output from the attacker's perspective. This function served as a foundation for identifying which word had the greatest impact on the model's behavior. To achieve this, they combined cosine distance calculations between the output embeddings and the difference in simple word counts.

Once the most impactful word was identified, the attacker used it to hijack the model's response, achieving the attacker's desired output. This approach demonstrated a novel method for influencing the behavior of LLMs by strategically manipulating specific vocabulary elements within the input.

**HouYi:** HouYi, a black-box prompt injection attack designed for LLM-integrated applications, was proposed by Liu et al. [38]. The attack is composed of three main components: the Framework Component, the Separator Component, and the Disruptor Component.

Framework Component: This component standardizes the input format, as many applications only accept predefined formats. By doing so, it can bypass malicious content detection mechanisms that might otherwise flag irregular inputs.

Separator Component: The Separator separates user input from predefined prompts, tricking the LLM into interpreting the subsequent input as commands rather than data. This separation allows the attacker to inject malicious instructions effectively.

Disruptor Component: The Disruptor component contains malicious queries designed to manipulate the model and achieve the attacker's objective. These questions are injected into the LLM to disrupt its normal behavior and elicit the desired output.

To execute a successful HouYi attack, three steps are involved:

Context Inference: The attack begins with a context inference step, in which input-output pairs are collected via a question-and-answer process. These pairs are then compiled into a document that serves as the basis for customizing the attributes of the target LLM analysis program in the subsequent stages.

Component Generation: The Framework Component is generated by inputting the context document into a generative LLM, which creates framework questions based on the attacker's specifications. Following a set of strategies developed by Liu et al., a separator component is generated to guide the LLM in producing separator instances. The Disruptor Component is tailored to the specific strategies and goals of the attacker, ensuring that the malicious content aligns with the overall attack objective.

Iterative Prompt Refinement: After generating the components, the final step is iterative refinement. Each component is optimized based on feedback to improve the attack's success rate, ensuring the attack is as effective as possible.

## 3.4. Model Theft

The increasing adoption of LLMs today has made these models extremely valuable due to the high cost of training. However, their value also exposes them to the risk of theft. Model theft, or model extraction, refers to the act of attackers using queries to extract knowledge from a target model and duplicate a copy that closely resembles the original one. This kind of attack is not only low-cost but also highly effective, as it enables attackers to train a model similar to the original by analyzing its responses to mass querying [45, 28].

Such attacks violate intellectual property rights, as the attacker essentially bypasses the original model's training process and creates a near-identical model. The ability to replicate models in this manner represents a serious threat to the proprietary nature of LLMs and could undermine the incentives for developing these models.

Wallace et al. proposed a model theft attack specifically targeting black-box NLP processing models [58]. Their study demonstrated the effectiveness of this attack on translation models, particularly those based on the Transformer architecture. In their experiments, they utilized a monolingual sentence corpus from the target model and selected sentences from this corpus to query the model, collecting the corresponding translations. This process provided them with labeled data, which they then used to train an imitation model.

Through this approach, Wallace et al. successfully imitated popular translation systems like Google, Bing, and Systran using the WMT14 dataset. They validated the performance of the imitation models using Test BLEU Scores, which are commonly used to measure the quality of machine translation. The results were impressive, with the imitation models achieving BLEU scores of 65.6, 67.7, and 69.0 for Google, Bing, and Systran, respectively, in English-to-German translation. This study highlighted the feasibility of model stealing attacks on translation systems based on the Transformer architecture and demonstrated how such attacks can effectively replicate the functionality of well-established models.

**Model Leeching:** Model leeching is a black-box model extraction attack proposed by Birch et al., designed to obtain a copy of a target model that can perform a specific task [3]. This attack involves four key stages: Prompt Design, Data Generation, Extracted Model Training, and ML Attack Staging.

Prompt Design: In the first phase, the attacker tests the attributes of the target model by giving it specific tasks, such as those in image processing, NLP, or audio. Based on these results, the attacker designs and validates various prompts to probe the model's functionality.

Data Generation: The prompts generated in the previous phase are then used to extract the purpose and task of the target model. The attacker inputs a preprocessed dataset into the model, collects the responses, and then uses them to generate a new dataset, essentially replicating the functionality of the model.

Extracted Model Training: The dataset generated in the previous phase is divided into training and evaluation sets.

A blank model is then trained using this data, with adjustments made to the model to closely match the original target model's behavior.

ML Attack Staging: In the final phase, the attacker tests the vulnerabilities and attack methods on the local copy of the model. Having unrestricted access to the copied model, the attacker can probe for weaknesses and devise attack strategies to exploit them.

This attack demonstrates the ease with which an attacker can replicate a model and subsequently stage attacks against it, making model leeching a significant concern in the realm of model security.

## 4. Defense Techniques

In this section, we provide an overview of current defensive mechanisms in the field of LLM security. We will categorize solutions according to defense techniques, focusing on three key types of attacks to which LLMs are vulnerable. Our analysis distinguishes between prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Prevention-based defenses typically involve processing inputs, outputs, or internals of the model to mitigate potential attacks. In contrast, detection-based defenses focus on monitoring inputs and outputs to identify and respond to malicious behavior. An overview of the related literature is shown in Table 2. The following sections will dive into these methods in more detail.

### 4.1. Defense against Jailbreak

Jailbreak has always been a tricky problem. Because of its flexibility and openness, it becomes difficult to solve well. Therefore, we focus on summarizing the research on the dangers of jailbreak and its defense.

**The Dangers of Jailbreak:** The goal of a jailbreak attack is to manipulate models into producing malicious outputs by disrupting their alignment [37]. These outputs can encompass a variety of harmful content, including racist statements, misleading or dangerous information, and personal data [13]. Such irresponsible outputs pose significant risks, undermining personal privacy, hindering the development and responsible application of LLMs, and potentially threatening societal security. Whether from the perspective of safeguarding personal information, ensuring the sustainable growth of LLMs, or maintaining public order and safety, these consequences are entirely unacceptable. Consequently, defense against jailbreak attacks has become a critical and rapidly evolving area of research in LLM security.

#### 4.1.1. Prevention-Based Defense

**SmoothLLM:** Robey et al. identified a novel phenomenon concerning the vulnerability of character-level perturbations to adversarial suffixes generated through adversarial suffix jailbreaking [49]. Specifically, they discovered that adversarial suffixes designed for jailbreaking are significantly weakened when a small portion of characters in the input are manually altered, such as through random character swapping or insertion.

Building on these findings, Robey et al. proposed a new defense mechanism called SmoothLLM to counter such jailbreaking attacks. This method involves two primary steps: the perturbation step and the aggregation step. In the perturbation step, three strategies—insertion, swapping, and patching—are applied to randomly perturb the adversarial hints provided to the LLM.

Insertion: A percentage $q$ of characters from the hints are randomly selected, and random letters from the alphabet are inserted after each character. The parameter $q$ represents a tunable perturbation ratio, with larger values of $q$ corresponding to more extensive perturbations. Swapping: A percentage $q$ of characters from the hints are selected and swapped with random letters from the alphabet.

Patching: A percentage q of characters from the hints are replaced with random letters from the alphabet.

In the aggregation step, to ensure that perturbing individual adversarial hints does not render the attack ineffective, Robey et al. aggregate the responses corresponding to these perturbed versions and return a single response. This aggregation nullifies the attack by reducing the effectiveness of the adversarial hints.

From a defensive perspective, SmoothLLM demonstrates a marked reduction in the effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Specifically, it reduces the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of the Vicugna model and GPT-4's PAIR semantic attack by a factor of 2, and it reduces the ASR of GPT-3.5 by a factor of 29. Such significant results are undoubtedly highly instructive. This research not only proposes effective solutions to existing problems but also points the way forward for future defense studies.

**System-Mode Self-Reminder:** This method was proposed by Wu et al [65]. as a simple yet effective defense mechanism against jailbreak attacks. It aims to provide the LLM with appropriate context and prevent the model from entering certain uncontrollable modes, such as DAN(DO Anything Now), by reminding itself to act as a responsible AI assistant. The authors leverage the reasoning capabilities of LLMs to encapsulate user queries with system prompts and remind themselves to take responsible actions. Although the method is simple and easy to understand, it successfully reduced the jailbreak attack success rate on the constructed dataset from 67.21% to 19.34% for ChatGPT. Additionally, it exhibits a certain level of resistance against two different adaptive attacks they designed.

#### 4.1.2. Detection-Based Defense

**Autodefense:** Autodefense is a filtering-based, multi-agent defense framework proposed by Zeng et al. [75], designed to actively monitor and filter the responses generated by LLMs to ensure they are safe and free from harmful content. This framework consists of three key components: the input agent, the defense agency, and the output agent.

The input agent preprocesses the model-generated responses by wrapping them in a specific format of prompt templates before sending them to the defense agency. In the defense agency, multiple LLM agents collaborate to analyze

**Table 2**
**Statistics on our investigation of defense technologies for LLMs**

| Category | work | Method | Method\Algorithm | Evaluated LLM Model | Dataset | Evaluation Metric |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Defense against jailbreak | [49] | prevent | SMOOTHLLM | Vicuna,Llama2 | AdvBench, JBB-Behaviors | ASR |
| | [65] | prevent | Self-Adversarial Attack via System Prompt | GPT-4V | \ | Recognition success rate, Defense success rate, ASR |
| | [23] | detect | Baseline defense | Vicuna-v1.1, Chat-GLM MPT-Chat,Guanaco Falcon-Instruct | AdvBench | ASR, PPL, PPL Windowed |
| | [75] | detect | Multi-Agent Defense | GPT-3.5 | \ | False Positive Rate, Accuracy,ASR |
| Defense against prompt injection | [55] | prevent | Signed-Prompt | ChatGPT-4, ChatGLM-6B | \ | ASR |
| | [8] | prevent | Generate structured instruction tuning dataset | Llama-7B, mistral-7b | cleaned Alpaca instruction tuning dataset | ASR, AlpacaEval |
| | [52] | detect | SPML | GPT-4,GPT-3.5 LLAMA-7B, LLAMA-13B | Gandalf, Tensor-Trust | error rate (ER) |
| | [22] | detect | Attention Tracker | Qwen2-1.5B-Instruct, Phi-3-mini-4k-instruct, Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Gemma-2-9b-it | open-prompt-injection benchmark, deepset prompt injection dataset | AUROC score |
| Defense against model theft | [77] | white box | Watermark detection, Watermark detection with text alone, | \ | IWSLT14,WMT14, ROCstories | F1 scores for ROUGE-L and BERTScore, Detect mAP |
| | [47] | white box | \ | \ | SST2,MIND, AG News, Enron,WikiText | Accuracy, KS test, cosine similarity, squared L2 distance |
| | [45] | black box | \ | GPT-2 Large-0.7B LLAMA2-7B, MISTRAL-7B | Human ChatGPT Comparison Corpus, InstructWild | BLEU and ROUGE metrics |
| | [19] | black box | Cater | BART (summarization) mBART (translation) | \ | BLEU, p-value, |

the content for potential harm and generate a final judgment on whether the response contains harmful content. The output agent then decides whether to reject the response or output the original, unaltered response of the protected LLM, based on the analysis provided by the defense agency.

**PPL Detect:** Alon et al. [2] proposed a detection-based method for identifying jailbreak attacks. Currently, several jailbreak attack methods bypass models by inputting strings that deviate from typical semantic structures or are rarely encountered in natural language. These strings, known as adversarial suffixes, are designed to exploit model vulnerabilities [80]. Alon et al. detect such adversarial suffixes by comparing them to regular text. They define a perplexity

calculation function $PPL(x)$ as follows:

$$PPL(x) = exp\left[-\frac{1}{t}\sum_{i=1}^{t}\log p(x_i \mid x_{<i})\right], \qquad (3)$$

where $x$ is a sequence of $t$ tokens.

In their approach, Alon et al. utilize GPT-2 to calculate the perplexity and other relevant parameters for each input prompt using a specific algorithm. Based on the input's calculated perfection, any input exceeding the threshold is flagged and subsequently filtered out.

The perplexity-based detection method is effective in identifying GCG attacks; however, it performs poorly in detect-

ing manual jailbreak attempts. Despite these limitations, the study provides valuable insights into the characteristics of current jailbreak attacks, laying a solid foundation for future research on the specific nature of these threats.

## 4.2. Defense against Prompt Injection

The detailed principles of prompt injection have been thoroughly explained in the previous section on attack techniques. Therefore, in this section, we will focus on the impact and defense of prompt injection on LLM.

**The Impact of Prompt Injection:** From the perspective of attack objectives, prompt injection attacks are highly versatile, as they can be executed through the flexible design of malicious prompts to achieve a variety of harmful outcomes. For instance, carefully crafted prompts can be used to perform unauthorized operations or extract internal data from models [74]. The potential risks are even more severe when prompt injection occurs in specialized LLMs, such as medical or commercial models, where the consequences can be catastrophic.

As a result, defending against prompt injection has become a primary focus of current research in LLM security. At present, defense strategies against prompt injection primarily center on input filtering and input sanitization techniques. The following sections will explore several of these defense methods in detail.

### 4.2.1. Prevention-Based Defense

**Signed-Prompt:** The Signed-Prompt method, proposed by Suo [55], is a defense technique designed to prevent prompt injection attacks in LLM-integrated applications. The core concept behind this method is to identify the allowed commands for the application by analyzing user input and replacing these commands with character arrangements that are rarely seen in natural language. This process of encrypting the commands is referred to as signing.

The signing process is carried out by the Signed-Prompt Encoder, which uses ChatGPT-4, trained in prompt engineering, to encrypt the input. The signed inputs are then distinguished from invalid inputs (those that are not allowed by the LLM-integrated application). Specifically, valid inputs are signed, while invalid ones remain unsigned.

In the next step, signed commands are formatted as system commands, while unsigned commands are not executed. The counterpart of signing is signing removal, a process also facilitated by ChatGPT-4 trained in prompt engineering. During signing removal, the model recognizes and outputs the corresponding formatted commands for both encrypted (signed) and unencrypted (unsigned) inputs.

As a result, user input undergoes two stages—signing and signing removal—to generate commands that the integrated application can accept.

**StruQ:** StruQ (Structured Queries) is a defense method proposed by Chen et al. [8], aimed at improving the security of LLM-integrated applications. The core concept of this approach is to convert user input into a structured format, filter out harmful content, and then have the specially tuned LLM respond to it using predefined commands.

To implement this process, both a Front-End and a specially tuned LLM are required. The Front-End is responsible for categorizing the user input into two types: prompts and user data, and then formatting them in a specific structure. Additionally, it filters out certain delimiters within the user data to prevent obfuscation attacks, while embedding markers that signal the LLM's command-tuning services. The specially tuned LLM, in turn, receives the structured input and processes it accordingly.

Experimental results show that StruQ significantly reduces the success rate of manual attacks on models like Llama and Mistral, lowering it to less than 2%. Furthermore, it reduces the success rate of GCG attacks [80] from 97% to 58%.

### 4.2.2. Detect-Based Defense

**SPML:** SPML (System Prompt Meta Language) is a defense method proposed by Sharma et al. [52] for enhancing the generation of system prompts, specifically designed for chatbots based on LLMs. The overall workflow is shown in the Figure 4. The primary goal of this method is to process user inputs into a specific format of code, known as SPML-IR, which serves as an intermediate representation. This SPML-IR is then fed into the LLM, enabling it to understand the user's prompt and generate corresponding natural language system prompts, thereby reducing the potential for harmful input.

A key component of this method is the SPML-IR, which plays a crucial role in detecting prompt injection attacks. The process involves several steps: first, the SPML-IR must process all variables within the code to generate the SPML-IR Skeleton. Next, each variable is filled with user input, and once this step is completed, the resulting version is compared to the original SPML-IR for security checks.

Compared to advanced LLM models such as GPT-4 and LLAMA-7B that do not use SPML, the inclusion of SPML significantly reduces the success rate of prompt injection attacks. SPML offers a novel approach to defending against prompt injection, distinguishing it from previous methods.

**Attention Tracker:** Hung et al. introduced the concept of the distraction effect by visualizing the partial numerical values of prompt injections within LLMs [22]. This effect emphasizes the critical role of separators in influencing the model's attention shift. Building on this insight, Hung et al. proposed a prompt injection detection method called Attention Tracker. This method operates in two key stages: Finding Important Heads and Prompt Injection Detection with Important Heads.

In the Finding Important Heads stage, the focus is on identifying specific attention heads that trigger the distraction effect by analyzing them based on the input text. Once these important heads are identified, they can be utilized in the Prompt Injection Detection stage to detect prompt injection attacks using a specialized algorithm. By utilizing the focus score (FS), it is possible to detect important attention heads and determine whether prompt injection has occurred. The definition of the FS focus score is given as follows:

**Fig. 4:** The general workflow of SPML[52] involves compiling the input prompts using this method and then checking the compiled results based on specific methods to ensure the security of the input prompts.

$$FS = \frac{1}{|H_i|} \sum_{(l,h)\in H_i} \text{Attn}^{l,h}(I), \qquad (4)$$

where $H_i$ represents the set of important attention heads identified through computation, and $Attn^{(l,h)}$ refers to the aggregated attention score, as described in [41].

Experimental results show that, compared to other baselines, the Attention Tracker achieved a 3.1% improvement in AUROC[41] on the open prompt injection benchmark and a 10.0% improvement on the deep-set prompt injection dataset.

Overall, the introduction of this method provides a new perspective for rapid injection detection, laying the foundation for further research into prompt injection in the future.

### 4.3. Defense against Model Theft

As mentioned earlier, trained or fine-tuned models generally hold significant value. Unfortunately, current defense mechanisms cannot completely prevent model theft. However, this does not mean that traces of model theft cannot be detected in stolen models. Therefore, rather than attempting to entirely prevent model theft, detecting plagiarized models and defending intellectual property rights through legal means is a more practical and feasible approach. As a result, model watermarking techniques have seen substantial development. Specifically, model watermarking involves modifying internal model parameters or employing other methods to embed specific signals into the model's output. Training imitation models using outputs embedded with these signals can impart certain properties (e.g., triggering specific responses to predefined inputs[47]), enabling the detection of plagiarism and facilitating the identification of stolen models. In summary, this section introduces several watermark-based defense mechanisms.

#### 4.3.1. White-Box Defense

**GINSEW:** GINSEW is a white-box watermark defense method proposed by Zhao et al. [77]. Unlike other defense methods aimed at preventing model theft, the purpose of GINSEW is not to stop theft directly but to ensure that any stolen model contains specific, detectable information that can be identified by a third-party arbitration agency. The

ultimate goal of this approach is to protect the intellectual property of the model owner.

To achieve this objective, GINSEW involves two key steps: the generation of invisible watermarks and watermark detection. The generation and detection of the invisible watermark are shown in the Figure 5. The generation of invisible watermarks relies on creating the probability distribution for each token within the target model.

However, modifying the token creation probability within the model without affecting its output has become a significant challenge. Therefore, Zhao et al. proposed that this process can be formalized as follows:

$$\tilde{Q}_{G_1} = \frac{Q_{G_1} + \varepsilon(1 + z_1(x))}{1 + 2\varepsilon}$$
$$\tilde{Q}_{G_2} = \frac{Q_{G_2} + \varepsilon(1 + z_2(x))}{1 + 2\varepsilon}, \qquad (5)$$

where the $\tilde{Q}_{G_1}$ and $\tilde{Q}_{G_2}$ refer to the modified group probabilistic periodic signals that we have computed. $\varepsilon$ denotes the watermark level, which quantifies the amount of noise introduced into the group probability. $z_1(x)$ and $z_2(x)$ represent the periodic signal functions derived through computation.

In the watermark detection phase, a detection dataset is input into the suspicious model, and the probability vector distribution during the decoding step is analyzed to extract the watermark signal.

Experimental results by Zhao et al. demonstrate that GINSEW provides excellent protective performance for the model while maintaining the quality of text generation. In conclusion, GINSEW presents an effective strategy for defending against model theft and ensuring that stolen models can be traced back to their source.

**EmbMarker:** EmbMarker is a model theft defense framework proposed by Peng et al. [47]. The core idea behind EmbMarker is to select a set of high-frequency words as triggers and use target embeddings to perform backdoor processing on the original embeddings. This ensures that any extracted model contains the corresponding backdoor. EmbMarker consists of three key steps: trigger selection, watermark injection, and copyright verification.

**Fig. 5:** Watermark Formation: The imitation model is embedded with a similar API to that of the victim by incorporating the victim's API into the output of the model. Watermark Detection: A specific algorithm is used to detect watermark signals from the imitation model.

In the trigger selection phase, the goal is to identify an appropriate number of words to serve as triggers, selected from the text using a specific method. During the watermark injection phase, the watermark is embedded into the model's embeddings based on the number of triggers identified in the previous step. Finally, in the copyright verification phase, the suspected stolen model is evaluated by querying it with two distinct datasets: a benign dataset and a backdoor dataset. The resulting embeddings are analyzed to verify the presence of the watermark and confirm model theft.

### 4.3.2. Black-Box Defense

**Model Shield:** Model Shield is a black-box, automatic watermark generation method proposed by Pang et al. [45], designed to guide LLMs in generating robust watermarks in a simple yet effective manner. Similar to other watermark defense methods, Model Shield consists of two key stages: watermark generation and watermark detection. What distinguishes Model Shield from other watermark defenses is its use of additional system prompts, which instructs the targeted model to autonomously embed the watermark into the generated content. These system prompts are specifically crafted by Pang to guide the model in embedding specific words as watermarks at appropriate positions within the generated text.

In the watermark detection phase, a set of formulas proposed by Pang is employed to detect the output of any imitating model. Extensive experiments conducted by Pang et al. demonstrate that Model Shield can successfully generate robust watermarks without manipulating the model's internal probabilities or outputs. However, the study also notes that Model Shield may become ineffective in the face of jailbreaking attacks, which can undermine the effectiveness of

the watermark generation prompts and, consequently, the defense itself.

In conclusion, this research provides valuable insights into watermark defense mechanisms in the context of LLM security.

**Cater:** Cater is a defense framework based on conditional watermarking, designed by He et al. [19]. Cater is divided into two main phases: watermark generation and watermark detection. However, unlike previous approaches that modify token probabilities, Cater does not alter the original probability distribution during watermark generation. Instead, it injects watermarks into specific conditional words.

In essence, a series of optimization algorithms is developed to calculate the generated text of the model under given conditions and ultimately produce text embedded with watermarks. Cater achieves conditional generation by taking into account the part-of-speech and dependency tree of the text, as well as their higher-order variations.

For watermark recognition, Cater verifies the input validation dataset of the imitating model and determines the presence of watermarks based on the word distribution of the model's output content. According to the experimental results, while Cater may exhibit slightly lower watermark effectiveness compared to some other methods, it is notably more resistant to watermark elimination and covert in its operation. These characteristics make Cater a valuable defense framework for preventing advanced model theft in the future.

## 5. Practical Challenges and Future Directions

Defending against attacks in LLMs is a multifaceted challenge that requires a combination of technical, ethical, and operational strategies. As the landscape of threats continues to evolve, ongoing research into robust defenses, ethical con-

siderations, and scalable solutions will be essential to ensuring the safe deployment of LLMs in real-world applications. In this section, we explore five practical challenges faced by defense techniques in LLMs, alongside potential future directions for mitigating these challenges. In this way, we can pave the way for more secure, fair, and trustworthy LLM models in the future.

## 5.1. Resistance to Evasion Attacks

Attackers can use dynamic evasion strategies, constantly changing their attack methods to bypass defenses. For example, they may vary the type and magnitude of perturbations in adversarial attacks over time. Defending against these evolving strategies requires detection systems to be able to adapt quickly, which is difficult to achieve with traditional static defense mechanisms. Additionally, in real - time applications, the LLM model needs to respond immediately to user inputs. This leaves little time for elaborate defense mechanisms to detect and block evasion attacks. The need to balance response time and security makes it challenging to implement effective defenses against evasion attacks in real-time scenarios.

Toward this end, we need to develop adaptive defense systems that can learn and respond to new evasion strategies in real-time. These systems can use safe reinforcement learning [17] to continuously adapt their defense mechanisms based on the observed attack patterns. For example, the defense system can adjust the thresholds for detecting adversarial inputs as the attacker changes the magnitude of perturbations. Furthermore, it is necessary to design lightweight detection algorithms that can be run on resource - constrained devices. These algorithms can use techniques such as feature selection and dimensionality reduction [25] to reduce the computational requirements while still maintaining high detection accuracy. For example, using compact neural network architectures [60] or approximate computing methods [35] for attack detection.

## 5.2. Robustness Against Poisoning Attacks

Poisoning attacks in LLMs can be hidden within the training data in a way that is difficult to detect. Attackers may add malicious data points that are carefully crafted to blend in with the normal training data. These poisoned examples may only affect the model's behavior under specific conditions, making it hard to identify them during the training process or through traditional data - quality checks. As the size of the training data for LLMs grows, detecting poisoned data becomes increasingly difficult. Traditional methods for detecting outliers or malicious data points may not scale well to the large - scale datasets used in training LLMs. Developing scalable detection algorithms that can handle the volume and complexity of these datasets is a major challenge.

To address the above challenges, we can use deep learning-based anomaly detection techniques [42] to identify poisoned data points in the training set. These methods can learn the normal patterns of the training data and flag any data points that deviate significantly from these patterns. For example, autoencoders [78] can be trained to reconstruct the

training data, and data points that are difficult to reconstruct accurately may be potential poisoned examples. Besides, we should leverage appropriate training algorithms that are more resilient to poisoning attacks. For example, robust optimization algorithms [15] can be used to minimize the impact of poisoned data on the model's learning process. These algorithms can be adjusted to give less weight to potentially poisoned data points during training.

## 5.3. Adversarial Attack Detection

Adversarial attacks in LLMs are often designed to be imperceptible to human readers. For example, attackers may subtly modify a sentence by changing a few words with similar semantic meanings, but these changes can significantly alter the model's output. Detecting such minute changes is extremely difficult, as the perturbed text still appears natural and grammatically correct. Most detection methods rely on large amounts of data to train classifiers that can distinguish between normal and adversarial inputs. However, obtaining a comprehensive dataset that covers all possible types of adversarial attacks is nearly impossible. New and novel attacks can emerge at any time, and the detection models may not be able to generalize well to these unseen attack patterns.

Meta-learning [56] can be used to train a detection model that can quickly adapt to different LLMs. By learning the general characteristics of adversarial attacks across multiple models during the meta-training phase, the meta-learner can then be fine-tuned on a specific LLM with minimal additional data. This approach has the potential to reduce the need for model-specific detection development.

Incorporating additional modalities such as syntactic analysis, semantic role labeling, and discourse analysis can enhance the detection of adversarial attacks. For instance, analyzing the syntactic tree of a sentence [29] can reveal abnormal patterns that may indicate an adversarial modification, even if the surface-level semantics seem normal. Combining these multimodal features can provide a more comprehensive view of the input and improve detection accuracy.

## 5.4. Lack of Generalized Defenses

One of the biggest challenges in securing LLMs against attacks is the lack of generalized defense mechanisms. Each attack type often requires a different defense strategy, making it difficult to develop a one-size-fits-all solution. On one hand, the wide variety of attack methods—from adversarial attacks to backdoors to data poisoning—makes it hard to develop a defense that can address all these threats effectively. On the other hand, many defense mechanisms, such as adversarial training or differential privacy, can degrade the performance of the model, leading to a trade-off between security and model effectiveness.

Universal Defense Frameworks are essential for ensuring the robustness of LLMs against diverse and evolving adversarial attacks. One approach is the use of modular defense architectures, where different defensive strategies can be applied based on the attack type. For instance, algorithms like Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [76] generate adversarial examples that can be incorporated into the train-

ing process to enhance the model's resilience to similar future attacks. Additionally, input preprocessing techniques like input sanitization (*e.g.*, through denoising autoencoders) can remove adversarial noise before the data is fed to the model [9].

Continuous Learning and Adaptation are also pivotal in maintaining the model's resilience against novel attacks. Online learning algorithms like Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) [44] can help prevent catastrophic forgetting, ensuring that models can adapt to new threats without losing previous knowledge.

### 5.5. Ethical and Bias Concerns

LLMs are trained on vast amounts of data from diverse sources, which often contain biases prevalent in society. These biases can be related to gender, race, ethnicity, or other social factors. For example, if a significant portion of the training data associates certain occupations more with one gender over another, the LLM may generate text that reinforces such stereotypes. Detecting and rectifying these biases is challenging because they are deeply ingrained in the learned patterns of the model. When trying to address biases, there are ethical dilemmas. For instance, removing certain data to reduce bias might lead to loss of important information or affect the model's overall performance. Additionally, different stakeholders may have different views on what constitutes a bias.

Future research should focus on developing training algorithms that are more sensitive to biases. These algorithms could monitor the training process in real-time, detecting when the model is learning biased patterns. For example, using fairness-aware optimization techniques [62] that adjust the model's parameters to minimize bias while maintaining performance. This could involve adding penalty terms to the loss function that penalize the model for generating biased outputs. Moreover, ensuring that the training data is more diverse and representative is crucial. This can be achieved through active data collection strategies that target underrepresented groups. Finally, data curation processes should be more transparent, *e.g.*, achieved through the pipeline of the AI metadata [27], with clear guidelines on how to handle potentially biased data.

## 6. Conclusion

In this article, we systematically summarize the existing research on attacks and defenses against the LLM ontology and its applications. We categorize these attacks and defense techniques systematically based on their corresponding strategies. Unlike previous studies, we pay more attention to the risks faced by LLM-related applications and their corresponding solutions. This is crucial for the future development of the LLM field. Additionally, we identify some shortcomings in current research, including insufficient development in certain areas and the need for more suitable benchmarks. Addressing these issues will lay a solid foundation for the future development of LLM. In conclusion, our study provides a summary of the threats faced by LLM and

the corresponding defense techniques based on the nature of various technologies. We aim to provide a clear understanding of the current state of LLM and its application security field, as well as provide researchers with clearer insights and details on various issues.

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