



# Abysssec Research

## 1) Advisory information

Title	: Apple QuickTime FLI LinePacket Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Version	: QuickTime player 7.6.5
Analysis	: <a href="http://www.abysssec.com">http://www.abysssec.com</a>
Vendor	: <a href="http://www.apple.com">http://www.apple.com</a>
Impact	: High
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Twitter	: @abysssec
CVE	: CVE-2010-0520

## 2) Vulnerable version

Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.5  
Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.4  
Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.2  
Apple QuickTime Player 7.6.1  
Apple QuickTime Player 7.6  
Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6.2  
Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6.1  
Apple Mac OS X Server 10.6  
Apple Mac OS X 10.6.2  
Apple Mac OS X 10.6.1  
Apple Mac OS X 10.6

### 3) Vulnerability information

Class

**1- Code execution**

Impact

**Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to cause denial-of-service conditions.**

Remotely Exploitable

**Yes**

Locally Exploitable

**Yes**

### 4) Vulnerabilities detail

#### 1- Division by Zero:

FLIC files have variety of standards with extensions like fli, egx. The structure of these files have some kind of chunks that depends on their extension some of them exists in some file extension and some of them not. Internal layout of the fli extension is represented below:

<u>File header</u>	
<u>Frame chunk</u>	standard frame
<u>Postage stamp</u>	icon, FLC files only
<u>&lt;image data&gt;</u>	compressed or uncompressed
<u>&lt;palette data&gt;</u>	color data
<u>&lt;image data&gt;</u>	compressed in various ways
<palette data> is one of either:	
<u>"256" colour palette</u>	palette with 8-bpp RGB entries
<u>"64" colour palette</u>	palette with 6-bpp RGB entries
<image data> is one of either:	
<u>Black frame</u>	full black frame
<u>Uncompressed full frame</u>	uncompressed pixel block
<u>Full frame</u>	RLE compressed, EGI also supports Huffman/BWT
<u>Delta frame (old style)</u>	RLE compressed
<u>Delta frame (new style)</u>	RLE compressed, EGI also supports Huffman/BWT

The File header length is 128 byte. Every chunk in the file starts with 6 bytes. 4 bytes is related to the length of the chunk and 2bytes is related to the kind of chunk and other chunk details are after these 6bytes. For example 2bytes of Frame Chunk have the F1FA value. One of the various chunks is Delta frame(old style) which holds the information about differences of previous and next frame.

After first 6bytes related to all chunks, 2bytes related to line number which difference of the two frame starts from that line. Next 2bytes are the number of lines exists in the chunk. The data section of the chunk starts after these 4bytes. Data segment is collection of lines which each line starts with a byte indicating number of packets in line and then the packets. Every packet have three section, first byte is 'skip count column'; Then a byte for 'RLE COUNT BYTE' and after these two byte zero or some bytes of data exist. 'skip count column' is the number of pixels should be skipped from the current position of the line. If 'RLE COUNT BYTE' is positive number it indicate the number of bytes that should be copied after that and in case of negative number the absolute of the number is number of bytes should be copied. Because of checks on this numbers, it is possible to copy more data to the memory which in turn a heap over flow causes an access violation. Now based on these knowledge we are going to explain the binary:

```
.text:67881F50 sub_67881F50  proc near      ; CODE XREF: sub_67883190+4Cp
.text:67881F50
.text:67881F50 var_4      = dword ptr -4
.text:67881F50 arg_0       = dword ptr 4
.text:67881F50 arg_4       = dword ptr 8
.text:67881F50 arg_10      = dword ptr 14h

.text:67881F50
.text:67881F50      push   ecx
.text:67881F51      mov    edx, [esp+4+arg_0]
.text:67881F55      mov    al, [edx]
.text:67881F57      add    edx, 1
.text:67881F5A      test   al, al
.text:67881F5C      mov    byte ptr [esp+4+arg_0], al
.text:67881F60      mov    [esp+4+var_4], 0
.text:67881F67      jle   loc_67882009
.text:67881F6D      push   ebx
.text:67881F6E      push   ebp
.text:67881F6F      mov    ebp, [esp+0Ch+arg_10]
.text:67881F73      push   esi
.text:67881F74      mov    si, word ptr [esp+10h+var_4]
.text:67881F79      push   edi
.text:67881F7A      lea    ebx, [ebx+0]
.text:67881F80

.text:67881F80 loc_67881F80:             ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+AFj
.text:67881F80      movzx  ax, byte ptr [edx]
```

```
.text:67881F84      mov    edi, [esp+14h+arg_4]
.text:67881F88      add    si, ax
.text:67881F8B      mov    al, [edx+1]
.text:67881F8E      add    edx, 1
.text:67881F91      movsx  ecx, si
.text:67881F94      add    edx, 1
.text:67881F97      test   al, al
.text:67881F99      mov    word ptr [esp+14h+var_4], si
.text:67881F9E      lea    edi, [edi+ecx*4]
.text:67881FA1      jle    short loc_67881FCB
.text:67881FA3      movzx  cx, al
.text:67881FA7      add    si, cx
.text:67881FAA      lea    ebx, [ebx+0]
.text:67881FB0
.text:67881FB0 loc_67881FB0:           ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+77j
.text:67881FB0      mov    cl, [edx]
.text:67881FB2      mov    ebx, [ebp+40h]
.text:67881FB5      movzx  ecx, cl
.text:67881FB8      mov    ecx, [ebx+ecx*4]
.text:67881FBB      mov    [edi], ecx
.text:67881FBD      add    al, 0FFh
.text:67881FBF      add    edx, 1
.text:67881FC2      add    edi, 4
.text:67881FC5      test   al, al
.text:67881FC7      jg    short loc_67881FB0
.text:67881FC9      jmp   short loc_67881FF3
.text:67881FCB ; -----
.text:67881FCB
.text:67881FCB loc_67881FCB:           ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+51j
.text:67881FCB      jge   short loc_67881FF3
.text:67881FCD      mov    cl, [edx]
.text:67881FCF      mov    ebx, [ebp+40h]
.text:67881FD2      movzx  ecx, cl
.text:67881FD5      mov    ebx, [ebx+ecx*4]
.text:67881FD8      neg    al
.text:67881FDA      add    edx, 1
.text:67881FDD      test   al, al
.text:67881FDF      jle   short loc_67881FF3
.text:67881FE1      movzx  esi, al
.text:67881FE4      add    [esp+14h+var_4], esi
.text:67881FE8      mov    ecx, esi
.text:67881FEA      mov    si, word ptr [esp+14h+var_4]
```

```
.text:67881FEF        mov    eax, ebx
.text:67881FF1        rep stosd
.text:67881FF3
.text:67881FF3 loc_67881FF3:           ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+79j
.text:67881FF3          ; sub_67881F50:loc_67881FCBj ...
.text:67881FF3        mov    al, byte ptr [esp+14h+arg_0]
.text:67881FF7        add    al, 0FFh
.text:67881FF9        test   al, al
.text:67881FFB        mov    byte ptr [esp+14h+arg_0], al
.text:67881FFF        jg    loc_67881F80
.text:67882005        pop    edi
.text:67882006        pop    esi
.text:67882007        pop    ebp
.text:67882008        pop    ebx
.text:67882009
.text:67882009 loc_67882009:           ; CODE XREF: sub_67881F50+17j
.text:67882009        mov    eax, edx
.text:6788200B        pop    ecx
.text:6788200C        retn
.text:6788200C sub_67881F50  endp
```

Value of packet counter is stored in AX at address .text:67881F80. Then from address .text:67881FB0 to .text:67881FC7 the values of the packets will be continued until AL is not zero in a loop. From address .text:67881F80 to .text:67881FFF there is a loop that copies all the values of the packets exist in a chunk to the memory. Here because of not checking the number of packets the software can be abused and cause exception.