



ABYSSSEC RESEARCH

1) Advisory information

Title	: Novell Netware NWFTPD RMD/RNFR/DELE Argument Parsing Buffer overflow
Version	: NWFTPD.NLM 5.09.02 (Netware 6.5 – SP8)
Analysis	: http://www.abyssec.com
Vendor	: http://www.Novell.com
Impact	: Critical
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2) Vulnerability Information

Class

1- Stack overflow

Impact

Successfully exploiting this issue allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code in the context of vulnerable application or cause denial-of-service conditions in failed exploitation. For the purpose of the attack, remote attackers need authentication, or anonymous user should be available on the ftp server.

Remotely Exploitable

Yes

Locally Exploitable

Yes

3) Vulnerabilities detail

Stack overflow.

A Buffer overflow attack can be implemented in the way ftp server parse path of file or directories when processing MKD, RNFR, RMD and DELE commands. The vulnerability exists in some kind of parsing function that does not properly check length of strings when using string handling functions `NWLstrncpy` and `NWsprintf`.

The vulnerable function is `sub_9038` and we've found three implement of improper use of `NWLstrncpy` and `NWsprintf`. The function takes the path of file or directory and does special tasks for different format of the path. In such tasks it copy the path string to a fixed length buffer.

```
.bss:00009105      push    62h ; 'b'
.bss:00009107      lea     eax, [edi+0A90h]
.bss:0000910D      push    eax
.bss:0000910E      push    ebp
.bss:0000910F      call   NWLstrncpy
.bss:00009114      add     esp, 0Ch
.bss:00009117      push    esi
.bss:00009118      lea     eax, [edi+0E23h]
.bss:0000911E      push    eax
.bss:0000911F      add     edi, 0E01h
```

The above code shows the first flaw which there is no bound checking before using `NWLstrncpy` and it directly copies string offset `eax` to offset `ebp`. The above code in the patch version is replaced like this:

```
.bss:00009143      push    202h
.bss:00009148      lea     eax, [edi+0E01h]
.bss:0000914E      push    eax
.bss:0000914F      mov     [esp+6C0h+var_18], eax
.bss:00009156      call   NWLmblen
.bss:0000915B      add     esp, 8
.bss:0000915E      push    202h
.bss:00009163      mov     ebx, eax
.bss:00009165      lea     eax, [edi+0E23h]
.bss:0000916B      push    eax
.bss:0000916C      mov     [esp+6C0h+var_1C], eax
.bss:00009173      call   NWLmblen
.bss:00009178      add     esp, 8
.bss:0000917B      push    202h
.bss:00009180      push    esi
```

.bss:00009181	add	ebx, eax
.bss:00009183	call	NWLmbilen
.bss:00009188	add	eax, ebx
.bss:0000918A	add	eax, 4
.bss:0000918D	add	esp, 8
.bss:00009190	cmp	eax, 202h
.bss:00009195	jg	loc_922D
.bss:0000919B	push	62h ; 'b'
.bss:0000919D	add	edi, 0A90h
.bss:000091A3	push	edi
.bss:000091A4	push	ebp
.bss:000091A5	call	NWLstrbcpy
.bss:000091AA	add	esp, 0Ch
.bss:000091AD	push	esi
.bss:000091AE	mov	ebx, [esp+6BCh+var_1C]
.bss:000091B5	push	ebx
.bss:000091B6	mov	esi, [esp+6C0h+var_18]

The above code uses NWLmbilen function to check the length of the string and if the string is not valid bound the conditional jump in address 00009195 changes the execution flow to the code below and the function returns with the return value of 0FFFFFFF2h.

.bss:0000922D	mov	eax, 0FFFFFFF2h
.bss:00009232	add	esp, 6A8h
.bss:00009238	pop	ebp
.bss:00009239	pop	edi
.bss:0000923A	pop	esi
.bss:0000923B	pop	ebx
.bss:0000923C	retn	

There are other flaws in other part of the function which exactly the same. At the address 000092D0 (as you see below) the block does an unconditional jump to 0000912B which in turn there is an improper use of NWsprintf.

.bss:000092D0	push	esi
.bss:000092D1	lea	eax, [edi+0E23h]
.bss:000092D7	push	eax
.bss:000092D8	add	edi, 0E01h
.bss:000092DE	push	edi
.bss:000092DF	push	offset aSSS_4 ; "%s:%s%s"
.bss:000092E4	jmp	loc_912B

Jump to :

.bss:0000912B	lea	eax, [esp+6C0h+var_2A8]
.bss:00009132	push	eax

.bss:00009133	call	NWsprintf
.bss:00009138	add	esp, 14h

In the patched version the function first jump to the code below and check for proper length if it is proper conditional jump is implemented to the NWsprintf block and it banned us from overflowing the stack.

Here is the bound check block:

.bss:0000942B	push	202h
.bss:00009430	lea	ebx, [edi+0E01h]
.bss:00009436	push	ebx
.bss:00009437	call	NWLmblen
.bss:0000943C	mov	[esp+6C0h+var_20], eax
.bss:00009443	add	esp, 8
.bss:00009446	push	202h
.bss:0000944B	add	edi, 0E23h
.bss:00009451	push	edi
.bss:00009452	call	NWLmblen
.bss:00009457	add	esp, 8
.bss:0000945A	mov	edx, [esp+6B8h+var_20]
.bss:00009461	push	202h
.bss:00009466	add	edx, eax
.bss:00009468	push	esi
.bss:00009469	mov	[esp+6C0h+var_20], edx
.bss:00009470	call	NWLmblen
.bss:00009475	add	esp, 8
.bss:00009478	add	eax, [esp+6B8h+var_20]
.bss:0000947F	add	eax, 2
.bss:00009482	cmp	eax, 202h
.bss:00009487	jle	loc_9551
.bss:0000948D	mov	eax, 0FFFFFFF2h
.bss:00009492	add	esp, 6A8h
.bss:00009498	pop	ebp
.bss:00009499	pop	edi
.bss:0000949A	pop	esi
.bss:0000949B	pop	ebx
.bss:0000949C	retn	

The above bound checking block like the last one returns 0FFFFFFF2h when the length is not proper. There is another similar flaw that patched in the same way in our parsing function that we no cover because of similarity.

Now it is time to see what happened when the function return 0FFFFFFF2h error code.

After the program has patched and the buffer overflow omitted when the parse function is called with long buffer it return and error code. The caller function check return value and send a error message to the client.

Here is the way it checks the return value:

```
.bss:00009474      push    ebx
.bss:00009475      push    esi
.bss:00009476      push    edi
.bss:00009477      sub     esp, 818h
.bss:0000947D      mov     ebx, [esp+824h+arg_0]
.bss:00009484      lea     esi, [ebx+61h]
.bss:00009487      mov     al, [ebx+60h]
.bss:0000948A      lea     edi, [ebx+0E01h]
.bss:00009490      mov     [esp+824h+var_10], al
.bss:00009497      mov     ax, [ebx+682h]
.bss:0000949E      push    ebx
.bss:0000949F      mov     [esp+828h+var_14], ax
.bss:000094A7      call    sub_9038
.bss:000094AC      add     esp, 4
.bss:000094AF      test    eax, eax
.bss:000094B1      jnz     short loc_94F2
.bss:000094B3      mov     ah, byte ptr [esp+824h+var_14]
.bss:000094BA      test    ah, 2
.bss:000094BD      jz      short loc_950C
```

It checks if the return code is 0 or not and if it is not 0 jump to loc_94F2. And here is the 000094f2:

```
.bss:000094F2      push    offset aInvalidPath ; "Invalid Path"
.bss:000094F7      push    226h
.bss:000094FC      push    ebx
.bss:000094FD      call    sub_1CE0
.bss:00009502      mov     eax, 0FFFFFFF2h
.bss:00009507      add     esp, 0Ch
.bss:0000950A      jmp     short loc_94E8
```

And the above code is the error message that is sent to the client. The function sub_1CE0 is responsible for sending various text messages to the client and is used in many part of the program and here simply warn the user for invalid path.

Exploitation

There is a proof of concept on the exploit database - <http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/14928/>