



Novell Distributed Print Services Remote Integer Overflow

15-May-2006

Summary

Novell Distributed Print Services (DPS) offers various printing services to networks using an RPC-based protocol between clients and servers. The library that facilitates this communication is present in all Novell products that support DPS and will be referred to as the DPRPC library.

There is a code defect in the variable-length array decoding portion of the DPRPC library. This defect is an integer overflow resulting from the multiplication of array-member count and element size. This multiplication can be abused to cause a small heap allocation and copy an arbitrary number of bytes to an arbitrary memory location. By overwriting specific data structures attackers may reliably execute arbitrary code. Also, since this flaw resides in a basic type exported from shared APIs, there are many vulnerable instances available to attackers.

Impact

These vulnerabilities are present by default in DPS software. Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities results in remote code execution with the full privileges of the DPS-communicating process. By default, the privileges are equivalent to the super-user. Due to certain features in the DPRPC library, exploits that leverage these features can be made reliable. Further, correct network-based detection of this vulnerability requires decoding the full DPS protocol since the vulnerability resides in extensions of a basic type.

Affected software

Novell Netware (All versions)
Novell Open Enterprise Server (All NetWare based versions)
Novell Netware Client for Windows (All versions)

Credit

These vulnerabilities were researched by Ryan Smith and Alex Wheeler.

Contact

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An integer overflow may occur at location 3 when the product of element size and number of elements cannot fit within 32 bits. If an overflow does occur, it will result in a memory allocation of insufficient size.

In sub_5900E770, code using the ndps_xdr_array function is not as judicious as it needs to be with the maximum elements parameter. When decoding this array of variable length structures, an integer overflow will occur in the calculation of the amount of memory required if the element count in the XDR stream is greater than 4EC4EC4.

```

sub_5900E770  proc near          ; CODE XREF: DecodeXDRStr
var_4        = dword ptr -4
arg_0        = dword ptr  4
arg_4        = dword ptr  8

                push     esi
                mov     esi, [esp+4+arg_4]
                push   esi
                push   [esp+8+arg_0]
                call   ndps_xdr_enum
                test    eax, eax
                jnz    short loc_5900E787

loc_5900E783:  ; CODE XREF: sub_5900E770
                xor     eax, eax
                jmp     short loc_5900E7BA

;
loc_5900E787:  ; CODE XREF: sub_5900E770
                mov     eax, [esi]
                sub     eax, 0
                jz     short loc_5900E7AD
                dec     eax
                jnz    short loc_5900E783
                push   offset sub_5900E74C ; #fpDecode
                push   34h                ; ulSzElement
                lea    eax, [esi+4]
                push   0FFFFFFFh         ; ulMaxElements
                add    esi, 8
                push   eax                ; *ulSpecifiedArrayLength
                push   esi                ; *ulCntDecodedElements
                push   [esp+18h+arg_0] ; xdr_stream
                call   ndps_xdr_array
                jmp     short loc_5900E7BA

;
loc_5900E7AD:  ; CODE XREF: sub_5900E770
                add    esi, 4
                push   esi
                push   [esp+8+arg_0]
                call   DecodeXDRStruct_0_2 ; enum,(bytes,byteArr.

loc_5900E7BA:  ; CODE XREF: sub_5900E770
                ; sub_5900E770+3B1j

                pop    esi
sub_5900E770  endp

```



There are many other invocations of the `ndps_xdr_array` decoding function that are susceptible to an integer overflow. The following image is a list of cross-references to the `ndps_xdr_array` function and the parameters of concern. As shown, all 22 invocations of the process importing this library are vulnerable. This list is representative of the vulnerable invocations in only one library that uses the DPRPC library.

Dir...	T	Address	Text
Up	p	decode_array0+16	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 8, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900D9FC+45	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 8, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	decode_array1+16	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 18, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 3C, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900E199+BB	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 3C, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900E29E+45	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 10, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900E770+36	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 34, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900E944+2A	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900E944+48	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900EA98+28	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size C, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size C, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 18, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900F116+43	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 18, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900F1E3+4E	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4C, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900F391+17	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 24, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900F701+41	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 40, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	decode_array2+19	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size A4, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	sub_5900FA7C+A7	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 14, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	decode_array3+19	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 98, max elements FFFFFFFF
Up	p	DecodeXDRStruct_0...	call ndps_xdr_array ; element size 4, max elements FFFFFFFF

Line 19 of 22





Remediation

In order for the calculation to not result in an integer overflow, all callers of this function should pass a value for the maximum number of elements to be less-than or equal-to 0xFFFFFFFF divided by the element size (instead of just 0xFFFFFFFF). Please refer to the following links for information and patches:

Server:

http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC&docType=kc&externalId=9145&sliceId=SAL_Public&dialogID=3455056&stateId=0%20%20%203453353

<http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/searchtid.cgi?/2973700.htm>

Client:

http://www.novell.com/support/search.do?cmd=displayKC&docType=kc&externalId=1076&sliceId=SAL_Public&dialogID=3455056&stateId=0%20%20%203453353

<http://support.novell.com/cgi-bin/search/searchtid.cgi?/2973719.htm>



Timeline of Events

01-May-2006 Vendor notification

04-May-2006 Initial patch for servers

09-May-2006 Initial patch for clients

10-May-2006 Due to miscommunication, vendor released the client patch

15-May-2006 Coordinated disclosure of vulnerability



Attributions

Duck Hunt images were taken from screenshots of a flash application published at <http://www.johnnyslack.com/duckhunt/>.

Code and cross-reference screenshots captured using IDA (<http://www.datarescue.com>).

Flawed code, and patch information obtained from Novell (<http://www.novell.com>).

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